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PREFACE 
U funds do not come for free. European citizens contribute to the EU 
budget through general taxation; thus, the EU and its member states 
compete for the same revenues. Since resources are limited and are 
needed for many essential purposes, there are opportunity costs. It is 
therefore necessary to make choices transparently, to prioritise action and 
to give account for the use of citizens’ money.  
An adequate accountability process for EU funds is not only 
instrumental to good management; it is also a critical condition of 
legitimacy for public authorities. In its conclusions on the budget 
guidelines for 2011, adopted on 16 March 2010, the Ecofin Council 
acknowledged that the EU budget is “one of the most significant tools to 
guarantee the accountability of the European Union towards its citizens 
(…); an accurate and accountable use of the EU resources is one of the 
essential means to reinforce the trust of the European citizens.” 
This study aims to shed light on the thorny question of holding to 
account for EU funds. Starting from the concept of accountability and the 
fundamentals of the EU framework, it examines the existing accountability 
arrangements (by whom and how, for what, to whom) within the role-
sharing between the European Commission and the member states. It 
endeavours to explain the reasons for and the consequences of diffused 
responsibilities and of the resulting accountability gap. Finally, the study 
sketches a possible scenario for the future, with two main characteristics: an 
interpretation of the concept of European added-value based on limited 
and achievable objectives and one single accountability framework. 
 
Gabriele Cipriani 
November 2010 
 
E 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ow, for what and to whom are the European Commission and the 
member states of the European Union to hold accountable for the 
some €120 billion spent each year by the EU budget? What are the 
main factors that lie at the root of the accountability gap? What is a possible 
way out?  
The EU budget accountability gap 
This study asserts that there exists an accountability gap, which can be 
attributed to three main reasons. First, due to opaque revenue 
arrangements, citizens are not directly made aware of the more than €200 
each of them pays on average each year into the EU budget. Therefore 
taxpayers are not induced to attempt to exert democratic control over the 
use of EU funds. Secondly, EU objectives are grand and numerous, with no 
clear or specific expected achievements. Vague expectations are easier to 
report but harder to be held accountable for. Finally, most of the 
management functions are carried out by national bodies that are not 
directly accountable at EU level and over which the Commission has no 
authority, although it is ultimately responsible for the budget’s 
implementation. Responsibilities remain diffused and there is no single 
owner of the EU budget. Ex-post clearance has become for the Commission 
a shortcut for accountability, thus putting the focus on compliance of 
spending rather than on ‘value for money’ requirements. 
The current accountability gap affects the significance of the 
discharge procedure before the European Parliament, through which 
citizens exercise their right of scrutiny.  
A possible way out 
The accountability gap is a symptom of the difficulties that have prompted 
the current EU budget review process. A new concept for the EU budget 
must go hand-in-hand with appropriate institutional reform, setting 
governance and administration of the budget by intentional action, i.e. 
according to well-defined EU objectives. 
The EU budget is one of the 28 EU public budgets and one of the tools 
available to the EU. This means that, as for any EU action in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, the EU budget's aim should be to do 
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things that nobody else can (or will) do with better results. It is about 
achieving objectives of common European interest, which is more than 
simply transferring money across member states. This leads to the concept 
of EU added-value, with three main characteristics: catalytic (making 
something happen that would otherwise not happen or happen more 
slowly), targeted (concentrating on the best added-value and most effective 
results on the basis of evaluation and impact assessment) and realistic 
(drawing from J. Monnet's ‘balance-sheet of needs and resources’). The 
underlying logic is: Why Europe? 
A more selective definition of the EU added-value would imply less 
numerous objectives than at present and more precise (measurable) targets. 
In turn, this would make it possible to concentrate the resources on a 
limited number of spending programmes, thus ensuring a critical mass to 
produce visible results. The EU budget should provide the ‘cake’ rather 
than the ‘icing’. EU funds should be linked to outputs, outcomes and 
impacts rather than to inputs of eligible spending. Performance should be 
rewarded and sunset clauses should provide for a discontinuation of 
spending programmes that fail to show meaningful results after a certain 
period of time. Also, a shift from inputs of eligible spending to results will 
make it possible to define control systems in a broader perspective, taking 
account of ‘value-for-money’ concerns and thus enhancing their added-
value for the management. 
The overall size of the EU budget ought naturally to be determined 
by the sum of the costs of the various objectives assigned. Whereas an 
overall ceiling on EU revenue could still be maintained, the introduction of 
a genuine EU tax should be considered. It would seem logical that the 
effort to make visible the achievements of the EU budget is accompanied 
by a corresponding visibility of the costs incurred.  
Since it is about achieving EU objectives, implementation should 
follow a political mandate given to the European Commission. The budget 
implementation should take place under its full responsibility as the 
‘executive’ of the Union. Like today, role-sharing between the EU and 
national levels seems necessary, but in a different framework. Management 
functions would be delegated to national bodies according to programmes’ 
needs, on the basis of some form of ‘contract’ based upon pre-specified 
outputs and performance targets as well as budgetary allocations. This 
delegation should be made conditional on these bodies passing beforehand 
a ‘stress test’ aimed at establishing their capacity to manage public funds THE EU BUDGET | v 
 
effectively. Partnership with national bodies should involve co-decision for 
management choices. This means putting an end to the dissociation of the 
decision-making aspect from the financial implementation. The 
Commission will therefore take up the role of the ‘programme manager’, 
having both the authority over trustful delegated bodies and the legitimacy 
to put in place the necessary measures to achieve the intended objectives.  
The Commission would ultimately be accountable before the 
European Parliament not just for compliance but also for the extent to 
which the expected results were achieved, the contribution made by 
activities and outputs of the programmes to the outcomes, and the learning 
and change that have resulted. Thus the discharge procedure will be given 
full dignity, providing opportunities for redress and better management.  
 
Overview 
Status quo  Proposal 
Revenue provided by national 
contributions and consequent ‘fair 
return’ logic 
An EU tax, made directly visible to 
citizens 
An overall spending ceiling, to which 
a plurality of spending programmes 
should adjust, with a lack, for most of 
them, of the necessary critical mass to 
produce recognisable results (the 
‘icing’ rather than the ‘cake’) 
An overall spending ceiling as a 
result of a limited number of 
catalytic, targeted and realistic 
spending programmes, with 
sufficient funding to achieve visible 
results (the ‘cake’ rather than the 
‘icing’) 
Spending based on eligible items and 
absorption of funds as an implicit 
target 
Spending made conditional upon 
pre-defined outputs, outcomes and 
impacts, with both performance and 
sunset clauses 
National bodies designated by 
member states 
‘Stress tests’ on designated national 
bodies to be accredited by the 
Commission 
Separation of financial 
implementation (Commission) from 
management decision (member 
states) 
One single management process 
under the Commission’s authority as 
programme manager 
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1. RESPONSIBILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY 
The buck stops here. 
 Attributed to former US President Harry S. Truman 
 
here are many examples of early accounting systems and forms of 
accountability among individuals as well as between them and the 
state, particularly within the ancient cultures of Mesopotamia and 
Egypt. One can find for example in the Code of Hammurabi, thought to be 
the most complete record of ancient law, the formulation of the principle of 
accountability through the example of a builder. If a builder undertakes to 
build a house for some one and, even though it is not yet completed, the 
walls seem to be in danger of toppling down, the builder must make the 
walls solid from his own means.1 
Evidence has been found in ancient civilisation of accounting 
methods comparing expected and actual performance, based on a number 
of detailed entries in the accounts showing a careful division of labour, 
allocation of predetermined work targets, regular reporting on actual 
achievements and the remainder of work to be completed (Carmona & 
Ezzamel, 2005:18).2 There is also evidence of a reward structure taking 
account of the rank of every category of work, hierarchical position or 
responsibility. 
A Biblical statement of accountability can be found in the detailed 
accounting statement of the funds collected for the erection of the Holy 
Sanctuary and of the various materials used for its furnishings and vessels.3 
Referring to the Christian tradition, St. Luke tells the story of a rich man 
who had a steward who was reported to him for squandering his property. 
He summoned him to prepare a full account of his stewardship. Notably, 
the rich man concluded: “No servant can serve two masters. He will either 
hate one and love the other, or be devoted to one and despise the other”.4 
T2 | RESPONSIBILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Accountability: ‘E pluribus unum’ 
Accountability is a key component of good governance. As a basic principle 
of public life, no authority should be exempt from scrutiny or review by 
others and someone has to be held to account for the results. Indeed, 
“[s]ociety has the right to ask a public official for an accounting of his 
administration”.5 Despite differences in legal traditions, constitutional 
structures and governance systems, accountability has emerged over time 
in EU member states (and indeed in constitutional democracies) as one of 
the shared principles for public administration and its relations with 
citizens.6 
Effective accountability arrangements generate a supervision process, 
aiming at improving quality in decision-making and providing the means 
for correction, prosecution and redress (Sigma, 1999:25). Bovens 
(2007:192,193) indicates four reasons for the need of public accountability: 
taxpayers’ democratic control over public policies; integrity of public 
governance against corruption, nepotism and abuse of power; improved 
performance of public funds; and maintained or enhanced legitimacy of 
public governance.  
Accountability is undoubtedly a kind of catch-all term with several 
faces: a good synonym would be “answerability” (Starling, 2008:169; 
Bovens, 2007:185) or responsiveness. van Gerven (2007:1,2) identifies 
different dimensions for accountability (legal, ethical, political and 
financial) and attributes to the concept a double meaning: “accountability 
for” (to be called to account, for example for incorrect behaviour) and 
“accountability to”, that is being obliged to inform someone, for example 
Parliament. This difference could also be described as “giving an account” 
and “holding to account”. 
In public life, “giving an account” basically consists of disclosing 
information in public and providing adequate justifications, but not 
necessarily to face consequences. The matters to account for have chiefly to 
do with how well the principles embedded in administrative law are 
honoured by civil servants and public authorities on the one hand, and on 
the other, about how well the legal procedures for shaping public 
administration decisions are followed (Sigma, 1999:13,19). 
“Holding to account” goes beyond the mere provision of information. 
The concept stems from the expression primarily used in a principal/agent 
context.7 It implies that the policies, decisions or actions are explained, 
motivated and argued before Parliament.8 The more so when decisions are THE EU BUDGET | 3 
 
taken on the basis of discretionary elements. “Holding to account” entails a 
relationship with another entity that has the authority to impose sanctions 
or give rewards. In this respect accountability could be defined as “a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences” 
(Bovens, 2006:9).9  
The difference between “giving account” and “holding to account” 
sheds light on the difference between “responsibility” and “accountability”, 
two words that are often used interchangeably due to some conceptual 
overlap.10 In its essence, “responsibility” refers to holding a specific office 
or duty and it is about working within prescribed tasks, frameworks and 
standards. Accountability is about ensuring that responsibilities are 
actually carried out (one cannot expect rules and requirements to be self-
enforcing!) and that action is taken where they are not. Therefore, 
accountability trumps responsibility. 
A clear identification of responsibilities and a deep sense of it is a 
necessary, though not sufficient condition for accountability. More 
importantly, if “responsibility” can be (and often is) shared, 
“accountability” cannot without the risk of being voided of its inherent 
value, thus creating the conditions for a “no man’s land”. To capture the 
concept of several responsibilities resulting in one single accountability, 
one could refer to the motto “E pluribus unum”, out of many, one.11 
Finally, the accountability process is closely linked with the exercise 
of power and the legitimacy of policies – and those pursuing them 
(Bemelmans-Videc & Lonsdale, 2007:3). It is about taking decisions and as 
such it implies the authority to put in place the necessary measures 
towards the expected targets. Supervision and a sense of ownership 
represent a first condition to make sure that public bodies are performing 
their functions effectively and efficiently (Sigma, 1999:11, 13). 
Accountability implies awareness of what is done, how well it is done, how 
much it costs and who paid for it (Bird & Smart, 2001:16). The concept goes 
hand in hand with transparency (Dyrberg, 2002:83). Two other vital factors 
are rewards and sanctions. 
Accountability and public funds 
Public administration is increasingly expected to manage public funds in 
accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.12 4 | RESPONSIBILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The accountability process is meant to pro-actively enforce these principles, 
by achieving intended results and preventing abuse of public powers and 
mismanagement of public resources (Sigma 1999:22). All naturally, audit 
institutions strive for full accountability. For example, the mission of the 
General Accountability Office (GAO) of the United States government is 
“to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the 
federal government for the benefit of the American people”.13 Concerning 
the EU budget, the European Court of Auditors promotes accountability 
and transparency and assists the European Parliament and Council in 
overseeing its implementation.14 
The Auditor General of Canada has defined accountability as “a 
relationship based on obligations to demonstrate, review, and take 
responsibility for performance, both the results achieved in light of agreed 
expectations and the means used”.15 
The accountability process can be summarised by the activities 
diagrammed in the following figure. 
Figure 1. The accountability process 
 
Source: Auditor General of Canada (2002:8). THE EU BUDGET | 5 
 
The effectiveness of the whole accountability process depends on the 
set-up of this framework and on how those responsible are held to account. 
In particular, a proper accountability framework requires: 
•  a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all parties 
concerned; 
•  expectations that are mutually understood and realistic;  
•  the identification of what information is to be reported by whom to 
whom and when; and, 
•  clarity on how and by whom performance will be reviewed and 
adjustments made.  
This is of the outmost importance when, as a result of numerous 
partnerships involved, the accountability process becomes diffused and it is 
difficult for citizens to identify the ultimate responsibility. 
Holding to account is based on credible reporting and (as a 
prerequisite for) review and adjustment. Conditions for a credible 
reporting requires being able to convincingly demonstrate, through 
external auditors’ assessment of the fairness and reliability of reported 
information: 
•  the extent to which the expected results were achieved;  
•  the contribution made by activities and outputs of the programme to 
the outcomes; 
•  the learning and change that have resulted; and 
•  the soundness and propriety of the means used.  
This means that credible reporting is not possible if expectations are 
unclear, in particular as to how the outputs produced are expected to lead 
to the desired outcomes. Vague expectations are easier to report against but 
harder to be held accountable for. 
Review and adjustment close the accountability loop. They require 
that those responsible for reviewing performance should consider what 
results have been accomplished in the light of expectations and of 
circumstances, recognising both achievements and failures as well as 
putting in place the necessary corrections.  
Finally, there are two key sustaining elements for the accountability 
process. First, openness and transparency. They imply that one can see 
clearly into the government’s activities, particularly regarding 
performance. Second, the effectiveness of the accountability process 6 | RESPONSIBILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
depends very much on promotion and enforcement of public sector values 
and ethics, such as fairness, honesty, probity, integrity and fidelity to the 
public trust.  
The EU ‘fundamentals’ 
The European Union originates from member states’ choice to pool aspects 
of their respective sovereignties, by conferring to the Union powers to act 
independently “to attain objectives they have in common” through the EU 
institutions.16  
The Union’s objectives are far-reaching. It is about promoting peace, 
its values and the well-being of its peoples; to offer EU citizens an area of 
freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers; to establish an 
internal market for the sustainable development of Europe; to promote 
scientific and technological advance; to combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, 
and solidarity among member states; and to establish an economic and 
monetary union. 
These objectives are pursued “by appropriate means commensurate 
with the competences”,17 according to a three-fold ‘steering compass’. First, 
the principle of conferral sets the boundary on the Union’s action “within 
the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein”.18 
Then, concerning the use of these competences, the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality come into play.19 The subsidiarity 
principle, applicable in areas of shared competence with member states, 
requires one to demonstrate that member states cannot sufficiently achieve 
the objectives of the proposed EU action, which can rather, by reason of its 
scale or effects, be better achieved by the Union.20 One of the characteristic 
of EU actions is therefore to be ‘inevitable’ in view of reaching a better 
result. Finally, “the content and form of Union action” should be limited to 
“what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties” (principle of 
proportionality).21 See Box 1. 
The underlying logic is that for every EU action one should be able to 
answer convincingly the question: Why Europe? 
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Box 1. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality  
The principle of subsidiarity requires one to establish that the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states' action 
in the framework of their national constitutional system. The reasons for 
concluding that an EU objective can be better achieved by the Union must be 
substantiated by qualitative or, wherever possible, quantitative indicators. 
Subsidiarity implies weighing up all kind of advantages and disadvantages, 
and finally the exercise of political discretion. It is a dynamic concept, which 
allows EU action to be expanded where circumstances so require, and 
conversely, to be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer justified.  
The principle of proportionality is about the intensity or nature of the 
EU’s action, which shall not go beyond that which is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaty. EU measures should leave as much scope for 
national decision as possible. Consideration should be given to setting 
minimum standards, with freedom for member states to set higher national 
standards. Any decision must favour the least demanding option. This 
means in particular that, in its right of initiative, the Commission must: 
consult widely before proposing legislation; justify that a legislative 
proposal complies with subsidiarity and proportionality; explain whenever 
applicable the reasons for the financing of an EU action in whole or in part 
from the EU budget; and, finally, minimise and make proportionate to the 
objective to be achieved any financial or administrative burden falling upon 
the Union, national governments, local authorities, economic operators and 
citizens.  
 
The European Union is neither a classical international organisation 
nor a state: “[p]eople have frequently stressed the innovative nature and 
the special balance of the Community edifice, which organises not the 
separation but the sharing of powers”.22 Indeed, this edifice is founded on 
the principle of representation of interests, not on the principle of 
separation of powers ‘à la Montesquieu’ (Lenaerts, 1991:12-14).23 
Functions that are exercised at the national level by the government 
are, at EU level, a matter for the EU legislative and the Commission, 
whereas the implementation of policies is largely delegated to national and 
regional administrations. The Union has no administration at individual 
country level and therefore relies on each member state to implement its 
decisions. The EU administration is in fact a chain of national 
administrations (Sigma, 1998:13). 8 | RESPONSIBILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The European Union does not fit within ‘conventional’ governing 
structures and cannot therefore be squeezed into a narrow corset of 
member states’ constitutional law traditions (Harlow, 2002a:172). The EU 
framework is based on a dual legitimacy which “brings together states and 
peoples via a unique form of political integration”,24 in a process of 
governance “without government” organised around a single institutional 
framework.25 The European Union constitutes a new legal order of 
international law the subjects of which comprise not only member states 
but also their nationals.26 This legal order is based on two cornerstones: the 
direct applicability of Union law and its primacy over national law. This 
means, for example, that national administrative authorities should refrain 
from applying national provisions having direct effect that conflict with EU 
law.27 
The institutional balance is ensured by a decision-making triangle 
made up of the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, where “[e]ach institution shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred on it in the Treaties (…).”28 The Treaty of Lisbon has 
further enhanced this ‘trinomial’ system, where effective cooperation 
between the institutions is the key element for success of the Union's 
objectives. Such system is based on the setting of the general political 
directions and priorities by the European Council,29 with the joint exercise 
of legislative and budgetary functions by the European Parliament and the 
Council, on the basis of the Commission's proposals;30 and on the latter’s 
action as the ‘executive’ of the Union.31 
The Council represents national governments, which are 
“democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their 
citizens”.32 It shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise 
legislative and budgetary functions” and “carry out policy-making and 
coordinating functions”.33  
The Treaty of Lisbon provides that “[t]he functioning of the Union 
shall be founded on representative democracy” and that Parliament is the 
institutional place where “[c]itizens are directly represented at Union 
level”.34 It “shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and 
budgetary functions” as well as “functions of political control and 
consultation”.35 
Finally, the Commission “shall promote the general interest of the 
Union”,36 on the basis of its three-fold role. While member states have the 
main duty to ensure the application of Union law, as ‘guardian’ of the THE EU BUDGET | 9 
 
Treaties the Commission has the authority and the responsibility to oversee 
member states’ application of EU law and ensure its effective application.37 
Secondly, the Commission shall execute the budget and manage 
programmes, exercise coordinating, executive and management functions.38 
Not least, the Commission has the monopoly of legislative initiative.39  
The Commission derives its political legitimacy from both the 
European Council and the European Parliament and it is made responsible 
to the latter.40 Its members are “chosen on the ground of their general 
competence and European commitment from persons whose independence 
is beyond doubt”.41 Indeed, the cornerstone of the Commission’s legitimacy 
is the independence from national and partisan interests.42 
The Commission is not the EU’s government43 but a sui generis 
collegial body, with no match elsewhere. It deals with governments and 
institutions, rather than directly with citizens. It has evolved towards a 
specific model departing from the classical definition of administration de 
mission as opposed to an administration de gestion.44 The Commission is a 
combination of both concepts: the scope of its competences is clearly 
delineated and most of its tasks have a technical nature. It lacks executive 
resources and, like for the EU budget, implementation tasks are mostly 
delegated to other structures (above all to national bodies). At the same 
time the Commission has the characteristics of an administration de gestion 
(day-to-day policy management, undefined life span, hierarchical and 
bureaucratic, represents the general interest) (Schön-Quinlivan, 2006:3-5). 
Concluding remarks 
Accountability is an ‘umbrella’ concept that encompasses different 
instruments (supervision and control, legislation, defined objectives and 
performance targets, codes of conduct of public officials). Adequate 
accountability processes require in particular a credible review of both 
expectations and results and an explanation of shortcomings and lessons 
learned. While effective accountability is not without cost, ineffective 
accountability can cost even more in waste, misuse of power and loss of the 
government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the governed.45 
Accountability is not just an ‘icon’ of modern public management; it 
is a critical condition for public authorities. Concerning the EU multi-level 
governance system it requires in particular giving account on the exercise 
of competencies conferred upon it by member states in view of reaching a 
better result than it would have been possible by the national level alone.  
10 | 
 
 
2. THE EU BUDGET: 
 MANY HANDS, MANY EYES 
s a consequence of the European Union’s unique framework, EU 
public finances represent a kind of ‘rare bird’ in all aspects, from 
approval of the EU budget and its financing, through the 
management of its revenue and expenditure, until holding to account for 
its implementation.46 
The EU budget intervenes in a increasing number of policy areas, and 
its effects are deployed practically everywhere in the world. Its 
implementation reflects the EU’s multi-level governance based on the 
decision-making triangle made up of the Council, the Parliament and the 
Commission. As EU actions are guided by the subsidiarity/proportionality 
principles, roles and responsibilities are shared between the EU and 
national levels. 
Why an EU budget? 
As observed by the President of the European Commission, “[t]he 
European Union has many different tools in its toolbox. There is legislation. 
There is political cooperation. There is the persuasive power of 27 member 
states coming together with a common purpose. And there is the EU 
budget”.47  
Yet, what can the EU budget do that member states cannot do for 
themselves? Does the European Union’s role in a given policy area 
necessarily require EU spending? Is more than €120 billion worth EU 
budget needed?  
There is no straightforward answer to these questions. According to 
the criteria of need-for-action (or subsidiarity principle), a policy is 
financed by the EU for the very reason that (and only insofar as) there is an 
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added-value as compared with funding from the national budgets. This 
means that one euro spent at the EU level can offer more than one euro at 
national level.48 Therefore, the EU budget should do things that nobody 
else can (or will) do with better results. It represents an additional 
instrument in the constellation of EU public finances instruments whose 
main stars are the national budgets. 
There are no ‘objective’ criteria for deciding whether a policy fulfils 
the conditions for EU financing, an issue largely debated in the academic 
world.49 In fact, because of the integration between the European states, 
“nearly all policies have a European dimension and a national 
dimension”.50 
The decision to complement EU actions with spending measures is 
finally taken on ‘political’ grounds. In given situations, on the basis of 
different arguments, member states may decide that the ‘European’ level is 
preferable to the national one.51 There could be various reasons: 
•  For agricultural policy, the objective was to create an integrated 
production area supported by a policy of common prices that could 
guarantee an adequate income for the agricultural community, to 
stabilise markets and to ensure the EU’s own food supply at 
reasonable prices. Following the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform in 2003, the CAP is today justified mainly in the name of 
environmental protection and rural development support. Aid is no 
longer strictly linked to production and it has the characteristic of a 
social solidarity scheme subsidising farmers’ revenue.52 
•  Cohesion policy is clearly an exercise in solidarity, complementing 
national actions and integrating into them Union’s priorities. The aim 
is to facilitate economic integration among member states, in 
particular after the accession of the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe.53 The clearest reflection of this principle is additionality.54 At 
the same time it is a ‘Trojan horse’ to improve and modernise public 
administrations, to enhance transparency and to foster good 
governance.55 Similar observations may be made concerning the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and 
the European Fisheries Fund (EFF).  
•  EU-funded research activities, the third main spending area, are 
meant to encourage researchers to cooperate across national 
boundaries and to share complementary skills and knowledge, thus 
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higher quality and excellence in research. It has two main strategic 
objectives: to strengthen the scientific and technological base of 
European industry and to encourage its international 
competitiveness, while promoting research that supports EU policies. 
•  As for aid to non-member countries, EU financial assistance is a form 
of solidarity, namely concerning the economic and development 
assistance to developing countries. In some cases this is finalised to 
facilitate institutional reforms and to put in place adequate 
infrastructure (e.g. for candidate countries for EU membership). 
The EU budget’s financial size is also an issue for debate. In 
particular, it is often observed that the EU budget is too small as it 
corresponds to ‘only’ slightly more than 1% of member states’ combined 
gross domestic product (GDP), while for example the federal budget of the 
United States of America represents the equivalent of some 20% of US GDP 
and that of Canada, some 18%. Comparisons are also made with the 
member states’ budgets, which take up an average of around half of 
national income. A key reference in this context is the MacDougal report 
suggesting, more than 30 years ago, that in order to have a perceptible 
macroeconomic effect on the EU economy as a whole, the minimum 
volume of the EU budget should be 2 to 2.5% of member states’ combined 
GDP.56 
Such comparisons should however take account of the fact that 
today’s EU budget does not in general finance goods and services aimed 
directly at EU citizens.57 Its main role is to contribute to existing national 
policies, for example by providing funds for infrastructure and favouring 
productive investments, training, research and studies. 
There is actually no ‘ideal’ or ‘normal’ size for the EU budget as such. 
Whether or not the EU budget is too small is basically a question that is 
only relevant once the objectives to meet have been set. As the Commission 
has said, “[t]he Union needs to ensure that its institutions continue to act 
effectively, that its policies meet their goals, and that its budget is 
commensurate with its objectives and with its financial resources.”58 
Revenue and Expenditure: Two sides of the same coin 
The essence of the EU budget is largely predetermined by a multi-annual 
‘financial framework’, whose aim is to “ensure that Union expenditure 
develops in an orderly manner and within the limits of its own 
resources”.59 This refers to the concept of ‘budgetary discipline’, whereby THE EU BUDGET | 13 
 
EU spending must respect pre-determined ceilings as a brake to control 
growth of expenditure. See Box 2 for an overview of the EU’s financial 
frameworks dating back to 1988. 
 
Box 2. An overview of the EU’s financial frameworks  
The practice of adopting a multi-annual financial framework started in 1988. 
Four financial frameworks have been adopted: the Delors I (1988-92) and 
Delors II (1993-99) packages, Agenda 2000 (2000-06) and the current 2007-13 
package (Inter-institutional Agreement of 17 May 2006). The financial 
framework determines the ceilings for commitments and payments in line 
with the ceiling on EU revenue. Amounts of expenditure in terms of 
appropriations for commitments should be established for each of the years 
and for each heading or subheading. Overall annual totals of expenditure 
should be also established in terms of both appropriations for commitments 
and appropriations for payments. Each of the absolute amounts set out in 
the financial framework represents an annual ceiling of expenditure under 
the EU budget.  
The current financial framework sets the global level of payment 
appropriations to €820.6 billion (2004 prices), equal to 1.00% of EU gross 
national income (GNI). This amount, although significant in absolute terms, 
represents a relatively low share of public spending (member states’ budgets 
as a whole account for almost 50% of the GNI). The financial framework, 
which was actually not foreseen in either the Treaty or EU legislation, used 
to be set by an Inter-institutional Agreement between the institutions 
involved in the budgetary cycle (the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission). It has now been incorporated into the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union (Art. 312 TFEU). It has to be adopted by 
the Council unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure 
(although the possibility exists for the European Council to authorise its 
adoption by a qualified majority), on a proposal from the Commission, and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. This means a right of 
approval and no genuine power of co-decision (although Parliament had 
previously no control on the multi-annual financial framework). The Treaty 
provides the possibility to reduce the present financial framework’s duration 
from seven to five years in response to the Parliament’s request to align 
future parliamentary terms with the Commission's terms of office. In view of 
its enhanced budgetary powers, the Parliament wanted to avoid being 
bound by a financial framework negotiated and adopted during the 
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The Commission has recently proposed to set the duration of the 
financial framework to 10 years, with a substantial mid-term review (‘5+5’). 
This proposal is seen as an opportunity for a major re-prioritisation, leaving 
open for re-assessment the distribution of resources within headings, and 
the prioritisation within programmes and instruments (see COM (2010) 700, 
19.10.2010, p. 23). 
 
The financial framework is part of a global package where both 
revenue and expenditure are considered “complementary and 
inseparable”.60 It goes hand-in-hand with an agreement setting the burden-
sharing among member states.61 Any change to the multi-annual financial 
framework in fact requires re-opening an intergovernmental negotiation.62  
As the European Union does not enjoy a financial autonomy to fix 
(and to manage) its financial resources, member states decide the amount 
to be put at the disposal of the EU budget as well as the type of resources. 
EU revenue is mostly provided through national contributions funded out 
of general taxation in the member states.63 
Driven by the so-called ‘budgetary balances’,64  which represent the 
accounting illustration that what is revenue for the EU represents 
expenditure for the member states, the EU financing system “has evolved 
piecemeal into a confusing and opaque mix of contributions and rebates”,65 
in a complex arrangement of financial deals on a country-by-country basis. 
The European Parliament has observed that the nature of EU resources and 
the derogation regimes progressively added have made the revenue system 
“more complex, more opaque for citizens and increasingly less equitable 
and have led to a financing system which has resulted in unacceptable 
inequalities between member states”.66 
Indeed, as shown by the following figure, there is not necessarily a 
correlation between member states’ GNI, meant to represent national 
income and therefore member states’ contributive capacity, and their share 
in the EU budget financing. Whereas per capita contributions of well-off 
member states are generally above EU average,67 the picture is quite 
different when comparing countries’ overall contribution as a percent of 
their GNI. One may notice in this case that a number of countries 
contribute above their GNI share (Cyprus, Slovakia, Malta, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Portugal and Greece), while it is the contrary for other member 
states (the Netherlands, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden).  THE EU BUDGET | 15 
 
Figure 2. Contribution to EU budget as a % of GNI and per capita (€) 
               Deviation from EU average (2009) 
 
Sources: European Commission, 2009 budget and annual accounts and Eurostat 
figures. 
Since EU revenue is not perceivable as such to taxpayers, they are 
therefore generally unaware about their individual contribution to the EU 
budget. Thus, as observed by the Commission, comprehension and 
monitoring of the present system on the part of citizens is virtually absent.68 
In this respect, the Commission’s proposal (2004) for a genuine fiscal VAT 
resource reaffirmed the aim of achieving greater accountability on the part 
of the policy actors to the budgetary authority by giving taxpayers/voters a 
clearer view of the cost of Europe.69 This would be in line with the oft-
expressed desire to bring Europe closer to its citizens, so that in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity decisions are taken “as openly as possible 
and as closely as possible to the citizen”.70 
Decentralisation of power to local governments is a factor that may 
favour accountability (Seabright, 1996:85, 86). However, a major separation 
of spending and taxing decisions leads to lack of accountability in the 
public sector (Shah, 2004:38). Accountability may be said to be better 
secured when the funding scheme rests on a well-identified tax resource, 
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conducted in terms of effective tax-prices for the various categories of 
taxpayers, rather than in terms of national net benefits or costs (Begg et al., 
2008:53). Also when (for example, Cohesion policy) mobilisation of EU 
funds requires national co-financing, local levels, not being responsible for 
raising taxes to finance the EU budget, will have less incentive to ensure 
that their spending is efficient. In particular, there is a risk that projects will 
be put forward mainly because funds are made available, on the 
assumption that ‘spending’ is a sufficient condition for achieving growth. 
As Parliament has observed, granting of funding “does not guarantee per 
se that it will be put to good use”.71 
It still remains that the idea of an EU tax, directly perceived on 
citizens, has never found member states’ support; a position confirmed 
recently in the context of the Budget review.72 If there are ‘European’ 
citizens, the taxpayers are still ‘national’. There is one single taxpayer, EU 
and member states compete for the same revenues. 
The opposition to the introduction of an EU tax directly perceived on 
citizens is justified on two main argumentations.73 The first is that the 
allocation of genuine fiscal resources to the EU budget, in place of the 
present national contributions, is perceived as an unnecessary luxury. After 
all, financing the EU budget through national contributions has the 
advantage to provide the agreed resources without major difficulties. A 
second line of argumentation is that an EU tax would create hostility on the 
part of the public and would end up decreasing its support for the process 
of European integration.  
The fear of provoking negative public reactions, however, is 
tantamount to admitting that the policies financed from the EU budget do 
not produce sufficiently convincing results about their added value. But 
then the public’s support for the European cause can only be acquired by 
financing policies that result in identifiable achievements to the advantage 
of the European citizen. This is a precondition for both the acceptance of 
the corresponding taxation and the legitimacy of the EU budget itself.  
Also, as the Commission’s proposal for a VAT resource demonstrates, 
an EU taxation would not imply in itself increasing overall taxation.74 But it 
would have the advantage of reducing the scope for arguments of the ‘fair 
return’ kind, which are the logical consequence of a revenue system based 
on national contributions.  
The true argument against an EU taxation seems rather to be the fear 
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sovereignty, a pill that national chancelleries find hard to swallow. The key 
issue in this regard seems to be how (and by whom) the call rate of this EU 
tax would finally be set and whether the EU institutions will have a direct 
power of control over the taxable persons.75  
Concerning EU expenditure, the multi-annual financial framework 
sets, in a rather inflexible way, the spheres of activity of EU finances and 
the amounts devoted to each spending area.76 Most resources are pre-
allocated on a country basis.77 The EU budget, which must remain within 
the annual upper spending limits established by the financial framework, 
represents in its essence a seventh portion of it.78 
 
Box 3. The EU budget process under the Treaty of Lisbon 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has formally 
established subordination of the EU budget to the multi-annual financial 
framework (see Art. 312(1) TFEU). The process of adoption of the budget 
starts with the establishment, by the Commission, of a draft budget, i.e. an 
overall estimate of revenue and expenditure for the year ahead. This 
document is subsequently submitted to different stages of approval by the 
‘budgetary authorities’, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament. With the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the power-
sharing between the Council and the European Parliament has been re-
balanced and both institutions are put on an equal footing (see Art. 314 
TFEU). Parliament and Council now have to reach a decision together on all 
of the budget. The new procedure, implemented for the first time for the 
2011 financial year, provides for only a single reading of the draft budget by 
each institution. Both the Council and the European Parliament could reject 
the draft budget in the course of the procedure. A Conciliation Committee, 
composed of representatives of the Council and of the European Parliament, 
can be convened with a view to reconciling the positions and reaching 
agreement on a joint text. Once a joint text is agreed upon by the Conciliation 
Committee, the Council and the Parliament can approve or reject it. The 
Parliament may adopt the budget even if the Council rejects the joint text. In 
case both the Council and the Parliament reject the joint draft or fail to 
decide, the Commission has to submit a new draft budget.  
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The use of the appropriations is subject to adoption of a basic act, 
normally an act of the EU legislator.79 EU expenditure generally takes the 
form of a reimbursement of inputs of ‘eligible’ national spending.80 
Although most of the EU funds (some 80%) are spent in agriculture and 
Cohesion policy, there are in total more than 70 spending programmes to 
which the EU contributes via various funds and financial instruments, 
covering a wide range of sectors.81 These programmes normally contribute 
to similar programmes financed from national budgets.82  
Many hands, many eyes 
Under the EU’s institutional power-sharing, it is the Commission that will 
“execute the budget and manage programmes”, and this “on its own 
responsibility”.83 This competence is framed by a number of conditions. 
First, the Commission implements the budget “in cooperation with the 
Member States”.84 Second, this should be done in accordance with the 
Financial Regulation85 (and other sectoral legislation), with the ultimate aim 
of ensuring compliance of EU spending with established rules. Third, the 
implementation should respect the ceilings set by the multi-annual 
financial framework. Finally, and not least, the budget must be 
implemented “having regard to the principles of sound financial 
management”. And in this respect member states shall cooperate with the 
Commission. 
The use of Union competences has a two-fold dimension: ‘what’ the 
EU should be doing, and ‘how’ this should be done.86 In particular, the 
principle of proportionality requires EU interventions to be proportionate 
in all aspects to the objectives that can be better achieved at EU level, thus 
t o  b e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  w h a t  i s  u n a v o i d a ble to reach a given objective. As a 
result, EU spending programmes may be implemented through several 
management modes, which are very different in nature and imply a 
variable intensity of EU intervention. This concerns in particular the degree 
of decision by the Commission in granting the funds and its direct control 
at the level of the funds’ beneficiaries. 
Which management method applies to which policy is a matter for 
the EU legislative authority to decide upon; and it would be quite unusual 
for the Commission to oppose a stance backed by all member states. The 
Commission can implement the EU budget on a centralised basis.87 Or, 
jointly with international organisations.88 But more than 80% of the EU 
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management arrangements, i.e. through a multi-level governance involving 
national or third-country governments (at central and/or regional/local 
level).89  
The implementation of the budget in ‘shared-management’ 
arrangements has three main characteristics: 
•  There is a two-tier system, a ‘co-administration’ based on 
partnership. Following delegation by the EU legislator, the 
Commission and member states are assigned different, although 
complementary, roles.90 The financial implementation (Commission) 
is dissociated from the main decision-taking aspect (member states). 
Both delegated competences are put on an equal footing, i.e. there is 
no hierarchical primacy of the Commission over national bodies.91 
Also, the incumbency for the national level is a direct responsibility of 
member states themselves, not of their bodies. The setting-up of 
national management and control systems according to EU 
requirements as well as their operation is therefore in the end a 
member state internal issue.92  
•  Member states have primary responsibility for day-to-day 
management and control of EU expenditure. In particular, national 
bodies implement all the main management and control functions. 
They initiate and process the files for EU financial support; for 
example, they validate the claims of farmers entitled to receive EU 
agriculture support and enjoy broad discretion in selecting the 
beneficiaries and drawing up the programmes to be financed under 
the Cohesion policy. Also, national bodies execute the payments to 
the beneficiaries. In this respect, they must satisfy themselves that 
actions financed from the budget are actually carried out and ensure 
that they are implemented correctly.93  
•  The Commission’s role consists essentially of putting in place the 
practical conditions for implementing measures the substance of 
which is predetermined by the multi-annual financial framework and 
the subsequent legislative acts adopted on that basis.94 This means 
that the EU may well have a ‘shared competence’ in terms of policy, 
without necessarily having a corresponding competence in terms of 
its implementation.95 For example, for Cohesion policy, the 
Commission is only informed of the largest projects proposed and it 
is not expected to micro-manage the implementation of the 
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field of the operations funded, the Commission commits and 
validates the appropriations without normally having a genuine 
control on the operations on the ground. This also explains why it is 
not in a position to know how effective national systems are in using 
EU money.  
 
Box 4. Systems assessment 
An assessment by the Commission of the strengths and weaknesses of 
individual member state's national systems for the administration and 
control of EU funds is a longstanding request by Parliament (most recently, 
see Resolution of 5 May 2010, with observations forming an integral part of 
its Decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the European 
Union general budget for the financial year 2008, Section III – Commission 
and executive agencies, point 135). One may notice that in the previous 
programming period (2000-06), in the event of ‘shared management’, and in 
accordance with the rules of sound financial management, the Commission 
was meant to first carry out document and on-the-spot checks into the 
existence, relevance and proper operation within the entities to which it 
entrusts implementation. This referred to the procedures applied, to control 
and accounting systems and to procurement and grant award procedures. 
The Commission had also the obligation to review such arrangements as 
necessary whenever there were substantial changes to procedures or 
systems in order to ensure continued compliance. This provision is no 
longer applicable since April 2007. Such basic ex-ante assurance is presently 
required in the sole case of indirect centralised management (delegation to 
executive agencies) and decentralised management (delegation to third 
country, national or international public-sector bodies).  
Instead, as an implicit confirmation of member states’ exclusive 
competence in putting in place the institutional arrangements for bodies in 
charge of implementing the EU budget, there are now far less ambitious 
measures limited to promoting best practices. Following a recent proposal 
of recasting the Financial Regulation, member states’ systems would be 
exempted from an ‘ex-ante assessment’ by the Commission, although sector-
specific rules may provide for it a role in the accreditation process of 
national bodies (see COM (2010) 260, op. cit., Art. 53a(3) of the proposal, p. 
73). 
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While under shared management arrangements, implementation is 
delegated by the basic legal act to both Commission and member states, 
decentralised management implies a delegation by the Commission to third 
countries whose administration is entrusted with implementation tasks 
(namely contracting). This management mode is based on an international 
agreement (often supplemented by memoranda of understanding) between 
the Commission and the third country concerned.96 
The situation is rather different for other spending programmes, 
under the Commission’s ‘direct management’. For example for Research 
there are no fixed national or regional allocations. To bid for EU funds, 
potential beneficiaries respond to calls for project proposals (see Box 5 on 
research spending).97 The Commission has therefore a direct contractual 
and control relationship to the beneficiary. Unlike in ‘shared management’, 
it performs in particular all the key control functions, where necessary 
engaging experts or contractors to carry out control or evaluation tasks on 
its behalf. 
Being the ‘executive’ of the Union, the Commission’s competences 
stem from a delegation by the EU legislator. Like in many countries, 
delegation from the legislator to an executive body of detailed rule-making 
and individual decision-taking is made subject to some form of supervision 
or control. This enables in particular the legislator to avoid excessively 
detailed basic acts, thus favouring flexibility and adapting to different 
realities on the ground. 
In the EU context, a system for delegating implementing powers to 
the Commission has been in place since the 1960s. This system, known as 
‘comitology’, consists of overseeing the exercise by the Commission of its 
implementing powers through the scrutiny of committees composed of 
member state representatives (the ‘members’ of a committee are the 
member states, not the individual persons) and chaired by the Commission. 
The idea was for member states to retain control over sovereign 
prerogatives transferred to the EU through their joint implementation.98 
In practically all fields of EU intervention, committees must be 
consulted by the Commission on envisaged measures before it can adopt 
them. These measures may concern draft legislative acts, single decisions in 
s p e c i f i c  c a s e s  o r  a p p r o v a l  o f  E U  funds in the framework of spending 
programmes. Committees apply different procedures (and voting rules). 
The choice depends on the content and scope of the implementing powers 
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by the committee to a Commission’s decision proposal means conditioning 
the decision-making to differing degrees, and can go as far as blocking the 
proposed measure. In practice, however, the Commission’s proposals meet 
with a high level of consensus beforehand.99 
The role of member states’ representatives in the committees is 
understandably also to promote their country’s expectations of getting a 
fair return in terms of funds allocation. This is why comitology has been 
criticised for representing de facto another way of transferring responsibility 
away from those who are supposed to be held accountable, being, at times, 
a forum for ‘dividing up the spoils’ of EU expenditure among member 
states.100 
The Commission has pointed out in the past that the intervention of a 
management committee is likely to encroach on its exclusive responsibility 
as regards budgetary implementation and interferes at the same time with 
the European Parliament supervisory powers with respect to the 
implementation of the budget.101 As a pre-condition for making the EU 
system more open and accountable to all European citizens, the 
Commission has considered that it should be “clearer who is responsible 
for policy execution”.102 It has thus advocated the down-grading of 
committees to an advisory role, the Commission thus remaining the body 
fully responsible for the decision on implementation measures, so that 
“[t]he Commission's responsibility for European-level implementation of 
decisions taken by the legislator w o u l d  t h u s  b e c o m e  c l e a r  a n d  
unambiguous for the people of Europe.”103  
The Treaty of Lisbon has retained a reference to mechanisms for 
control by member states of the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers. Its entering into force will entail substantial modifications of the 
comitology procedures and would require the setting up of a new legal 
framework for the comitology system.104 Also, the Treaty has extended the 
ordinary legislative procedure to most EU competences, thus making co-
legislation between Council and Parliament the rule. Yet, if ‘comitology’ is 
meant to provide an opportunity for the EU legislator to be associated in 
the policy implementation, the present committees consist only of member 
states representatives. The European Parliament has no formal role in the 
process, though it is kept informed and can give its views. This opens a 
possible tension between the absence of Parliament from the committees 
and its increased role in the legislative process. 
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Box 5. Research spending, an example of the ‘comitology’ model 
Research funding (over €50 billion for the 7th Framework Programme for 
Research, Technological Development and Demonstration activities for 2007-
13) is based on a Multi-Annual Framework Programme, adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council. The two institutions decide upon the 
overall allocation of funds and research objectives, the funding schemes and 
its instruments as well as the basic rules for running the research 
programmes (Rules for participation). Detailed funding and research themes 
are contained in specific programmes for research, adopted by the Council 
after consultation with the European Parliament. Finally, these programmes 
are further detailed into work programmes, adopted and implemented under 
the Commission’s responsibility. Work programmes define in particular the 
funding schemes to be used, the content of the calls for proposals inviting 
candidates to submit a proposal as well as the evaluation and selection 
criteria to be applied to these proposals. 
There are four programme committees under the 7th Framework 
Programme, one for each of the specific programmes. Programme 
committees, formed of member states’ representatives, use most frequently 
the ‘management procedure’ and intervene at different stages. The 
Commission should obtain the Committee’s agreement before adopting the 
work programmes. Then, at the issue of calls for proposals, the programme 
committee examines the list of projects approved by the Commission 
(normally in line with the experts’ advice) and the list of projects rejected. 
The committee gives a formal opinion on funding of actions above a certain 
threshold. On this basis, a grant agreement is signed by the Commission. 
The Committee, which is regularly informed about the progress of each 
specific programme, is also consulted if the Commission wishes to change 
the indicative funding breakdown for the different specific programmes 
research themes.  
The European Parliament is kept informed by the Commission of 
committee proceedings on a regular basis.  
Concluding remarks  
The size of the EU budget ought naturally to be determined by the sum of 
the costs of the various policies assigned to the EU. Whether a given policy 
requires EU spending (or non-budgetary measures only) depends on an 
assessment of its added value compared to national spending.  24 | THE EU BUDGET: MANY HANDS, MANY EYES 
 
The volume of the EU budget is such that it seems no longer possible 
to avoid increasing awareness on the part of the public as to the cost of the 
policies funded. This is key to ensuring the necessary accountability of the 
management actors, compromised by the current opaqueness of the EU 
budget financing. As has been observed, an “examination of the funding of 
the Union is also part of the debate on the legitimacy of the Union’s 
action”.105 
Although ultimately a responsibility of the Commission, 
implementation of the EU budget is the work of many ‘hands’ and many 
‘eyes’. The main management decisions are normally taken elsewhere than 
in Brussels. A plurality of actors, EU institutions but also (and not least) the 
27 member states are involved in various forms. The Commission finds 
itself at the centre of a constellation of multiple and, eventually, conflicting 
interests. This presents the unique challenge for the Commission to 
promote the general interest as the ‘executive’ of the Union, on the basis of 
its three-fold role of ‘guardian’ of the Treaties, responsible agent for budget 
implementation and the holder of legislative initiative.  
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3. THE EU BUDGET & ACCOUNTABILITY 
his chapter deals with the different dimensions of accountability for 
the EU budget (by whom and how, for what and to whom). It 
examines the scope of the Commission’s ‘ultimate’ responsibility for 
the budgetary implementation and the different implications of the 
distinctive arrangements in place. 
This refers in particular to ‘shared management’, which is the EU 
budget’s main management mode, involving a high number of national 
bodies and a considerable remoteness from the EU funding source of the 
several millions of beneficiaries.106 
Accountability: By whom and how? 
As recalled earlier, the Treaty has entrusted the Commission with the 
ultimate responsibility for implementation of the EU budget, regardless of 
whichever entity is responsible for all or part of this implementation.107 The 
extent of such responsibility is not lessened by the fact that the choice of the 
mode of the EU budget implementation is outside the Commission’s remit 
(and it can therefore not repeal it), or that for a significant part of the EU 
budget there is a separation between financial implementation on the one 
hand and management functions on the other (‘shared management’), with 
the involvement of member states’ bodies.108  
Indeed, management may be shared but the Commission’s ultimate 
responsibility cannot, even with a national administration. As it recognised 
itself, “[w]hatever methods are used and whatever assurance mechanisms 
are pursued, there will always be an obligation on the Commission to 
ensure that control mechanisms are adequate to discharge its overall 
responsibility for the implementation of the budget”.109 
T26 | THE EU BUDGET & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
A complex control system 
Due to its remoteness from the field, ‘shared’ management is undoubtedly 
the most challenging management mode for the Commission. Control of 
the implementation of these arrangements is a complex issue. As illustrated 
by the following figure, this is spread over several layers, involving not just 
EU institutions but also member states’ implementing bodies and external 
audit institutions. This process is designed to provide to the Council and 
the European Parliament (EU budget authorities), but also to national 
parliaments, the basic elements for their oversight. 
Figure 3. Overview of internal control and external audit of the EU budget 
(‘shared management’) 
 
Source: European Court of Auditors, Opinion No. 2/2004 on the ‘single audit’ model. THE EU BUDGET | 27 
 
As a translation into practice of the principles of partnership and 
common interest between all actors involved in ‘shared management’ 
arrangements, and to improve budgetary control mechanisms, Parliament 
put forward the concept of a ‘single audit’ chain of control procedures. The 
intention was to maximise the impact of controls on compliance of EU 
expenditure by streamlining member states’ and Commission checks 
through their integration. 
 
Box 6. The ‘single audit’ 
The concept of ‘single audit’ has been promoted by the European 
Parliament, following concerns that “the control and audit activities in 
relation to the EU budget are characterised by a large number of auditors 
and audit services, each carrying out visits and drawing up reports almost 
independently but often on the basis of different standards”. Parliament 
expressed the wish to examine “the feasibility of introducing a single audit 
model in relation to the EU budget in which each level of control builds on 
the preceding one, with a view to reducing the burden on the auditee and 
enhancing the quality of audit activities, but without undermining the 
independence of the audit bodies concerned” (see European Parliament 
resolution of 10 April 2002 containing the comments which form an integral 
part of the decision concerning discharge in respect of the implementation of 
the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2000 
(Commission), para. 48).  
In its opinion on the ‘single audit’ model the Court of Auditors 
stressed that the EU internal control framework should be based around a 
logical chain structure where controls are undertaken, recorded and 
reported to a common standard, allowing reliance to be placed on them by 
all participants. Internal controls should provide reasonable assurance on the 
legality and regularity of transactions, and compliance with the principles of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Controls should be coordinated to 
avoid unnecessary duplication. The ‘owner’ of the checks should be the 
European Union, not the individual control organisations (see European 
Court of Auditors, opinion No 2/2004 on the ‘single audit’ model (and a 
proposal for a Community internal control framework) - OJ C 107, 30.4.2004, 
p. 1).  
 
It is no accident that Parliament’s initiative followed closely the 
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mismanagement with a consequent lack of confidence in the Commission’s 
ability to implement the EU budget properly.110 Therefore, the implication 
that increased control requirements at all levels and tightened procedures 
were needed to restore public confidence in the management of the EU 
budget.  
The underlying idea of the ‘single audit’ is a multi-level internal 
control framework, “integrated on the basis of clearly defined 
responsibilities for the various actors, established standards for the work 
required, and reporting systems and feedback mechanisms.”111 
The ‘single audit’ model has three main characteristics: 
•  There is one single control chain, starting from member states’ bodies 
a n d  e n d i n g  u p  i n  t h e  C o m m i ssion. Mirroring the ‘shared 
management’ concept of partnership, each actor is supposed to rely 
on the previous one, so as to build up assurance at each stage and 
avoid unnecessary duplications and burden, in particular on 
beneficiaries. Subject to the effective functioning of the national 
control systems, the Commission can therefore abstain from 
controlling directly an infinity of beneficiaries with a corresponding 
immeasurable control effort.  
•  National bodies are primarily responsible for preventing, detecting 
and correcting ineligible expenditure. They represent a ‘forefront’ 
defence against irregular spending, based on an administrative 
structure set up according to EU rules. This provides in particular for 
an effective and efficient internal control system, a segregation of 
duties between different functions and an obligation for national 
bodies to inspect directly samples of expenditure claims and to 
recover irregular funding.112 To mitigate the risk of failures in 
national systems and to ensure that they are operating as required, 
the Commission exercises a supervisory role over member states 
management and control systems. This is based on reporting by 
national bodies and on its own controls, including at beneficiary 
level.  
•  In line with the nature of EU spending, the system is fundamentally 
‘compliance’-oriented, as its aim i s  t o  s e c u r e  c o n f o r m i t y  o f  E U  
spending with a set of rules defining the ‘eligibility’ of inputs of 
national spending (as opposed to disbursements based on a set of 
concrete objectives and linked to the achievement of results). The THE EU BUDGET | 29 
 
focus is on the correct application of the financial, contractual and 
legislative rules. 
The detail of controls and reporting functions at national level for 
Agriculture and Cohesion policy are reported in the Annex. One may 
notice the conceptual similarities of the two frameworks. Throughout the 
implementation period, the system entails far-reaching control and 
reporting obligations at national level about the management, monitoring 
and day-to-day financial control of the expenditure. There are three 
different control levels, independent of one another, and corresponding to 
three bodies operating on the basis of agreed control standards. There are, 
in particular, ‘primary level controls’ (to check compliance of final 
beneficiaries with their regulatory obligations) and ‘secondary level 
controls’ (checking the effectiveness of the primary level controls). Last, but 
not least, full compliance with established rules (European and national 
ones) of reimbursement claims presented to the Commission should be 
certified by a national body functionally independent of the spending 
agency. This is an essential element for the Commission to obtain assurance 
before proceeding to EU disbursements.  
As an example, Figure 4 shows the assurance model for Cohesion 
policy, based on three building blocks, at both EU and national level, in the 
aim of preventing, detecting and correcting ineligible expenditure. The 
starting point is the set-up by member states, at the beginning of the 
programming period, of dedicated management and control systems. A 
pre-condition for EU disbursements is the Commission’s assessment of 
their compliance with the required standards.  
The Commission’s supervisory function during implementation is 
based on an audit strategy over a period of years, building on the 
information provided by member states as mentioned in Figure 4. The 
intention is to principally rely on the work of the national audit authorities, 
in line with the single audit model. The Commission’s role is also to 
provide guidance to member states and spread good practices among 
national bodies. 
In case of failure of the ‘forefront’ line at member state level, the 
Commission has a number of means. Should its influence and persuasive 
powers not have the desired effect, there is the possibility to interrupt 
and/or suspend payments, up to cancellation of EU grants by disallowing 
the reimbursement of ineligible national expenditure.113 In particular, at the 
end of the programming period, the Commission checks the closure 30 | T
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financing part or in similar projects totally funded by national funds.118 The 
fact, for example, that a large part of the irregularities for Cohesion policies 
is attributable to infringements of procurement procedures reveals a failure 
to accomplish a long-standing objective of the EU internal market.119 At the 
same time, this shows margins of improvement to ensure that EU activities 
are pursued at the best price. 
The overall level of irregular EU payments shows a tendency towards 
reduction, but it remains high in significant areas of expenditure.120 
Although improvements are expected as a result of rules simplification and 
potentially enhanced systems introduced for the 2007-13 programming 
period, irregularities and related financial amounts reported by member 
states in 2009 have been increasing steadily for agriculture and Cohesion 
policy.121 
If the idea of a ‘single audit’ system in ‘shared management’ 
arrangements is rather straightforward, its implementation proves to be far 
from an easy task. One of the main difficulties for applying one single 
system to a plurality of national bodies and to different spending 
typologies is to maintain comparable levels of application of rules. 
Therefore, the long chain of functions, duties and actors from member 
states to Brussels required legislating in great detail about who does what 
and how. As the Commission pointed out, “[t]he framework must be 
defined in sufficient detail to permit all participants in the control chain to 
identify and fully execute their role and to specify under which conditions 
assurances from the work of other management and control entities can be 
obtained”.122 Also, as EU spending is based on items of eligible spending, 
EU reimbursements were to be referred to a definite and commonly 
accepted legal standard: the ‘eligibility rules’, stemming from EU and 
national legislation.123 
This EU ‘regulatory zeal’ was also meant to compensate for the 
Commission’s remoteness from the ground field and its lack of legislative 
authority over national bodies, on the implicit assumption that the mutual 
trust between EU and the national level at the basis of ‘shared 
management’ should be sustained by a number of prescriptions and 
interdictions. 
During the last ten years, systems’ financial requirements and control 
procedures were repeatedly refined through successive legislative reforms. 
In turn, member states have often extended the scope of EU legislation by 
adding their own standards to EU requirements. This ‘over-32 | THE EU BUDGET & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
implementation’ has resulted in a complex and tightly-woven set of legal 
and procedural requirements, increasingly felt as having developed 
towards a legislative labyrinth.124 
Similarly to what economic theory suggests about tax burden, which 
becomes counterproductive beyond a certain point because excessively 
high tax rates discourage economic activity (and thus cause a decrease in 
tax revenues), too many legislative requirements may make the system 
ineffective. It is a source of potential misinterpretation, with a consequent 
high risk of rules-breaching above all by beneficiaries. This can therefore 
result in erroneous financial claims that need to be corrected, involving 
time-consuming procedures and end up in unnecessary administrative 
burdens at institutional and beneficiary levels. Also, over-legislation 
constitutes the humus for rule-obsessed bureaucracies and may thus deflect 
managers from content issues. Not least, it may deter potential applicants 
from seeking EU funds.125 
A multiplicity of actors, over-legislation and over-auditing go hand-
in-hand. The control system for EU spending, summarised by Figure 3, 
generates a significant number of controls (an ‘audit explosion’, Bachtler & 
Mendez, 2010), 126 with a consequent significant cost. The need of striking a 
reasonable balance between the administrative costs of control and the risk 
of reimbursing irregular expenditure has led to the concept of ‘tolerable 
risk of error’. This is a recognition of how unrealistic it is to strive for a 
‘zero irregularity’ system, due to the disproportionate cost of controls. 
Box 7. The cost of controls 
According to the Commission’s estimates, the cost of controls for national 
bodies can account for 3% of yearly expenditure in entitlement-based 
schemes (like the payment of direct aids to farmers), up to more than the 
double (7%) for programmes, like Rural development, whose aim is to 
implement projects based on delivery of a defined output. This translates the 
fundamental differences between the two policies, the first based on the 
payment of an entitlement to farmers, the second on the implementation of 
projects aiming at improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and 
forestry sector, the environment and the countryside and the quality of life 
in rural areas and encouraging diversification of the rural economy. Reliable 
data are not yet available concerning the Cohesion policy, but given the 
similarities between the two policies, one may estimate that the cost of 
controls in this policy area should be proportionally as high as for Rural 
development.  THE EU BUDGET | 33 
 
At the Commission’s level, the estimate is that at least 10% of the some 
26,000 Commission staff is engaged in activities like financial management 
and accounting, internal control, anti-fraud, risk management and on-the-
spot audits in member states and third countries.  
One should also consider the cost for business entailed by 
administrative requirements and controls. According to a study undertaken 
at the request of the Commission, the total administrative costs/burdens for 
the Cohesion policy amount to more than €900 million. Most of this cost 
(almost two-thirds) is due to the obligation for final beneficiaries to submit 
information to the management authorities in order to draft the annual 
and/or final implementation report. Information obligations arising from 
the financial controls on the final beneficiaries on behalf of the member state 
authorities also give rise to a considerable share (14%) of the total 
administrative burdens (see Opinion of the High Level Group of 
Independent Stakeholders on Administrative Burdens, Cohesion policy 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better-regulation/files/ 
hlg_opinion_070709_cohesion_en.pdf). 
As observed by the Court of Auditors in its opinion on the “single 
audit” model, any control system is a trade-off between the cost of operating 
the defined intensity of checks on the one hand, and the benefit these 
procedures bring on the other. The Court thus suggested setting the 
intensity of controls in the light of overall economic and political benefits. 
The Commission has recently proposed to insert in the Financial Regulation 
the notion of ‘tolerable risk’, to be decided by the Legislative Authority for 
each policy area, taking into account the costs of control, the risk or error and 
the benefits of the policy (see COM (2010) 260, op. cit., Art. 28b of the 
proposal, pp. 58-59). 
 
While ten years ago the priority was to ‘tighten the bolts’, there is 
now a broad consensus that legislation may have gone too far and that 
there is a need for ‘simplification’. This concerns not just the EU budget but 
EU legislation as a whole.127 Indeed, simplification of rules may have the 
effect of reducing both administrative burdens and ‘venial’ irregularities. In 
this respect, a number of actions have been taken in recent times.128 It 
remains, however, that simplification cannot be an end in itself and that 
there are limits to what one can expect from simplification measures in a 
multi-level system. Indeed, “a certain degree of complexity in rules and 
eligibility criteria is unavoidable as these are often fixed in order to achieve 
desired policy objectives, and are the outcome of a complex legislative 34 | THE EU BUDGET & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
procedure.”129 The more numerous are the actors, the more their roles and 
responsibilities need to be set by legislation, especially if they stem from 
different institutional contexts. An EU delivery system, based on a long 
chain of actors and items of eligible spending, cannot be a ‘simplistic’ one.  
The need to strive for a ‘sustainable’ simplification, one that does not 
jeopardise the proper use of public funds, seems to be a recognised goal. 
For example, Parliament has recently asked the Commission to “continue 
its reflection on how to reshuffle the complex system of rules and 
requirements (…), without departing from the key principle of sound 
financial management”.130 The Council has drawn attention “to the 
necessity to maintain an appropriate balance between simplifying 
eligibility rules and targeting expenditure towards intended objectives, 
while not undermining the level of assurance provided by thorough 
controls.”131 The Court of Auditors has observed that “care is needed to 
ensure that due attention is also paid to the likely effects on the quality of 
spending of introducing simplification primarily aimed at reducing the 
level of irregularity.”132 
Diffused responsibilities  
The tailoring of tasks between the EU and national level in ‘shared 
management’ has been the basis on which the Commission has long 
advocated an accountability framework in line with the equation ‘shared 
management’ = ‘shared responsibilities’, with two distinct lines of 
accountability, according to each party’s management role. The intended 
aim of the Commission is to reduce its overall Treaty responsibility to its 
direct tasks, through the secondary legislation. This stance sounds like an 
implicit confirmation of the challenge of ensuring adequate 
implementation and enforcement of a policy delegated to other levels of 
government having a primary management responsibility. And in 
particular of the inherent difficulties to assess and endorse the considerable 
amount of information (reports, certifications) provided by national bodies. 
Once again, the Commission is not the EU government, but rather a 
‘task-oriented administration’. In ‘shared management’, EU rules leave 
financial implementation mainly to the Commission and link its ultimate 
responsibility to the application of financially corrective mechanisms.133 
Thus the Commission tends to focus its attention (and therefore its account-
giving) on the ex-post clearance against the benchmark of the eligibility 
rules.  THE EU BUDGET | 35 
 
Box 8. Sharing of responsibilities between the Commission and member states 
Breaking down the responsibilities between Commission and member states 
in the EU budget implementation was part of a process initiated for 
agriculture spending and extended progressively to Cohesion policy, in 
particular since the ‘Agenda 2000’ reform package. The process has 
continued during the 2000-06 programming period, leading the Commission 
to progressively concentrate on programming strategy, compliance with EU 
policies, monitoring and control of implementation and evaluation of 
results, while national authorities assumed the responsibility for the 
implementation of the measures. Convinced that the provisions on 
accountability and sharing of responsibility with member states were not 
satisfactory, the Commission expressed the intention “to clarify with the 
Council its share of responsibility in meeting the objectives established for 
the shared management of the Structural Funds” as well as “to make 
proposals in order to align its monitoring and control powers to its 
responsibilities” (see  European Commission, Synthesis of the Annual 
Activity Reports and declarations of the Directors-General and Heads of 
Service, COM (2002) 426, 24.7.2002, p. 10 and 30).  
It is in this context that the Commission proposed to the European 
Convention, although unsuccessfully, to formalise in the Treaty the 
separation of responsibilities with the member states in “shared 
management” (see note 84). Along the same lines, one of the main goals of 
the regulatory instruments for Structural policies in the current 2007-13 
programming period was meant to “clearly delimit…the framework, the 
nature, and the division of responsibility between the different actors 
concerned by the execution of the Community budget” (see European 
Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European 
Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund, COM(2004) 492, 14 July 2004, para. 5.3). 
The move towards increasingly transferring responsibilities to member 
states is confirmed by the Commission in its conclusions of the Budget 
review. The Commission envisages basing future EU reimbursements in 
‘shared management’ on the declaration of payments by member states 
rather than on expenditure by beneficiaries (see COM (2010) 700, op. cit. p. 
24). The key assumption, probably conditioned by the wish to obtain a 
“clean” statement of expenditure from the Court of Auditors, is the “de-
coupling” of compliance of EU reimbursements to member states from 
legality and regularity of the expenditure on the ground.  
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Yet, if EU rules have passed to member states the substantive 
management decision power for which they have accepted primary 
responsibility, member states have not for all that accepted a dual 
accountability process making them directly accountable at EU level on the 
use of the funds they manage. Whenever this has been suggested, member 
states have opposed such a stance, even for policies where the EU budget 
supports the full cost of the spending programmes (e.g. payments to 
farmers). In this respect, national bodies’ reporting and certification 
obligations represent nothing more than the fulfilment of a conditio sine qua 
non for EU reimbursements to take place. This reporting does not represent 
a disguised form of account-giving following the principal/agent 
concept.134 
Member states tend to take the view that they only have control and 
reporting obligations towards the EU. As the Treaty says, governments are 
“democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their 
citizens”.135 So, they are not accountable at EU level, but neither are they 
often held accountable by their national parliaments for their shared 
responsibility for implementing the EU budget.136 The key features of the 
system (financial agreement based on pre-agreed revenue and expenditure) 
tend to divest them of rendering an account. Absolved of collective 
responsibility, member states look the other way (Bachtler & Mendez, 
2010:20). 
The surge of ‘dissecting’ different functions has touched the 
Commission itself, leading to a further tailoring of responsibilities between 
Commissioners and their services. This is an outcome of the institutional 
crisis of the late 1990s and of the subsequent administrative reform. Since 
then Commissioners no longer perform tasks of budget implementation, 
like committing or paying expenditure or signing contracts.  
As the Commission points out in the annual accounts, “[t]he College 
of Commissioners assumes collective political responsibility but in practice 
does not exercise itself the budget implementation powers vested in it. It 
delegates these tasks each year to individual civil servants accountable to 
the College and subject to the Financial Regulation and the Staff 
Regulations”.137 The concept is illustrated in Figure 5. 
According to van Gerven (2007:2), ‘political responsibility’ could be 
defined as the possibility for a political organ to attach a political sanction 
to such misbehaviour on the part of a holder of public office, and/or to 
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to Parliament, or giving incorrect or misleading information. van Gerven 
clarifies that a sanction for incorrect behaviour is characteristic of a 
parliamentarian form of government. 
Figure 5. Responsibilities within the European Commission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/budget/sound_fin_mgt/how_who_en.htm). 
Concerning the College of Commissioners, political responsibility is a 
matter for the European Parliament before whom the Commission is 
responsible.138 It starts with Parliament’s approval of the appointment of 
the Commission President, as well as the College as a whole.139 And it 
follows with the duty to give account in various forms to Parliament, 
normally through institutional reporting (in particular, Five-year strategic 
objectives, Annual policy strategy, Work programme, Synthesis of 
management achievements, Annual general report), answers to oral and 
written questions and evidence submitted to parliamentary committees.140  
Concerning specifically the EU budget, the Commission submits 
annually the accounts to the budgetary authorities, the Council and the 
European Parliament. A recent addition (Treaty of Lisbon) is the obligation 
to establish “an evaluation report on the Union’s finances based on the 
results achieved”, in particular in relation to the indications given by the 
budgetary authorities.141 
With reference to the EU budget implementation, the nature and the 
extent of the College of Commissioners’ ‘political responsibility’ is a matter 
for interpretation.142 Naturally, such responsibility cannot go beyond the 
institutional role given to the Commission. One should recall in this respect 
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that the EU budget is based on two main ‘political’ decisions, both of which 
fall outside of the Commission’s command. First, there is the multi-annual 
financial framework, which sets the map for EU spending and forms the 
basis for the subsequent approval of the annual budget by the European 
Parliament and the Council. Secondly, the adoption of the sectoral 
legislation and the choice of the implementation method. In the latter case, 
as in the case of ‘shared management’ arrangements, the main 
management decisions are reserved to member state bodies and “the 
Commission has to operate without full political authority whilst retaining 
under the Treaty full responsibility for the funds disbursed”.143 
As a result of the Commission’s reform, Directors-General sit in the 
‘control room’ of the EU budget implementation. They document their 
accountability to the College of Commissioners through their annual 
activity reports. In the Commission’s own words, these are the pillars of its 
‘accountability architecture’, whose apex is represented by the synthesis 
report, where the College sets out, for the attention of the budgetary 
authority, its conclusions on management achievements for each main 
spending area and on systemic cross-cutting issues. The College thus 
assumes “its political responsibility for management by its Directors-
General and Heads of Service, on the basis of the assurances and 
reservations made by them in their annual activity reports”.144 
Yet, a number of factors limit the scope of the political responsibility 
endorsed by the College through the synthesis report, and hence its impact 
in terms of overall assurance and accountability. 
The College’s synthesis reports are based on presumed assurance, 
derived from the fact that “the European Union defines the necessary 
control mechanisms and the Directors-General concerned include in their 
annual activity reports a description of the control environment, and of the 
different tasks and responsibilities of all actors involved”.145 This may lead 
to the ambiguous situation, highlighted by the Council, whereby the 
Commission’s synthesis report states that the control procedures put in 
place give the necessary guarantees concerning the legality and regularity 
of the underlying transactions, while acknowledging at the same time “that 
further efforts are needed to resolve a number of weaknesses”.146 
Before their finalisation annual activity reports are discussed between 
Commissioners and Directors-General. However, these reports are not 
endorsed by the College of Commissioners. This means that the College 
does not formally approve the management results and does not confirm THE EU BUDGET | 39 
 
compliance of the budgetary implementation with EU rules. Finally, like 
Directors-General’s annual activity reports and in line with the Institution’s 
role of ‘task-oriented administration’, synthesis reports focus on the 
executive functions and reflect the lack of power on the main management 
decisions. 
 
Box 9. Directors-General’ responsibilities  
Initiated in the aftermath of the EU’s crisis in the 1990s, the Commission’s 
administrative reform was based on decentralisation of the management and 
control responsibilities at service level, to enhance Directors-General’ 
responsibility for the matters entrusted to them. As a consequence, 
Directors-General are charged to ensure the entire management process, 
from determining what needs to be done to achieve the policy objectives set 
by the institution to managing the activities launched from both an 
operational and budgetary standpoint, including signing legal 
commitments, monitoring performance, making payments and, if necessary, 
recovering funds. The reform also introduced the obligation for each 
Director-General to present an Annual Activity Report and an Annual 
Declaration of Assurance. The report must indicate the results of the 
operations by reference to the objectives set, the risks associated with these 
operations, the use made of the resources provided and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the internal control system. Directors-General must also 
arrange for evaluations to assess the viability of possible policy proposals, 
improve the decision-making process and increase the transparency, 
accountability and cost-effectiveness of EU intervention.  
Moreover, they should also gauge the success and cost-effectiveness of 
programmes already underway (interim and ex-post evaluations). However, 
sectoral legislation may derogate to this principle and provide that 
evaluations are carried out by member states. This is the case for the 
Cohesion policy where ex-ante and on-going evaluation is a member state’s 
responsibility and the Commission carries-out an ex-post evaluation (see Arts 
47-49 of Regulation No 1083/2006, op. cit). Though without establishing a 
particular responsibility in the financial field as compared the ordinary 
provisions of the Staff Regulations, Directors-general may be held liable 
(including, subject to disciplinary proceedings, to pay compensation) in the 
event of serious negligence; in particular where the wrongdoing was made 
possible by inadequacies in the internal control systems devised and put in 
place under their responsibility.  
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However, Directors-general are not made responsible for management 
decisions taken by member states in case of ‘shared management’ policies. 
One may also note that due to the concentration of EU spending in few 
areas, most expenditure (around 80% in 2009) is implemented under the 
responsibility of four Directors-General (Agriculture and Rural 
Development; Regional Policy; Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities; and Research). 
 
The absence of full insight into EU funds managed by member states 
has opened the door to criticism that the Commission assumes political 
responsibility “without knowing what happens with the funds in the 
Member States”.147 This is attributed by the Parliament to insufficient 
monitoring and supervision by the Commission, and to the absence of 
concrete solutions and accountability at member state level.148 
Moreover, the distinction between ‘political’ and ‘operational’ 
responsibility within the Commission, between holders of public office and 
civil servants, has led to criticism of an implicit acknowledgment by the 
College that Directors-General implement the budget on their own, whilst 
their role is actually to perform duties following delegation from the 
institution.149 
Concerns about a displacement of responsibility between 
Commissioners and officials as well as the fear that no one  would 
ultimately take responsibility for the EU budget implementation go back to 
the institutional crisis at the end of the 1990s.150 This led Parliament to 
suggest that the responsible Commissioner should co-sign the annual 
Declaration of Assurance given by the Directors-General, “as this would 
bridge the gap between the Director-General’s individual assurance 
declarations and the College's institutional assurance declaration”.151 In this 
way the Parliament would get “an overall ‘institutional’ assurance 
statement to accompany the ‘departmental’ assurance statements which are 
what it gets under the current accountability structure.”152 The Commission 
claimed, however, that accepting the Parliament’s suggestion “would call 
into question Directors’-General individual responsibility and blur the 
distinction between political (College) and management 
responsibilities/accountabilities (Director General)”, leading de facto to an 
exoneration of Directors-General from any responsibility.153 
As an example of the difficulties caused by diffused responsibilities 
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project. The project’s management structure proved inadequate to cope 
with the needs. This prompted the Commission to put forward a different 
management structure, with the aim of strengthening public governance. 
 
Box 10. The Galileo management structure 
The Galileo programme is the last stage for establishing the European Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), the first worldwide satellite radio 
navigation and positioning infrastructure for civil purposes (e.g. vehicle 
navigation, commercial and safety services and services for government 
users). 
The initial phases of the programme have been co-funded by the 
European Space Agency (ESA) and the Commission, taking responsibility 
respectively for the technological development and policy-making. The 
deployment and operational phase was due to be carried out by the private 
sector in the framework of a Public Private Partnership (PPP). However, in 
2007, the concession contract negotiations failed as the risks involved were 
considered too high by the private consortium. 
This failure provided the opportunity to redirect the Galileo 
programme. As a result, the programme will be financed and handled 
entirely by the EU under a strengthened governance scheme. Indeed, as 
observed by the European Court of Auditors, the previous programme’s 
governance was inadequate. The division of roles between the different 
entities involved (EU and ESA member states, the Commission, Galileo Joint 
Undertaking and the ESA) was not clearly defined. There was no 
programme manager. This resulted in unclear lines of responsibility and 
many decisions were affected by the lack of a taker for full responsibility (see 
Special Report No 7/2009 on the management of the Galileo programme’s 
development and validation phase, available at 
http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/2760294.PDF). 
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Source: European Commission, Progressing Galileo: Re-profiling the European GNSS programmes, 
COM(2007) 534 final, 19.9.2007 
 
The governance scheme foresees a two-fold oversight. Political 
oversight belongs to Council and Parliament while programme oversight takes 
the form of a European GNSS Programme Committee, composed of member 
states’ representatives. Overall programme management responsibility rests 
on the Commission which, as Programme Manager, is accountable for the 
entire Galileo programme. This has implied for the Commission to adapt its 
management capacity, both in house and with the support of qualified 
external advisors. The GNSS supervisory authority has the task to facilitate 
the introduction onto the commercial market of the services offered. ESA is 
responsible for the technical aspects of the project and is entrusted with the 
tasks of procurement agent. It acts on the basis of a detailed delegation 
agreement. It should also be mentioned that a Galileo Inter-institutional 
Panel, composed of representatives of Parliament, Council and Commission, 
has been set up in view of facilitating their close cooperation. The Panel will 
follow all relevant aspects, including the effectiveness of the governance 
arrangements. 
 THE EU BUDGET | 43 
 
The ‘gap’ in the process of holding to account for EU spending and 
the difficulty of reconciling one ‘single’ responsibility with a sharing of 
roles between EU and national level has appeared above all to Parliament 
as a major difficulty. Pressure was put in particular by repetitive 
qualifications of EU expenditure by the Court of Auditors, provoking 
growing concerns at both national and EU institutions’ level for the loss of 
credibility for the whole EU spending system. Achieving a ‘clean’ 
statement on EU spending has therefore been a recognised political 
imperative since the early 2000. 
Parliament took the view that, due to member states’ important role 
in budgetary implementation, a ‘clean’ statement on EU spending could 
not be ensured by the Commission alone, the latter claiming that if the EU 
Court of Auditors cannot give positive assurance on the whole budget, this 
is because “[m]ost of the errors found by the Court concerned EU funds 
under national management”.154 Parliament’s main concern was in 
particular that despite a number of statements and documents presented in 
a series by the Commission, there seemed to be no clear way out. Very 
often the debate took the appearance of a shuttling back and forward of 
individual responsibilities between Commission and member states, with 
eventually suggestions of further legislative and control measures, rather 
than viable and sensible solutions. 
In order to overcome this ‘standstill’, the European Parliament 
proposed that member states should be involved at the highest level and 
that, therefore, the relevant political authorities should “take full 
responsibility for the funds placed at their disposal”.155  
Box 11. National management declarations 
The European Parliament proposed that each member state should provide 
annually an ex-ante disclosure statement and an ex-post statement of 
assurance as regards its use of EU funding. The idea was that each member 
state's highest political and managing authority (Finance Minister), by 
signing an ex-ante Disclosure Statement and an annual ex-post Declaration of 
Assurance as regards the legality and regularity of national expenditure 
submitted to EU reimbursement, should formally endorse overall 
responsibility for the quality of the control and supervision at national level. 
The  ex-ante disclosure statement was meant to confirm that the 
organisational structures put in place by the member state comply with the 
requirements of EU legislation and are expected to be effective in managing 
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In this respect, the annual Disclosure Statement should include: 
a)  a description of the control systems by the managing authority of a 
member state, 
b)  an assessment of the effectiveness of these control systems,  
c)  a remedial action plan if necessary, drawn up by the managing 
authority of the member state in consultation with the Commission; 
and 
d)  confirmation of the description by a national audit institution or 
another external auditor.  
The  ex-post Declaration of Assurance should take into account the 
multi-annual dimension of the accountability process and the multi-annual 
nature of most EU programmes while at the same time giving assurance that 
the control systems have worked effectively during the year in question. 
 
The Commission further elaborated on the Parliament’s proposal, 
suggesting that member states’ responsibilities should be assumed 
according to a ‘four-pillar’ scheme also involving oversight and reporting 
by national external audit institutions –  a stance endorsed shortly after by 
Parliament.156  
Parliament’s aim was to obtain a kind of ‘national’ Statement of 
Assurance, by reference to that of the Court which represents by its very 
nature a global statement for EU expenditure as a whole, undifferentiated 
at national level. The innovative element was not so much for the 
declaration itself as similar requirements had already been introduced in 
the sectoral legislation (see Annex), but rather for the level of its signature.  
Yet, the main issue seems to be not ‘who’ will sign such a declaration, 
but on which basis it would have been established; a ‘clean’ assessment 
should also be a ‘right’ one. As the Court of Auditors has pointed out, “[a] 
declaration that systems are functioning as required by EU regulations may 
not in itself provide assurance about the legality and regularity of the 
transactions concerned”.157 However, the Parliament was “convinced that a 
finance minister will prefer to establish properly functioning supervisory 
systems and controls instead of running the risk of having to explain to 
his/her Parliament why the national purse has to repay substantial sums to 
the European Union”.158  
Member states did not favourably receive the Parliament’s request for 
a high-level political Statement of Assurance, or its further suggestion to THE EU BUDGET | 45 
 
split the ex-post Declaration of Assurance among several authorities, 
according to their competencies for the different areas of intervention.159 In 
this respect, the Council of Ministers invoked the need “not to put into 
question the existing balance between the Commission and the member 
states or to compromise responsibility and accountability at the operational 
level”.160 Also, national external audit institutions were generally not 
prepared to be involved following the Commission’s suggestion.161 
Nevertheless, some member states accepted, on a voluntary basis, to issue 
statements on EU expenditure managed by their own bodies.162  
Some progress was achieved with the approval of the financial 
framework 2007-13. Member states accepted that “[a]s part of their 
enhanced responsibilities for Structural Funds and in accordance with 
national constitutional requirements, the relevant audit authorities in 
Member States will produce an assessment concerning the compliance of 
management and control systems with the regulations of the 
Community”.163 This should however be considered as a compromise at the 
lowest level. In the end, these summaries do not provide for an overall 
Assurance Statement, as they are just meant to summarise material existing 
in sector-specific reporting and declarations required for Agriculture and 
Cohesion policy. And despite the Parliament’s request, the information 
provided by member states does not allow the Commission to assess in a 
reliable way “the strengths and weaknesses of each Member State's 
national system for the administration and control of EU funds”.164  
One might wonder whether this further requirement would achieve 
what the current ‘cascade’ of declarations at all levels in the spending 
process has not achieved. In particular, will this extra source of information 
help in making national systems more effective and less prone to 
irregularities? Announcing that a stock-taking exercise of the added-value 
of annual summaries is foreseen by the end of 2010, the Commission 
reached the conclusion that in order for the Annual Summaries to bring 
useful changes in shared management, a stronger legal basis is needed.165 
The issue of national management declarations has become a political 
priority for Parliament that has also rallied support from national 
parliaments for holding national governments to account for their 
management of the spending of EU funds.166 Parliament insists that these 
declarations should be “signed at an appropriate political level and 
certified by their national supreme audit body, as a means of 
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shared management”.167 And it has requested the Commission to make the 
necessary proposals within the framework of the review of the Financial 
Regulation. Yet, the Commission’s proposal of recasting the Financial 
Regulation does not seem to follow Parliament’s request to place the 
holding to account for the EU budget implementation in ‘shared 
management’ at member states political level. Responsibilities are assigned 
to national implementing bodies, thus confirming the substance of current 
requirements in the secondary legislation.168 
Divergent interests  
The underlying assumption of the ‘shared management’ system is that, 
although they have different (but complementary) roles, the Commission 
and member states ‘share’ the same interests and pursue the same 
objectives. Indeed, “[p]ursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation”, the 
EU and the member states shall assist each other in carrying out tasks 
which flow from the Treaties. Member states shall take any appropriate 
measure to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties 
and facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks.169  
It is however undeniable that the implementation of the EU budget 
brings substantial and direct interests into play for the member states. 
Indeed, the agreement on the multi-annual financial framework has both a 
revenue and expenditure side, the latter’s geographical allocation being for 
a significant part already decided at that stage. EU expenditure represents 
at the same time the financial ‘return’ of national contributions paid to the 
EU budget. 
At the beginning of the programming period, when it is about 
committing pre-allocated expenditure to member states and paying out 
pre-financing, the Commission and member states do not have many 
reasons for conflict. During and (above all) at the stage of the ex-post 
clearance (at the end of the programming period), Commission and 
member states start having potentially conflicting roles. This is in the logic 
of the system itself; member states defend tooth and nail what they 
consider their own prerogatives, above all their financial interests 
whenever the Commission threatens disallowing national expenditure. The 
former partners may thus become counterparts.170  
For example, member states should make sure that their 
reimbursement claims are ‘error-free’ from the outset. This would ideally 
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controls and the subsequent risk of possible financial corrections by the 
Commission in connection with the irregularities uncovered. Yet, the 
immediate ‘benefit’ of disallowing national expenditure from EU 
reimbursement accrues to the EU budget, therefore resulting “in little 
incentive for Member States to devote sufficient resources to controlling EU 
funds”.171 Effective implementation of member states’ control obligations is 
obviously influenced by the diversity of interests mentioned above. 
The multi-level assurance system designed to ensure compliance of 
EU spending is only seemingly ‘single’. In reality, it operates as a 
juxtaposition (and not necessarily as an integration) of two systems 
running in ‘parallel’, one in charge of financial implementation 
(Commission) and the other dealing with management functions (member 
states). 
According to circumstances and the interests at stake, these systems 
may or may not pull in the same direction.172 This also means that, contrary 
to the assumption made by the ‘single audit’ concept, the Commission’s 
level of audit activity cannot be reduced significantly. As shown by the 
example in the box below, despite primacy of EU law, the requirement for 
member states to put in place adequate systems, ensuring that EU-funded 
operations are implemented correctly, may be overridden by other 
considerations. 
Box 12. EU and national objectives may differ 
Following a control, the Commission found serious weaknesses in the 
national management of a programme co-financed by Structural Funds to 
fight long-term unemployment and to facilitate the professional insertion of 
young persons and others excluded from the labour market (failure of 
monitoring by the responsible authorities over the beneficiaries, absence of 
supporting documents, lack of verification of the reality of co-financed 
actions and, not least, a certification not based on real costs). 
As a consequence, the Commission had decided to withdraw €22 
million out of €30 million initially allocated to the programme.  
According to national law, this financial loss has been considered as a 
loss for the national budget itself. A legal proceeding against the official in 
charge of the implementation of the programme has been started. The 
national jurisdiction had established that EU funds were used for ineligible 
actions and that they had almost completely replaced national funds. The 
official has been given a fine of €5,000, in particular thanks to recognition of 
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•  management of EU funds was not a priority for the Ministry; 
•  there was a political consensus in the Ministry to use EU funds for 
ineligible actions to compensate reduction of national funds; and 
•  the internal control had approved all operations found to be irregular. 
Source: Cour de discipline budgétaire et financière, Première section, Arrêt du 20 
décembre 2007, Secrétariat d'État aux petites et moyennes entreprises, au 
commerce et à l'artisanat, Direction de l'artisanat, gestion des crédits du 
fonds social européen (FSE), N° 159-529), (http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/ 
CDBF/documents/ARR/Arret-159-529-ano.pdf). 
 
The difficulty of putting national systems in line with requirements is 
shown by the development of the ‘Contract of Confidence’, an initiative 
launched by the Commission in 2002 as a way of implementing the ‘single 
audit concept’ in the Cohesion policy and reducing the administrative 
burden on member states due to EU controls. The idea of this voluntary 
commitment by member states was that subject to assurances on the proper 
functioning of national systems, the Commission would no longer carry 
out audits of the functioning of these systems for the programmes covered, 
nor of operations in such programmes, unless exceptional circumstances 
arise. For national systems to achieve this ‘AAA rating’ three conditions 
had to be met: 
•  the Commission had reasonable assurance that the systems complied 
with the requirements, 
•  the national authorities had drawn up a satisfactory audit strategy 
and 
•  the member state had provided an adequate basis for assessing the 
effective implementation of the audit strategy and set out conclusions 
with regard to the functioning of the systems. 
As stated by the Commission, this initiative “has created a bench-
marking procedure”.173 One would actually expect a normal occurrence 
that all systems are ‘certified’ as complying with the requirements of the 
'Contract of Confidence'. Indeed, these requirements are nothing more than 
the logical consequence of applicable rules about ‘shared management’.174 
However, this ‘quality label’ which could be defined as an indicator of 
voluntary compliance, has only been sought by few member states, for an 
amount representing less than 10% of Structural Funds (2000-06). This low 
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that member states tend to play a rather ‘minimalist’ approach compared to 
what it is perceived as a more demanding standard.175 
These examples confirm that the equation national interests = 
European interests cannot be taken for granted and that there could be 
instances where national and European objectives may diverge.176 As has 
been observed, “[s]upranational systems of accountability are likely to 
confront specific challenges that arise from their location in a political space 
beyond states but one that rests on states” (Laffan, 2003:763). It is a fact that 
national bodies, which operate under the (national) authorities that have 
designated them and to whom only they are therefore accountable, “may 
be put in the position of the servant of two masters whose interests may 
differ very substantially” (Harlow, 2002a:184). The more so as they often 
combine purely national responsibilities with EU functions. National 
bodies are all naturally susceptible to ‘local’ pressure and sympathetic to 
(sometimes very short-term) national/local concerns, which may well 
outweigh ‘EU’ pressure. In case of conflicting priorities, the ‘remoteness’ 
factor, typical of the EU budget implementation, represents an objective 
element favouring the predominance of national interests. 
Financial corrections: A shortcut for accountability 
The Commission’s supervision over national systems is mainly based on 
desk-reviews and a limited number of controls which cannot cover all 
funded actions. Due to the multi-annual nature of many spending 
programmes, such controls would often only take place on the basis of a 
multi-annual cycle during the programming period. As a result, assurance 
on conformity of expenditure is not ultimately sought annually but several 
years later, at the stage of the multi-annual ex-post clearance.177 The view is 
taken that there is no urgency, that a greater risk of error in the interim 
claims can be accepted because of the possibility to apply financial 
corrective mechanisms later. After all, possible creditors being mostly the 
member states, there is no problem of ‘solvency’.  
Therefore, when the Commission’s Directors-General declare (subject 
sometimes to reservations for member states’ systems) “that the control 
procedures put in place give the necessary guarantees concerning the 
legality and regularity of the underlying transactions”,178 this should not be 
interpreted as a statement on the legality of EU spending for a given year. 
In practice, with their declaration Directors-General express confidence that 
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only expenditures that comply with EU and national rules will be subject to 
reimbursement by the EU budget. 
One may refer in this connection to the distinction between ‘police 
patrol’ and ‘fire alarm’ approach, in the meaning of active and passive 
forms of oversight.179 The advantage of ‘police patrol’ oversight is that the 
actor is under continuous and direct control, while in a ‘fire alarm’ 
framework there is less active and direct intervention. 
Although for different reasons, the Commission and member states 
are inherently ‘fire alarm’ oriented. ‘Police patrol’ oversight implies a lot of 
resources and, above all, an integration of the different control activities 
within a common system. In this respect, as discussed earlier, the ‘single 
audit’ model, due to different interests at stake, has developed towards a 
‘juxtaposition’ rather than an integration of the different control stages. 
Member states are tempted to await the outcome of the Commission’s 
checks (and audits of the Court of Auditors) and react in consequence. To 
undertake such a ‘police patrol’ oversight on the basis of the Commission’s 
own forces would be unthinkable. With several hundreds of national 
bodies involved, a proper scrutiny of systems operation by the Commission 
would require far more resources in its control departments than presently 
available. 
There is therefore in the present context of a plurality of spending 
programmes and a significant number of financial actors no other 
alternative than a second-best solution, based on a fire-alarm scrutiny 
diffused among the EU and national level, reacting ex-post to individual 
warnings.  
A first consequence is that assurance has to be presumed in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. National systems continue to manage 
EU funds for years without an undisputed assurance that they fulfil the 
basic requirements, and that therefore the operations co-financed and the 
related spending are eligible for EU reimbursement.180 While in ‘shared 
management’ arrangements compliance of EU spending is supposed to be 
based essentially on efforts from member states, as recalled earlier, they 
have no particular incentive in devoting significant resources to controlling 
EU funds that could end up in a cut of their EU spending share. Nor do 
they have an immediate interest in applying financial corrections for 
actions that they have approved and paid for in the first instance, and that, 
moreover, they may consider as a due counterpart of the financial 
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In the logic of a EU spending system conceived to be ultimately ‘self-
policing’, if member states fail to correct irregularities, or if the Commission 
concludes that there are serious failings in the management and control 
systems that may give rise to systemic irregularities, then the Commission 
may impose financial corrections on the member states.181 In fact, this 
possibility has become for the Commission an essential counterweight to 
member states’ responsibilities in ensuring compliance of EU 
reimbursements, assuming that this instrument constitutes for them a 
deterrent to declare ‘ineligible’ expenditure.182 Ex-post clearance has been 
transformed into a kind of ‘gatekeeper’, or in the Commission’s words “an 
essential safety net at the end of the control cycle”.183 At the same time, as 
EU spending is based on eligible inputs, ex-post clearance marks out the 
borders of the ‘eligibility’ conditions for EU reimbursements and 
constitutes in practice the yardstick for compliance.184 This is true to the 
point that one could actually argue that in its essence the Commission’s 
ultimate responsibility for actions in ‘shared management’ represents more 
a task (the application of financial corrective mechanisms) than a true 
responsibility for the EU budget implementation as a whole. 
The effectiveness of ex-post clearance in both ‘cleaning’ national 
expenditure and representing a deterrent against irregularities does not 
meet with unanimous agreement.185 The question is in particular whether 
financial corrective mechanisms are sufficiently dissuasive, comprehensive 
and fully repairing the damage to the EU budget. 
A first consideration to be made is that financial correction 
mechanisms do not constitute a penalty system.186  Ex-post clearance is 
limited to counteract ‘ineligible’ spending (in whatever way this could 
have been estimated), and does not take account for example of recidivism 
or other aggravating factors. In line with the principle of proportionality, 
financial corrections constitute a simple recovery of undue payments from 
the member states, i.e. the result from the difference between member 
states’ declared expenditure and expenditure recognised as eligible by the 
Commission and chargeable to the EU budget.187 
The Commission’s aim is limited to shielding the EU budget from 
ineligible expenditure paid out to member states. Hence ex-post clearance 
only targets them; it represents no more than an accounting correction, 
whose scope is not to rectify erroneous payments at the root.188 Whether, as 
required by EU rules, ex-post clearance represents a first step of a recovery 
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member states. Indeed, the Commission’ s  v i e w  i s  t h a t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
principle of shared management, recovering irregular payments to 
beneficiaries “is the sole responsibility of Member States”.189 
When the Commission implements the budget directly (for example, 
Research spending), single beneficiaries may have to reimburse part or all 
expenditure received as a result of a financial correction.190 By contrast, the 
final beneficiary of EU funds in ‘shared management’ arrangements may 
feel in the end no impact whatsoever as these corrections are mostly 
supported by member states themselves, an issue about which Parliament 
has expressed concern.191 A first reason is that, as shown by the example in 
Box 12, national bodies may themselves be at the source of the irregularity. 
Also, the recovery from beneficiaries is problematic when a financial 
correction is established on a flat-rate basis, in the absence of a valid link 
between the irregularities and the amounts to be recovered.192 A further 
reason is when financial corrections become ‘socially’ relevant and risk 
attracting protests, for example, from a professional category.193 
The fact that financial corrections by the Commission for agriculture 
and Cohesion policy (some €2.9 billion in 2009) are usually borne by 
member states has two further main implications. The first is that this turns 
into an extra cost for national budgets and therefore into a disguised 
additional ‘tax’, which is at odds with the aim of pooling national resources 
at EU level in view of allowing member states “to cut their costs, avoid 
overlaps and get a better return on their investment”.194  The second 
consequence is that a transfer of ‘ineligible’ expenditure from one public 
budget to another is simply to sweep the ‘dust under the carpet’. The 
irregularity remains and ‘ineligible’ expenditure continues to be supported 
by public funding.  
Also, the establishment of financial corrections does not necessarily 
mean that EU funds are recovered by the Commission and that member 
states’ financial allocation is reduced correspondingly. To avoid this, 
member states tend to over-declare national expenditure in order to create 
a buffer of eligible items, as in the case of Cohesion policy where EU 
spending represents often a limited fraction of national spending. In this 
field a financial correction generally represents (for some 70% from 2000-
09) a simple substitution of new projects for ‘non-compliant’ ones.195  
Recovery procedures entail administrative costs, at the level of both 
the Commission and the member states and take a long time before they 
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member state’s financial allocation, they are likely to lead to legal disputes 
and often generate long drawn-out procedures whose outcome is 
uncertain. With the consequence, noted by Parliament, that “the systematic 
imposition of sanctions on Member States has resulted in a reluctance by 
Member States to disclose implementation problems”.197 
Further, it is difficult to know whether such corrections provide a 
comprehensive estimate of all undue payments.198 The argument often 
used that subsequent checks conducted throughout the whole 
programme’s duration would have corrected the irregularities may be 
appealing, but it is not convincing.199 The Court of Auditors has observed 
that there is, at present, insufficient information available to support this 
claim.200 And, as the Commission admits, there may still be a ‘residual risk’ 
several years after the end of the programming period.201 Also, one cannot 
rely on member states to spontaneously make the necessary corrections in 
full. Available data show that irregularities detected by individual member 
states may be far below the amounts ultimately documented by the 
Commission.202 This gives a concrete indication of the diversity of interests, 
mentioned earlier, between member states and the Commission. It also 
shows that the amount of financial corrections depends to a significant 
degree on the number of controls that the Commission (and the Court of 
Auditors) may perform during the time-scale period allowed.203  
By their very nature, financial corrections are much more appropriate 
for violations of specific compliance rules rather than weaknesses in terms 
of sound financial management, namely lack of results. For example, the 
extent to which expected outputs, outcomes and impacts are achieved by 
EU programmes is not the basis on which a financial correction is 
triggered. Although compliance with eligibility rules is a key condition for 
effective spending, it is only one side of the coin. 
As they often come at the end of the programming period, there is a 
risk of not seeing the forest for the trees. Financial corrections tend to 
correct for specific uncovered irregularities. They may at most limit the 
damage for the EU budget by recovering, years after, the funds spent, but it 
is unlikely that they may resolve systemic problems. If systems have not 
operated in line with the requirements, it is no longer possible to correct ex-
post fundamental weaknesses and it is too late to ‘close the barn door’ and 
cause a deterrent effect on other claimants. As has been observed: “[t]he 
(…) disadvantage of ex-post control increases with the time lapse between 
the date on which expenditure is made and that on which it is queried”.204 54 | THE EU BUDGET & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The question of the supposed crucial effect of financial corrections 
should be raised: do the birds return to their nest after the shot? The 
regular (and increasing) occurrence of financial corrections has made them 
seem an inevitable routine procedure, thus demonstrating the limited 
deterrence of this instrument and its reduced effectiveness in causing 
structural repairing effects.205 One might therefore question to what extent, 
as argued by the Commission, financial corrections represent “a strong 
incentive for the Member States to improve their management and control 
systems and thus to prevent or detect and recover irregular payments to 
final beneficiaries.” 206 
As a matter of principle, one should however not welcome a situation 
where a significant amount of EU payments has to be reimbursed because 
of irregularities. Indeed, financial corrections are above all an indicator of 
whether a policy has been implemented according to established rules. The 
higher the amount of financial corrections, the higher the evidence of 
failure and missed opportunities. As observed by the Council about 
Cohesion policy, the final objective should not be “to increase the amount 
of corrections but to maximise the correct use of the funds”.207 
Accountability: For what? 
By reference to the treaties and secondary legislation, there are three 
different levels of requirement for the budget implementation under 
‘shared management’ arrangements, representing as a whole the 
‘standards’ for EU spending. First, the Commission is required to 
implement the budget “having regard to the principles of sound financial 
management”, a responsibility that implies cooperation with the member 
states.208 A second level of requirement is represented by the essential 
minimum standards that member states’ management and control systems 
involved in EU spending must meet.209 A third level concerns the nature of 
expenditure that can be reimbursed and under which conditions – the so-
called ‘eligibility rules’, which are complemented by national rules.210 
As a result of its ultimate responsibility in implementing the EU 
budget, one would expect the Commission to give account on all three 
levels of requirement. Indeed, ‘compliance’ and ‘performance’ is not an 
‘either/or’ option between quantity and quality; assurance should exist on 
both.211 While compliance refers to different standards than ‘value for 
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public funds; “[t]he EU added-value concept is not only about doing the 
right things. It is also about doing them right.”212 
Box 13. Sound financial management 
As early as the EEC Treaty of 1957, auditing the budget had been entrusted 
to an Audit Board with the purpose of establishing that “the financial 
management has been sound” (Art. 206 TEC). This mandate was confirmed 
in 1975, when the European Court of Auditors was created. It was much 
later that ‘value for money’ was elevated to the rank of institutional principle 
for the budget implementation (1992, Maastricht Treaty). A few words were 
added to Art. 205 TEC (then 274 TEC and nowdays Art. 317 TFEU) to 
indicate that the Commission shall implement the budget “having regard to 
the principles of sound financial management”. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997) further amended Art. 274 TEC by providing that “Member States shall 
cooperate with the Commission to ensure that the appropriations are used in 
accordance with the principles of sound financial management”.  
In 2002, a thorough reform of the Financial Regulation further clarified 
the scope of the concept of ‘value for money’. In particular, the obligation 
was introduced to set “specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed 
objectives” for all sectors of activity covered by the budget. The Regulation 
also stated that compliance of EU spending with the principles of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness should be checked by means of performance 
indicators established per activity and measurable in such a way that results 
can be assessed (see 11th Whereas and Art. 27(3) of the Financial Regulation, 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, op. cit.).  
One should note that the concept of ‘value for money’ has not yet 
found a clear understanding in practice. For example, concerning Cohesion 
policy, EU rules provide that the managing authority shall be responsible for 
managing and implementing the operational programme in accordance with 
the principle of sound financial management. Yet, its tasks are basically 
related to compliance requirements (see Art. 60 of Regulation No. 
1083/2006, op. cit.). A similar ambiguity is contained in other institutional 
texts. Thus, in the section on “Sound financial management of EU funds”, 
the Inter-institutional Agreement on the 2007-13 Financial Framework 
indicates the importance of strengthening internal control, giving priority 
“to sound financial management aiming at a positive Statement of 
Assurance, for funds under shared management.” (see the Inter-institutional 
Agreement of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial 
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This text refers however to the annual Statement of Assurance by the 
European Court of Auditors, a statement about compliance of EU revenue 
and expenditure, not ‘value for money’. Similarly, the Commission’s report 
on the functioning of the Inter-institutional Agreement on budgetary 
discipline and sound financial management (COM (2010) 185, 27.4.2010) 
contains a section “Sound financial management of EU funds” which 
actually only refer to compliance issues and financial resources available. 
Not differently, the Commission’s proposal for a draft Inter-Institutional 
Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on cooperation in budgetary matters (COM (2010) 73, 3.3.2010) 
contains a similar section which does not in fact deal with ‘value for money’ 
issues. 
 
The Commission’s Directors-General are meant to take responsibility 
“for implementing revenue and expenditure in accordance with the 
principles of sound financial management and for ensuring that the 
requirements of legality and regularity are complied with”.213 Among other 
things, their annual activity reports “shall indicate the results of the 
operations by reference to the objectives set” as well as “the use made of 
the resources provided”.214 Yet, the scope of Directors-General 
responsibility has to be put into the context of the executive functions 
devoted to the Commission. Thus, their annual activity reports focus on 
funds disbursement, an assessment of member states’ management and 
control systems on the basis of the available information and compliance of 
spending with the eligibility rules.  
Whether the policy objectives set have been achieved and whether 
the expected outcomes have been produced remain outside the scope of 
Directors-General responsibilities, as these results depend on a broader set 
of circumstances that are beyond their control.215 This is particularly the 
case in ‘shared management’ arrangements where the Commission knows 
generally very little about the day-to-day implementation of EU-funded 
actions. As recalled earlier, it has practically no say on the main 
management decisions, those that (like the identification of beneficiaries or 
the selection of projects) determine (or undermine) ‘value for money’ 
spending. Hence, Directors-General are not expected to take responsibility 
for any failure for policies on which they only have an indirect impact. 
Therefore, when Directors-General declare that they have reasonable 
assurance that the resources assigned “have been used for their intended 
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management”,216 this should be understood as restricted to the executive 
activities under their own direct responsibility. The word ‘resources’ does 
not refer to the funds managed in the framework of a given policy, but 
rather concerns the use by the directorate-general of available means 
(above all, staff) in respect of financial management procedural 
requirements (namely, issuing financing decisions, executing payments 
and clearing accounts). Similarly, in the declaration that information 
contained in the annual activity reports “gives a true and fair view”,217 the 
devil is in the detail; a footnote explains that this means “a reliable, 
complete and correct picture of the state of affairs in the department”.218 
With the 2010 draft budget, the Commission has presented for the 
first time a ‘Budget Memorandum’, meant to provide “an overview of the 
main achievements which have been or will be delivered by the EU 
budget.”219 The intention is to highlight concrete achievements as a 
consequence of EU funding, “in particular in relation to their impact on 
business activity, employment creation and economic growth”.220 
Organised around the four priority areas of the Lisbon Strategy (people, 
business, infrastructure and energy, and research and innovation), the 
purpose of the ‘Budget Memorandum’ is to link “the budget proposal to 
objectives and delivered results such as ‘creation of new jobs’ which is 
essential for EU citizens and businesses during the economic crisis”.221  
Yet, as do Directors-General Annual Activity reports, the Budget 
Memorandum takes shelter by stating: “The depicted results are 
achievements or estimations based on available information in activity 
statements and it cannot be guaranteed by the Commission that the target 
will be met.” It also indicates that for some indicators “external factors will 
also have substantial impact on the final results” and that for “some policy 
areas such as Regional Policy the list of deliveries only include information 
for those Member States who provided the relevant information in their 
operational programmes”.222 
Concerning member states, their obligation to cooperate with the 
Commission to ensure ‘value for money’ cannot be more than a general 
principle as long as it is not spelled out into a practical and meaningful 
procedure of account-giving. Yet, accountability cannot be effectively 
imposed if the criteria against which conduct is to be measured in the 
process of calling to account are not made clear.223 As recalled earlier, the 
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to obtain the EU reimbursement, it does not embody a true accountability 
process.  
If ‘value for money’ aspects remain in the dark in the accountability 
process for EU spending, this is also due to a number of structural factors. 
A main difficulty is to distinguish the effects of EU measures from all the 
others. EU policies’ main aim is often to ‘support’ similar programmes 
financed from national budgets, to provide ‘the icing rather than the cake’. 
These programmes represent a relatively marginal financial contribution to 
far-higher funded national policies.224 Moreover, there has been a tendency 
over the years to increase the number of spending programmes. There are 
more than 70 of them, covering a wide range of policies.225  
As shown by the table below, only eleven programmes have been 
granted funding of more than €1 billion per year. These programmes 
absorb 94% of available appropriations, the lion’s share being taken by 
Agriculture and Cohesion spending. None of them belongs under the 
heading “Freedom, Security and Justice” or “Citizenship”. One should add, 
concerning the remaining 6% of funds, that this is divided-up among 65 
spending programmes, two-third of which have been endowed with no 
more than €100 million per year. Actually, funding for 30 of these 
programmes is between €1 and €30 million per year.226 There is therefore an 
issue of critical mass that permits the showing of tangible results.  
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Table 1. Current EU spending programmes ≥ €1 billion/year (current prices in millions of €) 
 
Heading Programmes  Total  amount  Average/year  % over Total 
2  Market expenditure and direct aids  301,579  43,083  33.2 
1b Structural  Funds  278,256 39,751  30.7 
2 Rural  Development  96,444 13,778 10.6 
1b Cohesion  Fund  70,110 10,016  7.7 
1a 
Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and 
demonstration activities 
50,554 7,222  5.6 
4  Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)  17,298  2,471  1.9 
1a  Community financial assistance  to projects in the field of energy (EERP)  3,980  1,990  0.4 
4  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)  12,356  1,765  1.4 
4  Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)  11,622  1,660  1.3 
1a  Nuclear research and training activities  4,001  1,178  0.4 
1a  Trans-European transport network (TEN-T)  8,038  1,148  0.9 
 
Sub-Total  854,238 124,062  94 
 
Total (Headings 1a-1b-2-3a-3b-4)  907,829 132,204  100 
 
Source: Author's elaboration from “Financial programming 2011 – 2013”, SEC(2010)473. 
 
Legend: 
Heading 1a — Competitiveness for growth and employment 
Heading 1b — Cohesion for growth and employment 
Heading 2 — Preservation and management of natural resources 
Heading 3a — Freedom, Security and Justice 
Heading 3b — Citizenship 
Heading 4 — European Union as a global player 60 | THE EU BUDGET & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
At the same time, EU spending programmes often have ‘all-inclusive’ 
objectives. As observed by the Court, these are too wide-ranging, unclear 
or somewhat conflicting; policy instruments and resources are insufficient 
to meet the objectives set; causal links between the funded activities and 
the desired outcomes are unclear; and there are deficiencies in monitoring 
and evaluation arrangements.227 The scope of Cohesion policy is a clear 
example of this.228 Although operational programmes should contain 
quantified targets and a limited number of indicators for output and 
results, to make it possible to measure the progress in relation to the 
baseline situation and the achievement of the targets, in practice the link 
from an intervention’s inputs to the production of its outputs is very 
limited. This makes it even more difficult to establish the subsequent link 
to impacts on society in terms of outcomes.229 The lack of selective and 
focused objectives is directly reflected in the difficulty in setting 
measurable indicators for the policies financed. This in turn undermines 
the role of the ex-post evaluation and the potential ‘pedagogical’ effects for 
future policies. 
Another factor that affects giving an account for ‘value for money’ is 
that the EU system is based on inputs of ‘eligible’ spending items; 
conditionality for EU reimbursements is not based on achievement of pre-
agreed outputs, outcomes and impacts.230 This is the reflection of a financial 
framework inspired by ‘fair return’ considerations whose clearest 
illustration is the geographical pre-allocation of funds. 
There are also policies whose intrinsic nature makes the ‘value for 
money’ element extremely difficult to assess. For example, since financial 
aid and agricultural production were separated, financial support for 
agricultural markets  is very close to granting a financial entitlement (like a 
pension right) to farmers on the basis of the physical situation of the 
individuals concerned (area farmed), albeit in exchange for certain 
requirements concerning environmental protection. 
If member states produce some overall information on targets and 
expected results (although not subject to an external quality assessment as 
to the reliability of the performance information), this does not go as far as 
requiring them to link the broad policies objectives with specific outputs, 
outcomes and impacts. In this respect, the ex-post Evaluation of Cohesion 
Policy Programmes 2000-06 shows that although quantitative targets were 
often set and an indicator system established, in many cases they were not 
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relation to the funding made available and what it could plausibly achieve. 
Accordingly, targets were either attained far too easily or were unattainable 
given the funds deployed.231 In many member states the main focus tended 
to be on processes and financial implementation rather than on the actual 
results of the programmes and the effectiveness of the projects supported. 
Monitoring and evaluation systems were often not integrated into the 
decision-making process.232 The risk is to turn evaluations into a 
requirement rather than an opportunity, hence making evaluations very 
much an issue for ‘experts’ rather than for politicians to draw lessons from.  
A number of reports and evaluations provide indications on overall 
expectations and achievements, for example in terms of GDP growth or 
impact on employment.233 But it is one thing to argue that EU spending has 
(or will) contribute to produce some defined results; it is another to answer 
the question whether these funds were used in the most effective way. And 
to further demonstrate that compared to national spending, EU funding 
has resulted in a better added value, which constitutes in the end the raison 
d’être of the EU budget.  
As the Court has observed, “[i]nsufficient information on results and 
outcomes also undermines accountability and transparency as well as 
decisions on the allocation of resources”.234 For example, while stressing in 
general that “the focus actually given to the legality and regularity of the 
spending does not help to inform the legislator and the public as to 
whether the money has been spent effectively”,235 Parliament has regretted 
the “lack of detailed information and comparative studies with rankings on 
the advancement of regions that profit from Structural Funds”.236  
As has been observed, “[t]he EU budget is a key tool for delivering 
the Union's policies, and the effectiveness of EU spending can therefore 
have an important influence on whether the EU matches the expectations 
of its citizens”.237 Yet, if EU rules provide an obligation for spending to 
comply with ‘sound financial management’, there is no framework for 
‘performance’ accountability. In particular there is no specific 
accountability process giving account of member states’ responsibilities for 
the main management decisions, those conditioning in the first place 
effectiveness of spending. The Commission recognises that it should be in a 
position to demonstrate that public funds are well targeted and well 
managed.238 However, as a result of placing “the law at the service of what 
is possible rather than let it express the impossible”239, ‘value for money’ 
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possible to provide a conclusive answer concerning the use of funds and 
their impact, thus making all the more fragile the Commission’s ultimate 
responsibility. 
Accountability: To whom? 
The final control of the EU budget implementation takes place each year 
before the budgetary authorities to whom the Commission submits the 
accounts of the previous financial year. It is for the European Parliament, 
acting on a recommendation from the Council, to give a discharge to the 
Commission for the budgetary implementation.241 In this respect, 
Parliament has a general power “to hear the Commission give evidence 
with regard to the execution of expenditure or the operation of financial 
control systems” and to submit any necessary information.242 It should also 
be mentioned that Parliament has the faculty to set up a temporary 
Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of EU law.243 
The discharge procedure constitutes more than the formal act of 
closing the accounts and a certificate of good conduct releasing those 
responsible from any further liability in respect of the management of the 
budget. It is also the means for citizens to exercise, through Parliament’s 
representation, their “right to ask a public official for an accounting of his 
administration”.244 The point for Parliament is in particular, to “identify the 
problems which lead to mismanagement and a deficit of financial control”, 
to “ensure that the Commission takes the necessary steps to put a lasting 
end to the shortcomings and omissions established” and to make sure “that 
unduly paid or uncollected amounts are recovered”.245  
The discharge procedure also represents a political judgment on the 
way the Commission has discharged its ultimate responsibility. It “offers 
the political authorities an opportunity to assess the management of the 
financial resources of the European Union, to propose measures for its 
improvement and to express an overall political judgment on its quality”.246 
In particular, the Commission is bound to take all appropriate steps to act 
on the observations of both the European Parliament and the Council 
concerning the implementation of the EU budget; and it has to report back 
on the measures taken in the light of these observations.  
In case of dissatisfaction, Parliament may postpone the discharge 
decision or even refuse to grant discharge. 
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Box 14. Postponing and refusing to grant discharge to the Commission  
The European Parliament may postpone the discharge decision (see Art. 145 
of the Financial Regulation, op. cit.), namely to ask the Commission to 
provide further information or in order to impose on it certain conditions 
which must be fulfilled beforehand. Postponements were decided for the 
financial years 1990, 1991 and 1996 and, lastly, for the financial year 2007 for 
the section concerning the Council. The principle of refusing discharge is not 
provided for in the Treaty nor in the Financial Regulation. It derives from an 
interpretation given by the European Parliament to its own powers (see Arts 
3 and 5 of Annex VI to Parliament’s rules of procedure). A decision by 
Parliament to refuse the Commission a discharge because of serious 
objections must be considered exceptional. Discharge has been refused twice 
(instead, the accounts were only noted by Parliament) – in November 1984 in 
respect of the 1982 financial year and in December 1998 in respect of the 1996 
financial year. In 1984, Parliament’s refusal of discharge was motivated by a 
series of failures on the part of the Commission and the lack of adequate 
remedies proposed. The Thorn Commission did not resign only because its 
term of office was to expire a few weeks afterwards. In 1998 Parliament’s 
refusal of discharge was provoked by a lack of transparency and the 
difficulty for the Commission to drawing the necessary consequences 
following cases of bad management within its services. The Santer 
Commission resigned in March 1999, under the threat of a censure motion, 
immediately after publication of the first report of the Committee of 
Independent Experts. More recently, Parliament has refused to grant 
discharge to the Director of the European Police College in respect of the 
implementation of the College's budget for the financial year 2008 for not 
meeting the standards of good administration set by the financial rules (see 
European Parliament resolution of 7.10.2010). 
 
A decision by Parliament not to grant discharge for the 
implementation of the budget may have serious political and institutional 
consequences. This may lead to the extreme measure (however not 
automatic) of adopting a motion of censure intended to attach a political 
sanction to misbehaviour on the part of the College of Commissioners and 
leading to its resignation as a body.247  
As observed by the European Court of Auditors, there is a close link 
between the Commission’s ultimate responsibility for implementing the 
budget and the significance of the discharge procedure, in particular the 
effectiveness of the budgetary authorities’ recommendations.248 Yet, if 64 | THE EU BUDGET & ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
following the Treaty, the discharge process is addressed towards the 
Commission as the ultimate responsible body, the latter feels 
uncomfortable in taking any commitment for actions under member states’ 
responsibilities; and, understandably, even more to bear the blame for the 
policy management, which is a formal member state responsibility and 
about which it knows very little. The Commission tends therefore to return 
the ball to member states whenever questioned by Parliament about the 
management on the ground. 
Giving the sharing of roles between the EU and national level, it is 
not surprising that Parliament considers the discharge procedure as part of 
a process seeking to establish full accountability not just on the part of the 
Commission but also from other actors like the member states’ bodies.249 
However, Parliament does not have the authority to question national 
administrations regarding their management of EU funds. Actually, 
national bodies have no ‘institutional’ relationship with EU institutions, 
since member states are the statutory Commission’s counterpart and bear 
in the end responsibility for actions undertaken by their bodies. But 
national ministers are not subject to EU parliamentary scrutiny. As 
discussed earlier, pressure on member states for more accountability has 
resulted in a limited outcome due to their reluctance to being held to 
account for their own management responsibilities.  
With the discharge procedure, truth will out. As a result of the 
diffusion of responsibilities and of the lack of an overall master ship for the 
EU budget implementation, the accountability framework is only to a 
limited extent “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face 
consequences” (Bovens, 2006:9). The discharge procedure remains in the 
middle of the ford and resembles for the main management decisions a 
kind of ‘trial’ in absentia as Parliament lacks a responsive interlocutor. This 
is not without a sense of disappointment in what a significant expansion in 
the amount of auditing and evaluation undertaken for accountability 
purposes “is able to do to ensure that those responsible for government 
performance are held accountable for their actions” (Bemelmans-Videc & 
Lonsdale, 2007:15). 
Further, a possible motion of censure against the Commission 
following Parliament’s refusal of discharge would not change the fact that 
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Commission, whose appointment is in any event a shared competence with 
member states,250 would not necessarily be more successful in ensuring 
better management on the ground. Also, more ‘vigorous’ action in 
promoting infringement procedures against member states might prove to 
be inimical to efficiency. And Parliament alone cannot decide the 
management mode for a given policy. EU spending compliance would still 
have to rely ultimately on clearance mechanisms, with the limitations 
discussed earlier.  
There are therefore grounds for considering the effectiveness of the 
present discharge arrangements, especially taking into account that 
Parliament’s faculty of giving discharge was decided more than thirty 
years ago on the grounds that due to a significant expansion of EU 
spending, “the implementation of the budget should be more closely 
supervised”.251 Parliament’s dissatisfaction has recently prompted it to call 
for “a comprehensive debate on the current discharge procedure system” 
with EU institutions, member states, national parliaments and supreme 
audit institutions.252  
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4. THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 
he EU budget is “one of the most significant tools to guarantee the 
accountability of the European Union towards its citizens (…); an 
accurate and accountable use of the EU resources is one of the 
essential means to reinforce the trust of the European citizens.”253 Indeed, 
democracy is ill-served “when the decision-making process is obscured by 
complexity, when those whom the citizens can sanction are not always 
those who take the decisions or are reluctant to shoulder their share of 
responsibility before the people who voted them in.”254 Among the 
principles of good governance one principle stands out, this is the 
accountability to ordinary citizens. Yet, it is a fact that the characteristics of 
the current EU finances framework are at the root of a number of ‘side-
effects’ affecting the accountability to citizens (and taxpayers) for the use of 
EU funds. Three main difficulties should be noted. 
As the EU budget is funded through governmental contributions, 
citizens are not directly aware of how, to whom and how much they pay 
for the EU budget. Not surprisingly, the EU budget remains a mystery to 
many Europeans.255 In their daily lives, citizens may come across 
information about EU budget-funded initiatives, but unlike for national 
expenditure, nothing draws attention to the fact that a portion of their fiscal 
burden is actually used to fund EU expenditure. Yet, the volume of the EU 
budget is such that it seems no longer possible to avoid increasing 
European citizens’ awareness about the cost of EU programmes. The 
famous ‘no taxation without representation’ principle is applied at EU level 
the other way round.256 There is representation (namely through the 
European Parliament), but no visible and explicit taxation for the EU 
budget. Citizens are therefore not stimulated to demand a proper account-
giving on the funds spent, and thus pressure from public opinion plays a 
limited role in influencing the decision makers. As observed by the 
Commission, while visibility to EU citizens has an important accountability 
T THE EU BUDGET | 67 
 
dimension, their comprehension and monitoring of the present system is 
virtually absent. The lack of a direct relationship between citizen and 
budget is another manifestation of the ‘democratic deficit’.257 
A second difficulty is due to the nature of EU spending. EU 
disbursements are not made conditional upon achievement of specific 
outcomes and impacts, but are based on items of ‘eligible’ expenditure. 
Moreover, this is regulated by a complex legal framework whose 
consequence is a ‘fear of error’, often overwhelming policy considerations 
and best use of funds. There are no established procedures for rewarding 
best performers. Also, in a ‘budgetary-balances’ driven system, ‘fair return’ 
considerations invite member states to seek ‘acceptable’ net balances rather 
than specific policy objectives, leading to an inevitable trade-off between 
desired outcomes and spending levels. Absorption of funds also becomes 
an objective, and potentially an objective in itself when there is a risk of 
losing funds following de-commitment.  
This situation encourages the dispersion of resources in a multitude 
of small initiatives whose main characteristic is to be easily put forward 
rather than their intrinsic added-value, introducing a tension with the aim 
to make efficient, effective and economic use of funding by pursuing 
specific policy objectives.258 In many cases political objectives are not 
commensurate with the resources made available; there are funds, but not 
necessarily specific EU policy targets. Spending programmes are numerous 
and often entail grand, ‘all-embracing’ objectives. However, due to a 
combination of several factors (ceiling on EU revenue, strict allocation of 
resources to spending headings and concentration of resources for the most 
part on Agriculture and Cohesion policies), relatively limited funds are 
available for many programmes, and in most cases probably below the 
critical mass necessary to produce recognisable results. In those cases there 
is obviously a risk of EU funds being scattered in the ‘ocean’ of similar 
national actions, thus reducing not only the significance (and visibility) of 
EU interventions, but also affecting their potential effectiveness. The 
prevailing logic of doing ‘something’ with the available resources ends-up, 
de facto, in an exemption from choices of purpose. Whilst arousing high 
expectations, the objectives of EU spending programmes are not really 
“specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed” as they should be.259 
This hampers the possibility to monitor their achievement, and it makes it 
extremely difficult to identify (and report on) the added-value citizens get 
in return for their money – a potential source of scepticism and even 
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Finally, ‘shared management’, the main management mode, does not 
necessarily rest on ‘shared interests’; national bodies play at the same time 
a ‘national’ and a ‘European’ role. The objectives to be pursued on these 
two ‘levels’ may in practice be different and sometimes in conflict since EU 
spending is equally a form of national income. This tension has prevented 
putting in place a single and consistent multi-level management system 
under a Commission’s effective supervision. Instead, inspired by the 
tailoring of tasks among actors set by the regulatory framework, several 
management structures are juxtaposed, often operating on separated rail 
tracks. The risk is a process of depersonalisation leading to proceduralism 
and formalism overtaking substance, leading as an unavoidable 
consequence to sub-optimal decisions. A system where more and more is 
being observed, quantified, verified and reported on, but in which 
increasingly less operational action is being taken.260 The system is ‘fire-
alarm’ oriented, basically ‘sniffing for fires’. Risen to the keystone of a ‘self-
policing’ EU spending system, ex-post clearance has become the yardstick 
for compliance, leaving aside ‘value for money’ concerns and thus giving a 
narrow interpretation of the requirements meant to be the standard for EU 
spending. The increased focus on the application of financial corrective 
mechanisms is actually a symptom of the inability to achieve the intended 
objectives. Moreover, their cost is generally supported by national budgets 
(and not by faulty beneficiaries), thus ending up in a ‘socialisation’ of losses 
and representing a further burden on taxpayers. 
There is de facto no single ‘owner’ for EU spending. Each actor gives 
account to different authorities according to different requirements, 
standards and modalities; thus responsibilities for the budget 
implementation are (and remain) diffused. There are actually four different 
levels of responsibility intervening in the budget implementation. There is 
first the legislative authority (Council and Parliament) setting the design of 
spending programmes, the management mode and other conditions (like 
the rules for participation in research programmes). Then there is the 
executive, split for most of EU spending between the Commission and 
member states. And finally, there is a further sectioning within the 
Commission, due to the separation of the Commission’s College 
responsibilities from those of its Directors-General. 
There is an overall ‘accountability gap’. While member states ensure 
the main management functions, the latter are not held to account at EU 
level for their duties.261 Despite being ultimately responsible, the 
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implementation. It tends to retain a rather formal responsibility for policy 
set-up and its operational implementation. The scope of this responsibility 
is basically limited to the function of financial management of the 
appropriations and the application of financial corrections, making thus of 
ex-post clearance a shortcut for accountability.  
As has been pointed out, key to accountability in practice is how 
those responsible are held to account. When accountability is not working 
well, there is no reporting or inadequate reporting on performance; there is 
no serious, informed review of the information reported; and neither are 
there appropriate programme changes nor consequences for responsible 
individuals.262 The various difficulties related to the EU budget 
implementation impact on the main requisites for effective accountability 
in shared governance arrangements. This points in particular to 
weaknesses about the setting of commonly agreed objectives, the clarity on 
the expected results and the partners’ capability to meet expectations. 
The knock-on effect of all this is that Parliament receives insufficient 
information, in particular fair and reliable performance information that 
would allow it to develop the demonstrated capacity to learn and adapt if 
things go wrong. In the absence of a responsive interlocutor, the discharge 
process before the European Parliament resembles for most of EU funds a 
‘trial  in absentia’. And as a result, citizens are unclear about who is 
supposed to ‘give account’ and to be ‘held to account’ for what and to 
whom.  
Yet, for institutional (but also practical) purposes, roles-sharing 
between the EU and national level in the EU budget implementation is 
necessary. However, member states do not seem prepared for 
constitutional reasons to give account at EU level. How can this circle be 
squared? It seems clear that a new concept for the EU budget must go 
hand-in-hand with appropriate institutional reform setting governance and 
administration of the budget by intentional action, i.e. well-defined EU 
objectives. Once again, the question is: ‘Why Europe?’. 
  
70 | 
 
 
5. SQUARING THE CIRCLE 
If we do nothing, fate will deal with our present difficulties, in spite of ourselves. 
Jean Monnet 
 
o one could reasonably believe that the fundamental shortcomings 
of the present EU budget could be solved with ‘simple’ and 
straightforward solutions. The decision-making mechanisms have 
not proven so far to be conducive to change, basically due to the absence of 
incentives to overcome the focus on ‘fair returns’ (Gros, 2008:2). Any 
change may potentially affect the delicate institutional balance of powers 
among the EU institutions, as well as between them and the member states 
well beyond any likely financial impact. 
The problem is that “while everyone agrees in the abstract on the 
need for reform, as soon as the debate moves to concrete measures, there 
seems to be a strong bias in favour of the status quo”.263 If a test of the 
sensitivity of the matter (and of the vested interests at stake) is needed, it is 
sufficient to see the raft of criticism generated by a leaked initial draft of the 
Commission reform proposal.264  
Indeed, there is always someone who can lose out from any reform. 
No change may appear to many as a merit in itself and a relatively ‘safe’ 
solution; the highest merit being that, contrary to change, one might believe 
that it does not require an explanation. However, a failure of the budget 
review process will not be devoid of consequences. Immobility and lack of 
demonstration of the EU budget’s added-value could lead in the 
short/mid-term to its ‘sterilisation’ and its progressive ‘disintegration’ 
through various forms (re-nationalisation, ad hoc intergovernmental 
agreements in line with a Europe à géométrie variable).265 The risk is that the 
EU budget will slide into irrelevance, paving the way to denying its raison 
d’être.  
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A few factors play potentially against a déjà vu scenario. As often, 
urgency is dictating the European agenda. The economic crisis has put the 
spotlight on member states’ severe public deficits, requiring the adoption of 
rigorous measures to significantly curb public spending. It seems unlikely 
that for the EU budget things can go on ‘as before’, as if nothing happened 
and it could escape contributing to tougher budgetary discipline and 
rigour.  
The economic crisis has also shown that the European Council has 
taken decisions on economic and financial matters and policies that would 
have seemed unrealistic only months before. Nothing prevents the same 
from happening to the EU budget as well. The more so as the European 
Council has considered the multi-annual financial framework 2007-13 as an 
overall negotiation package of which the budget review was one of the 
clauses.266  This suggests that if the agreement on the current financial 
framework was in the end imposed by the timing, the call on the 
Commission “to undertake a full, wide-ranging review” covering all 
aspects of European Union spending and revenue267 was more than a ritual 
statement. After having clearly claimed the need to implement significant 
changes in the EU budget delivery process and its key role in reinforcing 
the trust of the European citizens, member states have no true interest in a 
failure. Faced with such significant issues, it is for them a matter of 
credibility to agree on far-reaching reforms and not just purely ‘cosmetic’ 
changes on the basis of the lowest common denominator.  
It is also worth recalling that the Treaty of Lisbon “marks a new stage 
in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as 
possible to the citizen.”268 The Treaty has expressed the intention “to 
enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions 
so as to enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional 
framework, the tasks entrusted to them”.269 In this perspective important 
changes have been introduced for Parliament and the Commission.  
One should note, concerning Parliament, the extension of co-decision 
in the legislative acts, and among them the Financial Regulation and the 
sectoral spending regulations;270 the new procedures for adopting the 
annual budget and the multi-annual framework; the right of initiative 
concerning revision of the Treaties.  
But the Treaty also states that the Commission, responsible as a body 
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the Union's finances based on the results achieved”.272 The expectation is 
that this would be an assessment by the Commission, going further than 
the traditional record of budgetary implementation. 
All this provides ground for the Parliament to seek (and obtain) 
increased influence in outlining the revised arrangements for EU finances. 
The setting-up of a special committee to prepare the EU's next long-term 
budget framework shows the willingness to seize this opportunity.273 
In particular, one may expect Parliament to recall previous requests 
such as: 
•  “A reform of the structure of EU revenue and a reform of the 
structure of EU expenditure have to go hand-in-hand”.274 
•  EU financial resources should be “used for actions with real 
European added-value, clearly defined priorities and visibility for 
citizens [and] spent under rules of sound financial management, 
focusing on efficiency and effectiveness”.275 
•  There is a need for “prior identification of positive and negative 
priorities rather than through self-imposed ceilings”; “it is essential 
that EU spending be re-evaluated and optimised in order to achieve 
the highest value-added and most effective EU action”; “it is 
particularly important that allocations of funds are based on objective 
criteria and on a continuous evaluation of their performance”.276 
•  “An initiative that is insufficiently verifiable should not be financed 
by public money”.277 And, not least, 
•  “The Commission has primacy in the management of the Community 
funds concerned”.278 
The Lisbon Treaty has also upgraded the role of the Commission, 
from ensuring “the proper functioning and development of the common 
market” to the more ambitious promotion of “the general interest of the 
Union”.279 This establishes a link (and a responsibility) with the 
achievement of the EU objectives as a whole and the need of ensuring 
consistency, effectiveness and continuity of EU policies and actions.280  
Concerning the EU budget, the Treaty confirms that it is 
implemented on the Commission’s “own responsibility” and “having 
regard to the principles of sound financial management”.281 To this effect, 
the Commission should count on adequate cooperation from member 
states, with the latter having control and audit obligations in the 
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represents a confirmation that member states’ bodies must have a key role 
in the EU budget implementation. It still remains however that it is the 
Commission that “shall execute the budget and manage programmes”.282 
This suggests an enhancement of the Commission’s role compared to 
today’s situation, in line with the reinforcement of its function as the 
‘executive’ of the Union. 
The EU added-value 
The European added-value may be said to constitute the keystone of the 
EU budget edifice. The raison d’être of the EU budget cannot be a matter of 
enthusiasm or faith. Or, be finalised to redistribute money across member 
states for which one could imagine far-simpler mechanisms. The EU 
budget’s ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of the citizens can only be based on clear 
objectives and convincing achievements.  
Indeed, “[a]s a leading principle, the EU budget should be targeted to 
policies where it can make a difference and bring real added-value.”283 
Choices must be explained, understood and accounted for. The more so in 
a time of great strain on public finances, imposing strict limitations on 
public spending at all levels. The budget review screening has shown once 
again a broad acknowledgment that EU spending must be based on an 
assessment of its added-value.284 The main question is whether and how a 
spending programme brings European added-value. Is there ‘European 
added-value’ everywhere? What criteria should be used to ensure that the 
principle of European value added is applied effectively? 
The Treaty provides in this respect a number of ‘curbs’. It establishes 
first a causality link between, on the one side, the Union’s competences and 
the objectives to be attained and, on the other side, the financial means 
necessary to attain these objectives.285 Second, it indicates that in areas that 
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union’s action is restricted 
to objectives that member states cannot sufficiently achieve themselves but 
can rather, by reason of the scale or effects, be better achieved at Union 
level.286 Third, it explains in support of the previous condition, that “[t]he 
reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at 
Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, 
quantitative indicators”.287 
As indicated by the Commission, the EU budget should be “targeted 
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bringing tangible improvements to the daily lives of citizens”.288 This 
suggests three main characteristics of EU spending added-value: 
•  ‘Catalytic’. The EU budget is expected to make something happen that 
would otherwise not happen (or would happen more slowly), i.e. to 
attain what cannot be matched by national or local spending in acting 
alone; so that “pooling national resources at EU level can bring major 
savings for national budgets”.289 However, the European added-value 
cannot be equated simply to more money available compared to what 
could normally be provided by national budgets. The ‘discriminating’ 
factor for EU spending being not the added-value of spending as 
such, but rather its ‘European’ dimension, acting as a catalyst for 
public and private investors. It is about EU objectives, not 
‘Europeanised’ national objectives.  
•  Targeted. The budget should concentrate on what offers the best 
added-value and most effective results. It should avoid duplication 
with national spending but also intervening in all areas of policy-
making as if EU spending was a ‘magic wand’ for all problems. 
Policies should be assessed against all kinds of costs they entail (for 
example, those costs imposed upon member states and upon 
beneficiaries) compared to the objectives. Different EU funding 
sources should be coordinated. In this context, financial assistance 
other than grants (for example, EIB loans and other financing 
facilities) should be considered to leverage the effect of Union funds. 
But the relative effectiveness of different (non-budgetary) means of 
intervention available to EU policy-makers, in particular legislative 
instruments should also be assessed. One should not exclude the 
possibility that a number of EU policy objectives could be better 
addressed by improving the regulatory framework than by 
transferring money across member states.290 
•  Realistic. The EU budget should be organised in such a way that the 
spending meets its goals, through streamlined delivery schemes and 
a proper account-giving with a single ‘owner’. 
Whether shared objectives could be better achieved at the European 
level or at another level is naturally a matter of political choice, involving 
above all member states and the European Parliament. A thought from J. 
Monnet seems inspiring in this context: “What must be sought is a fusion of 
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maintain an equilibrium of those interests through additional machinery 
for negotiation”.291 
In any event, the fixed route towards a greater EU added-value 
passes above all through selectivity, concentration of resources and 
adequate implementation arrangements. Indeed, “[w]hen ambitious 
objectives are pursued with limited resources and weak implementation 
mechanisms, we have a recipe for disappointment”.292 
More money for fewer but achievable objectives  
Funds are not unlimited. EU and national spending compete for the same 
tax revenues. Realism requires an awareness that it is most unlikely that the 
post-2013 EU funds available will be significantly above the current level.293 
And even cuts should not be excluded as member states attempt to rein in 
their spending.  
However, “it is not only important to discuss the quantity, but also 
the quality of spending and investment”.294 There are basically two 
alternatives: more money for a ‘few’ spending programmes, or less money 
for a plurality of programmes. In this respect, an indiscriminate horizontal 
‘cutting’ to preserve all existing programmes does not appear to be a 
sensible solution.295 The advantage of this ‘conservative’ approach would 
be confined to an accounting matching with the available resources, further 
compounding the current lack of critical mass. One should also consider 
the EU budget in a broader perspective, by looking at European and 
national budgets together. Less funds from the EU budget do not mean 
necessarily less funds for a given policy, but rather the choice for a different 
level of government.296  
The priority seems to be to ‘prioritisation’, involving most likely hard 
political choices.297 In this context the argument that the EU budget is 
relatively ‘small’ has its best value. This ‘constraint’ is actually a potential 
means of giving more significance and credibility to EU action by putting 
in place an evidence-based decision-making process to support such 
choices.  
The starting-point of all administration is “the balance-sheet of needs 
and resources”.298 To ensure that “our proposals really do deliver what 
they promise and to enable us to revise and correct them where they fail to 
work as expected”,299 the obvious way out is an assessment of (past and 
future) policies, taking stock of the significant experience and evaluation 
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design spending programmes in terms of specific, measurable and 
achievable objectives, expected outcomes and resulting costs.300 In this 
respect a ‘critical mass’ of necessary funds constitutes a crucial factor to 
achieve a precise and identifiable result.301 In its turn, accountability can 
only be enhanced by establishing a link between investment costs and 
expected benefits. 
This means that the volume of funds allocated to the EU budget 
should result from an assessment of the costs of specific objectives 
achievable with the available funds. While still being compatible with an 
overall ceiling on EU revenue, the EU budget would thus enhance its 
function as an instrument of action and potential achievements, as opposed 
to pre-agreed ‘budgetary balance’-driven intergovernmental redistribution. 
Putting the emphasis on achievable objectives rather than on 
processes would also put the basis for a shift from ‘eligible’ inputs of 
spending towards outputs and outcomes. This would make unnecessary 
‘absorption-addicting’ rules like the N+2 (or N+3) rule in the Cohesion 
policy. And it would pave the way to a combination of sunset clauses 
providing for the discontinuation of spending programmes without 
meaningful results after a certain period of time, and incentives to reward 
best performers.302 This approach addresses one of the present ‘taboos’: the 
lack of conditionality for results. One should welcome in this respect that 
one of the key conclusions of the Commission concerning the EU budget 
review is the need for a results-driven budget (as opposed to inputs-based), 
where spending programmes must have a real impact.303 A first signal in 
this respect is represented by the initiative recently taken by the 
Commission in the research field, moving away from a cost-based system 
focused on inputs towards a system of funding based on prior definition 
and acceptance of outputs/outcomes.304 Also, a shift from inputs of eligible 
spending to results will make it possible to define control systems in a 
broader perspective, taking account of ‘value for money’ concerns and thus 
enhancing their added-value for the management. 
In line with the ‘targeted’ nature of the EU added-value and the 
‘special’ role of the EU budget as a functional instrument for realising 
actions that could not otherwise be effectively implemented by the national 
level, consideration should be given to using EU funds to ‘realise’ well-
defined actions that undeniably belong to the EU level. In other words, to 
provide ‘the cake rather than the icing’. The ‘complementarity’ or 
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adding ‘something’ to a number of existing policies already financed by 
national budgets, but, above all, by realising in toto projects that are 
‘European’ by definition and could therefore, in some way, be considered 
as an exclusive priority of that level.  
EU budget, what ‘phone number’? 
The natural outcome of a virtuous process where objectives are clear, 
agreed and achievable is an unequivocal ownership as a precondition for 
both achieving policy objectives and ensuring ‘value for money’. This 
would also lead to an accountability process “based on obligations to 
demonstrate, review, and take responsibility for performance, both the 
results achieved in light of agreed expectations and the means used”.305  
As pointed out in the Commission’s Budget review consultation 
paper, “a fresh look needs to be taken to determine how different types of 
management can offer sound financial management and whether the 
existing balance represents the right answer”.306 Nowadays, the 
interpretation given to the subsidiarity/proportionality principles implies 
that ‘shared management’ arrangements are based on a dissociation of the 
decision-taking aspect from the financial implementation. Such a 
framework creates the conditions for diffused responsibilities and, in 
practice, for ‘immunity’ of the management actors as the main management 
and control functions are implemented by national bodies not directly 
accountable at EU level. The Commission, which in theory bears ultimate 
responsibility, is not in the position to commit itself to anything under 
member states’ responsibilities as it lacks the necessary authority. In this 
respect, any clearance mechanisms it may apply constitute at most an ex-
post funds recovery and not a ‘policy-oriented’ function. 
For both constitutional and political reasons, there is a natural 
sensitivity to any form of accountability of national bodies towards EU 
institutions. In particular, it does not seem realistic to put in place a formal 
accountability process before the European Parliament, for example in the 
framework of the discharge procedure. In the end, this would mean 
making national governments accountable to both national parliaments 
and the European Parliament, a possibility that member states have always 
dismissed, insisting on keeping the Commission’s ultimate responsibility 
set in the Treaty. The alternative to run such a process at national level and 
in a national context (each member state responsible for the EU funds spent 
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equating the EU added-value to ‘more money’ rather than a project of 
achieving EU objectives with EU funds. It would lead in practice to a 
‘nationalisation’ of the EU budget, thus calling into question its very 
necessity. 
As the Commission observed, it must “be clearer who is responsible 
for policy execution. This constitutes the pre-condition for making the EU 
system more open and accountable to all European citizens.” Since it is 
about placing public resources in common to achieve common EU 
objectives, it is legitimate to expect that the management of EU funds takes 
place through an effective EU-driven process, ending-up in a full 
accountability at EU level. To counter the present diffusion of 
responsibilities and as a result of an enhanced concept of EU added-value, 
there seems to be no alternative but to designate the Commission as the 
single master for the EU budget implementation as a whole. This full 
incumbency, following a political mandate, should lay in its hands 
whatever the management mode. Its competence to “execute the budget 
and manage programmes” should be instrumental in fulfilling its main role 
of promoting the general interest of the Union.307  
In a future perspective, where one might look more to results than to 
inputs of spending, the Commission will have to demonstrate that it has 
done everything possible to achieve the intended results, ‘making the 
difference’ when compared to purely national spending. And that it has 
learned from past experience what works and does not work. Indeed, the 
primary purpose of accountability is not to cast blame and to punish. It 
should rather help in identifying lessons for the future, to make future 
approaches more relevant and effective. 
For this to happen, a precondition is the alignment of the 
Commission’s tasks, powers and responsibilities. There is no need to 
transform the Commission into a kind of ‘Colossus of Brussels’, with 
hundreds of thousands of officials replacing functions presently carried out 
by national bodies. This would not be feasible in practice, certainly not 
cost-effective and in any event not politically realistic. National bodies 
should remain an essential element of the EU delivery system. There is 
however room for reflection on “where the balance should lie between EU-
level tools and national level tools, and what expectations should be placed 
on Member States implementing EU policy in their own countries.”308 
Experience shows that remote administration, devoid of 
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complexity at the expense of substance. Systems ‘modelling’, pursued 
through increasingly tight provisions and sustained by a number of 
prescriptions and interdictions, cannot make up for insufficient 
supervision. It is indeed quicker and easier to develop and pass legal 
provisions than to build effective implementing institutions (Sigma, 
1998:6).  
To avoid an implementation gap, i.e. a deficit between the set of legal 
norms and the capacity to implement and enforce them according to EU 
standards, it seems logical that as a consequence of the Commission’s full 
incumbency in the EU budget implementation, national bodies dealing 
with EU funds should act on behalf of the Commission. The delegation to 
national bodies should then be understood as covering specific executive 
tasks only, not the budgetary implementation as such.309 This would 
require some form of accreditation and ‘contract’ based upon pre-specified 
output and performance targets and budgetary allocations, in line with the 
EU objectives selected.310 It is only if there is ‘one’ implementation line (and 
not as many as there are national bodies) that one can sustain the 
Commission’s ultimate responsibility, which cannot itself be subject to 
delegation. 
The idea of an accreditation by the EU of national systems is not new. 
Its main components were embedded in EU rules until recent years. 
Assurance on systems should become a pre-condition for allocation and 
management of EU funds; i.e. administrative structures at national level 
should be assessed (at operational level) as adequate to deliver the 
outcomes expected. The aim is to ascertain their capacities to ‘absorb’ funds 
effectively, by putting forward, managing and maintaining meaningful 
projects in line with the pre-agreed policy objectives. This means the 
establishment by the Commission of ‘stress tests’ as overseer of national 
bodies operating in the framework of the EU budget. 
Such an ‘accreditation process’ would not be incompatible with an 
eventual ‘geographical’ allocation of funds to member states, providing 
that these funds will be used only by the ‘certified’ bodies. A ‘selective’ 
process of identification of national bodies for EU spending (a kind of 
‘Champions league’) would introduce an element of ‘reward’ and sound 
external pressure, which in the end should benefit public spending also at 
the national level.311 A s  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  p r esent financial corrective 
mechanisms, whose effectiveness as deterrent is questionable, a 
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EU funds would be a reputational sanction far more effective and 
dissuasive. 
The current implementation logic should be reversed, with a shift 
from the present ‘ex-post’ (first pay out the money, then time will tell) to ‘ex-
ante’ (prevention is better than the cure). In short, from a substantially 
passive oversight to a more active one.312 There should no longer be a 
segregation of functions between the EU and the national level, but a true 
‘sharing’ of roles under one single responsibility. This means putting an 
end to the dissociation of the decision-taking aspect from the financial 
implementation.  
Partnership with national bodies should not be limited to an 
exchange of plans, reports and reimbursement claims. It should involve co-
decision in the EU meaning, with a weighting proportional to the funds 
committed for achieving a given objective. This would imply for example 
that the setting-up and the management of the programmes implemented 
in shared management arrangements will no longer be left solely in the 
hands of the member states. And that at the very least the Commission is 
made aware and is prepared to endorse directly that what is intended to be 
achieved responds to the criteria of EU added-value.313 
The EU authorising officer would therefore be truly responsible “for 
implementing revenue and expenditure in accordance with the principles 
of sound financial management and for ensuring that the requirements of 
legality and regularity are complied with”; and it should be accountable for 
“the results of the operations by reference to the objectives set” as well as 
“the use made of the resources provided”.314 In this connection, only a full 
awareness of the Commission on the EU budget implementation may 
ensure practical relevance to the new provision of establishing each year an 
evaluation report on the Union's finances based on the results achieved by 
EU funds.315 
Like the port pilot, the EU Commission would not be the owner of 
the boat but would retain responsibility to take it safely to port. A clearer 
management line under the Commission’s responsibility would put an end 
to the shuttling back and forth of responsibilities between national and EU 
level. And, not least, as indeed accountability is closely linked to 
parliamentary control, it will give full dignity to the EU discharge 
procedure. Contrary to the today’s situation, the Commission would be in 
the position to respond on the actual use of the funds and the results 
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Concluding remarks 
The above considerations attempt to provide a tentative response to the 
difficulties of the present EU budget system at the origin of the present 
accountability gap. The prejudice is that a ‘quantum leap’ is needed. The 
resulting framework should be considered in a prospective dimension and 
in a fundamentally different context than the present one. 
The sketched framework would admittedly go far further than the 
one in place today. It would end up in practice first for the Commission to 
establish a kind of ‘rating’ of systems prior to bidding for EU money. An 
inevitable result could be that not all bodies that are dealing today with EU 
funds would finally prove fit for the task. And then, as the owner of the EU 
budget implementation, it would involve the Commission taking part in 
the decision process, although in partnership with national bodies. This 
would require adopting a functional understanding of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality to make room for a different governance 
system. Also, a ‘gear change’ for the Commission would be necessary, with 
a different balance of skills in its services and an adapted project 
management approach. 
The recently presented Commission’s conclusions on the EU budget 
reform constitute a comprehensive illustration of the present difficulties. 
Sensitive proposals are put forward as a basis for a better post-2013 EU 
budget. The debate on the EU future finances has however only started and 
its outcome is clearly unpredictable today. It will however undoubtedly 
serve as a ‘litmus test’ of the European project as a whole. 
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ANNEX: NATIONAL CONTROL & REPORTING FUNCTIONS  
Control system for agriculture (direct expenditure) 
Member state’s body  Control functions  Reporting and certification obligations 
Paying agency  Provides sufficient guarantees that: 
•  the admissibility of claims and compliance with 
EU rules are checked before payment is 
authorised; and 
•  the payments effected are correctly and fully 
recorded in the accounts. 
The systems generally provide for exhaustive ex-ante 
administrative controls of 100% of the aid applications, 
cross-checks with other databases where this is 
considered appropriate as well as pre-payment on-the-
spot controls of a sample of transactions ranging 
between 1% and 100% (normally between 5% and 
10%), depending on the risk associated with the regime 
in question. If the on-the-spot controls reveal a high 
number of irregularities, additional controls must be 
carried out. 
Ex-post controls are carried out in accordance with an 
annual audit plan established on the basis of a pre-
determined audit strategy.  
The head of the paying agency provides the 
annual accounts of the accredited paying agency 
accompanied by a Statement of Assurance with 
a declaration on the completeness, accuracy and 
veracity of the accounts and that a system is in 
place that provides reasonable assurance on the 
legality and regularity of the underlying 
transactions. 88 | ANNEX 
 
Certifying body  Independent body responsible for certifying reasonable 
assurance that the accounts transmitted to the 
Commission are true, complete and accurate and that 
the internal control procedures have operated 
satisfactorily. 
Examines the paying agency‘s administrative 
structures and procedures as well as a sample of 
transactions. This examination covers the question 
whether the paying agency‘s administrative structure is 
capable of ensuring that compliance with EU rules is 
checked before any payments are made. In broad 
terms, Certifying bodies are not required to verify 
activities at the level of the final beneficiary. The 
responsibilities do not extend to checking that claims 
for payment of subsidy are correct. 
Establishes an opinion on the paying agency‘s 
Statement of Assurance and Declaration, stating 
whether: 
•  the paying agency complies with the 
accreditation criteria; 
•  the paying agency‘s procedures are such 
as to give reasonable assurance that the 
expenditure was effected in compliance 
with EU rules; 
•  the annual accounts are in accordance with 
the paying agency‘s books and records; 
•  the statement of expenditure and 
intervention operations are materially true, 
complete and accurate; 
•  the financial interests of the EU are 
properly protected; and 
•  Verifies and validates IACS statistics. 
Coordinating body  If the member state has more than one paying agency, 
it acts as the Commission‘s sole interlocutor for all 
questions regarding the management and control of 
agricultural expenditure. 
Produces an annual summary (synthesis report) 
of all Statements of Assurance and of all 
certificates from the certification bodies. 
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National control system for Cohesion policy 
Member state’s body  Control functions  Reporting and certification obligations 
Managing authority   •  Makes sure that operations selected for the 
programme comply with the criteria and rules 
applicable. 
•  Verifies that products and services are delivered 
and that the expenditure declared by the 
beneficiaries for operations has actually been 
incurred and complies with EU and national rules. 
This implies both desk checks (on documents such 
as lists of invoices and progress or final reports 
accompanying payment claims from project 
promoters) and on-the-spot visits to projects 
selected using a sound sampling methodology. 
•  Corrects irregular expenditure found by 
withdrawing it from payment claims to the 
Commission and recovering grants already paid 
from the beneficiaries. 
Delivers an annual performance report to the 
Commission showing the progress made in 
implementing the operational programme and 
its financial implementation. A final report must 
also be delivered no later than 31 March 2017. 
Certifying authority  •  Examines the expenditure claims transmitted by 
the Managing Authority. It assesses reliance of the 
information on the latter’s verifications of the 
beneficiaries. It also takes account of the available 
Audit Authority reports on the functioning of the 
control systems. 
•  It may carry out additional checks itself or ask 
others to do so. 
 
Certifies to the Commission that the expenditure 
being declared for reimbursement is accurate, 
results from a reliable accounting system, and is 
compliant with applicable EU and national 
rules.  90 | ANNEX 
 
Audit authority  •  On the basis of an audit strategy approved by the 
Commission, verifies the effectiveness of the work 
done by the Managing and Certifying Authorities 
in order to determine whether risks remain that 
irregular expenditure could be certified. 
•  Its work is based on a standard methodology built 
on systems assessments and supported by 
substantive testing of project expenditure declared 
over a 12-month reference period. 
Provides an annual control report to the 
Commission setting out the findings of the 
audits carried out during the previous year. This 
is accompanied by an audit opinion as to 
whether reasonable assurance exists that 
statements of expenditure presented to the 
Commission are correct. 
Submits to the Commission at the latest by 31 
March 2017 a closure declaration assessing the 
validity of the application for payment of the 
final balance and the legality and regularity of 
the underlying transactions covered by the final 
statement of expenditure, which shall be 
supported by a final control report. 
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Notes 
                                                      
1 See the Code of Hammurabi (§ 233), translation by L.W. King (available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp). The Code of Hammurabi is a 
collection of the King of Babylon’s laws [1795-1750 BC]. 
2 Barlev (2006:176) refers in this respect to the accounting method of comparing 
theoretical (expected) and actual performance used in Mesopotamia and referred 
to as “budgetary procedure” by Mattessich (1998). 
3 See Book of Exodus (Ex. 38:21–31), cited in Barlev (2006:192).  
4 See the Holy Gospel according to St. Luke (16.1-2/13). 
5 See Art. 15 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (National 
Assembly of France, 26 August 1789). A similar definition has been adopted by the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life, an independent advisory body to the UK 
Government. The definition reads: “Holders of public office are accountable for 
their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever 
scrutiny is appropriate to their office”. 
6 Together with openness, participation, effectiveness and coherence, the European 
Commission (2001:10) has defined accountability as one of the five principles 
underpinning good governance. Although there are no EU rules (thus an acquis 
communautaire) regarding administrative organisation or public management, 
shared principles of public administration among EU member states progressively 
resulted from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, so as to put in 
place the conditions for an ‘European Administrative Space’ (EAS). The EAS 
represents an evolving process of increasing convergence between national 
administrative legal orders and administrative practices of member states, 
enforced in practice through administrative laws and procedures. One should also 
notice that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 303 of 
14.12.2007) recognises (in its Art. 41) the right to “good administration” as one of 
the EU fundamental citizens’ rights. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), Art. 6 
(1), has given to the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as the 
Treaties. 
7 The principal-agent partnership model constitutes in essence a hierarchical 
relationship in which objectives and policies are set by the principal and 
implementation by the agent is closely supervised and monitored. Standard 
management-by-objectives models and methods provide the means of making this 
type of partnership work (see Sigma, 1998:51).  
8 See Committee of Independent Experts (1999, Vol. II, point 7.14.5, p. 130).  
9 This concept is close to the definition of ‘political responsibility’ given by van 
Gerven (2007:2). 
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10 For example, in the EU Financial Regulation, the words “responsibility” and 
“accountability” are used interchangeably, although with a marked preference for 
the first (see Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on 
the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities, OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, as amended last by Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1525/2007 of 17 December 2007, OJ L 343, 17.12.2007). 
11 “E Pluribus Unum”, the concept of ‘many’ becoming ‘one’, is embedded in the 
seal of the United States of America. It refers to the union between the states and 
federal government in a single nation. 
12 The principle of ‘economy’ requires that the resources used shall be made 
available in due time, in appropriate quantity and quality and at the best price. 
‘Efficiency’ is characteristically a managerial value consisting in essence of 
maintaining a good ratio between resources employed and results attained. A 
related value is ‘effectiveness’, which basically consists of ensuring that the 
performance of public administration is successful in achieving the goals and 
solving the public problems set for it by law and government (see Sigma, 1999:13). 
These principles (known as the ‘three E’s’) are also codified in the EU Financial 
Regulation under the concept of sound financial management (see Art. 27 of the 
Financial Regulation, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002, op. cit.).  
13 See the GAO website (http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html). 
14 See the European Court of Auditors’ “Mission, Vision, Values and Strategic 
Objectives”  (http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/5544724.PDF). 
15 See Auditor General of Canada (2002:5).  
16 See Art. 1 TEU. It should also be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon has abandoned 
the constitutional concept which consisted of repealing all existing Treaties and 
replacing them by a single text called “Constitution” as provided by the (not 
ratified) Constitutional Treaty signed on 29.10.2004 (OJ C310 of 16.12.2004).  
17 See Art. 3(6) TEU.  
18 See Art. 5(1) and (2) TEU. Art. 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) establishes three categories of EU competences depending on the 
intervention field (exclusive, shared with the member states, and competence to 
carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement members states’ actions). In 
few areas the European Union has exclusive competence (see Art. 3 TFEU). Most of 
EU competences are shared with member states (see Art. 4 TFEU). It is worth 
mentioning that Art. 4(1) TEU (and the Declaration No. 18 in relation to the 
delimitation of competences attached to the Treaty of Lisbon) underlines that 
“competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States”. Protocol No. 25 on the exercise of shared competence clarifies that 
“when the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of 
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competence only covers those elements governed by the Union act in question and 
therefore does not cover the whole area”. An increase or a reduction of EU 
competences may be decided in accordance with the Treaty’s ordinary revision 
procedure provided for in Art. 48 TEU. The procedure may be initiated by member 
states, the European Parliament or the Commission. A Treaty revision would 
require ratification by member states in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
19 The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were set out by the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992) as general principles of EU law. The principle of subsidiarity had 
some historical antecedents in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
Treaty of 1951 (Art. 5) and in the Single European Act of 1986 (Art. 130r(4)). The 
overall approach has been developed by the conclusions of the Presidency at the 
European Council of Edinburgh (11-12 December 1992). Subsequently, the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concluded in November 
1993 an Inter-institutional Agreement on procedures for implementing the 
principle of subsidiarity (OJ C 329, 6.12.1993, p. 132). Furthermore, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) introduced the protocols on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality as well as on the role of national Parliaments in 
the European Union. This encouraged greater involvement of national Parliaments 
in EU activities and enhanced their ability to express their views on matters that 
may be of particular interest to them. The importance of the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles has been further stressed by the Treaty of Lisbon. A 
Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality provides that national Parliaments may express their opinions with 
regard to the compliance of a legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity and 
ask for it to be reviewed. The same protocol also provides for national Parliaments 
and the Committee of the Regions to bring suspected violations of the principle of 
subsidiarity before the European Court of Justice. One may also note that a 
‘subsidiarity monitoring network’ has been created by the Committee of the 
Regions in order to facilitate the exchange of information between local and 
regional authorities in the European Union and the EU level. This regards the 
various policy documents and proposals of the European Commission which, once 
adopted, will have a direct impact on local and regional authorities and the policies 
for which they are responsible (see 
http://subsidiarity.cor.europa.eu/Help/tabid/283/Default.aspx) .  E a c h  y e a r  t h e  
Commission presents a report on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality (for the latest report, see COM (2010) 547 final of 8.10.2010). 
20 See Art. 5(3) TEU. 
21 See Art. 5(4) TEU. 
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22 See European Commission (2002:24).  
23 Lenaerts indicates that the common understanding of the principle of separation 
of powers, i.e. a distinction between those who hold the legislative, executive and 
judicial power, is not practicable in the EU because of a lack of a clear-cut line 
between the legislative and the executive branches of the EU government. But this 
is not to say that the separation of powers is meaningless in the EU context, but 
rather that its understanding should be a functional one. The author stresses that 
while the legislative function is normally performed by EU Institutions, the 
executive and judicial functions are performed to a large extent by member states 
on behalf of the EU. Cassese (2006) has pointed out four specific features of the EU 
framework compared with domestic administrative orders. Firstly, contrary to 
domestic administrations, the European administration has not just one centre of 
power but two. These are an intergovernmental body (the Council) and a purely 
European institution (the Commission). Second, while domestic administrations 
have exclusive powers of implementation, the consequence of the subsidiarity 
principle is that the European administration is not the only implementing 
authority of the EU. The implementing power of the EU is consequently residual 
and not monopolistic. So, domestic administrations must facilitate and implement 
European law (a formal recognition of this principle can be found in Art. 4(3) TEU). 
Thirdly, while domestic administrative law is binomial (i.e. there are relations 
between two poles, the executive and a private party), European administrative 
law is trinomial. There are relations among the European Commission, national 
administrations and private parties, and each may play multiple roles. This 
multiplicity of players generates “polycentric adjudication processes”. Finally, 
while domestic administrative law is usually a privileged branch of law, full of 
executive prerogatives, in European administrative law the administration does 
not generally enjoy special rights and privileges. 
24 See European Commission (2002:20). 
25 See the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union. Art. 13(1) TEU reads: “The 
Union shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its values, 
advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the 
Member States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its 
policies and actions.”  
26 See case-law 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van 
Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. Judgment of the 
Court of 5 February 1963, ECR 1963, p. 1 and Case-law 6/64, Flaminio Costa v 
E.N.E.L.. Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, ECR 1964, p. 1251. 
27 See Case-law 103/88, Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano. Judgment of 
the Court of 22 June 1989. ECR 1989, p. 1839, para. 33. 
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28 See Art. 13(2) TEU. One may notice that the Treaty reiterates the limits of powers 
of each institution “with particular regard to the Union’s own resources and the 
balance between revenue and expenditure” (see Art. 314(10) TFEU). One should 
also note that the European Court of Justice has dismissed the argument that all 
original law-making power is vested in the Council, whilst the Commission has 
only powers of surveillance and implementation. The Court has judged that there 
is no basis for this argument as according to the Treaties the Commission is to 
participate in carrying out the tasks entrusted to the Community on the same basis 
as the other Institutions, each acting within the limits of the powers conferred upon 
it by the Treaty (see Joined Cases-law 188 to 190/80, French Republic, Italian 
Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v 
Commission of the European Communities. Judgment of the Court of 6 July 1982, 
ECR 1982, p. 2545). 
29 See Art. 15(1) TEU. 
30 See Arts 14(1), 16(1) and 17(2) TEU. Following entering into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, almost all EU legislation will be endorsed by both the Parliament and 
Council through the ordinary legislative procedure (see Art. 294 TFEU). The 
latter’s field of application, previously known as “co-decision”, has more than 
doubled, applying to existing EU policies (like agriculture and fisheries, Structural 
Funds, immigration and judicial cooperation) or new areas like energy, space and 
tourism.  
31 See Arts 17(1) TEU, 290 and 291 TFEU. Reference is made to the distinction 
between delegated acts (the Commission to adopt delegated acts in the field of 
competence of the European Parliament and/or the Council, Art. 290 TFEU) and 
implementing acts (acts adopted by the Commission in its own field of 
competence, Art. 291 TFEU). Under the EC Treaty it was the Council that could 
confer implementing powers on the Commission. The Council could also reserve 
implementing powers to itself in specific cases. The new Treaty put the co-
legislators on an equal footing in relation to the conferral of delegated and 
implementing powers. See also note 104. 
32 See Art. 10(2) TEU. The Council consist “of a representative of each Member 
State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in 
question and cast its vote” (see Art. 16(2) TEU).  
33 See Art. 16(1) TEU. It is worth mentioning in this respect the declaration made by 
the German Chancellor K. Adenauer on 9 September 1952, at the inaugural 
meeting of the ECSC Council, as reported by J. Monnet: “The Council stands at the 
crossroads of two kinds of sovereignty, national and supranational…While it must 
safeguard the national interests of the member States, it must not regard this as its 
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paramount task. Its paramount task is to promote the interests of the Community; 
and unless it does so, the Community will not develop” (Monnet, 1978:381). 
34 See Art. 10(1) and (2) TEU. 
35 See Art. 14(1) TEU. In this respect Parliament has the faculty to hear the 
European Council, the Council and the Commission (see Art. 230 TFEU). 
36 See Art. 17(1) TEU. This principle has been introduced by the Lisbon Treaty but 
was already embedded in the Commission’s Governance Statement of 30.5.2007. 
This stance has been recalled by European Commission President José Manuel 
Barroso, stating that “[o]nly the Commission has the authority, the administrative 
capacity and the technical expertise to make proposals that take the interests of all 
Member States and all citizens into account, and the long-term view needed to 
tackle the big issues we face today” (see European Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso, Political guidelines for the next Commission, 3 September 2009, p. 
37). As pointed out by Ponzano (2009:218) the general interest of the Union does 
not necessarily correspond to the addition of national interests, neither it equates 
the lowest common denominator of the different national stances.  
37 See Art. 17(1) TEU. As observed earlier (see note 23) the executive and judicial 
functions are performed to a large extent by member states on behalf of the EU. As 
a kind of ultima ratio, when the Commission considers that a member state has 
failed to fulfil a Treaty obligation, it may bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice seeking a declaration of an infringement of EU law. The Commission can 
apply to the Court a second time seeking the application of financial sanctions until 
the first ruling of the Court is respected (see Arts 258 and 260 TFEU). 
38 See Art. 17(1) TEU. 
39 See Art. 17(2) TEU. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (see 
Art. 289(4)) provides that in specific cases legislative acts may be adopted on the 
initiative of a group of member states or of the European Parliament, on a 
recommendation from the European Central Bank or at the request of the Court of 
Justice or the European Investment Bank. For example, in the area of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and of the police cooperation acts may be adopted 
on the initiative of a quarter of the member states (see Art. 76 TFEU). Both the 
European Parliament and the Council may request the Commission to submit any 
appropriate proposal and, if the Commission disagrees, to justify its position (see 
Arts 225 and 241 TFEU). The Treaty also provides that a group of not less than one 
million EU citizens may ask the Commission to draw up a proposal (see Art. 11(4) 
TEU).  
40 See Arts 14(1), 17(7) and (8) TEU. It is worth recalling in this respect the words of 
J. Monnet, President of the High Authority, addressing the ECSC Parliamentary 
Assembly: “The High Authority has been entrusted with the implementation of the 
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objectives laid down in the Treaty. It is to you, and to you only, that the High 
Authority is responsible.” (see Debates in the Common Assembly – Session of 11 
September 1952, Opening address to the Assembly concerning the High 
Authority’s programmes, reported in European Parliament (2010:56). The Treaty 
(see Art. 17(7) TEU) sets a two-stage procedure for appointing the European 
Commission. The European Council shall propose to the European Parliament a 
candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the 
Euro p e an  Pa rli am en t  b y a m ajo r it y o f  it s members. Failing this, the Council of 
Ministers must put forward another name who shall be elected by the European 
Parliament following the same procedure. Then, by common accord with the 
President-elect, the Council shall propose the other members of the Commission. 
The College of Commissioners must then be endorsed as a body by the European 
Parliament through a vote of consent. On the basis of this consent, the Commission 
shall be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.  
41 See Art. 17(3) TEU. The Treaty stresses that in carrying out its responsibilities, 
the Commission shall be completely independent. Except for the common foreign, 
defence and security policies, its members “shall neither seek nor take instructions 
from any Government or other institution, body, office or entity” (see Arts 17(3) 
and 18(2) TEU). The Treaty also provides that member states shall respect the 
independence of the members of the Commission and “shall not seek to influence 
them in the performance of their tasks” (see Art. 245 TFEU). 
42 See European Commission (2002:25). It is interesting to note in this respect that 
the Treaty itself recognises that national interests might not be in line with 
European ones. Indeed, the Treaty states that members states “shall facilitate the 
achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives” (see Art. 4(3) TEU). Similarly, 
concerning the common foreign and security policy, member states “shall refrain 
from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair 
its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” (see Art. 24(3) TEU). 
Also, member states “shall take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the 
financial interests of the Union as they take to counter fraud affecting their own 
financial interests” (see Art. 325(2) TFEU).  
43 See CEPS, EGMONT & EPC (2007: 23). 
44 The two concepts are discussed in Pisani (1956:324-325). 
45 See Auditor General of Canada (2002:12). 
46 F o r  a  c o m p l e t e  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  E U  b u dget process, see European Commission 
(2008). For a critical analysis, see the numerous contributions presented in the 
context of the EU budget review 
(http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/index_en.htm). 
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47 See Barroso (2008).  
48 See European Commission (2004:5, 8).  
49 It is worth mentioning that, already in 1978, the Commission had tried to define 
the intervention of the EU budget on the basis of criteria such as ‘economies of 
scale’, the ‘need for a global approach with the other policies funded’ or the 
‘reduction of the burden of national budgets’ (see European Commission, 1978:6-
8). However these criteria turned out to be too vague to be applied. With the 
Lisbon Treaty it would still be possible for the EU budget to intervene in all 
sectors. Indeed, while the Treaty establishes three types of categories and areas of 
EU competence (see note 18), it does not provide operational criteria to define the 
EU area of intervention. 
50 See European Commission (2002:20). For example, immigration, justice, taxation, 
the labour market, energy and telecommunications are all sectors in which 
responsibilities are still largely national but which doubtlessly have effects across 
frontiers. 
51 Gros (2008:2) argues that the current composition of spending is the result of 
historical accidents and that the main legacy of the ‘founding’ compromises on 
agriculture and Structural Funds is that the budget is basically seen as a vehicle for 
the redistribution of money between member states, rather than a tool for fostering 
common goals. 
52 Farmers receive an amount of money based approximately on the area they farm 
(regardless what they produce), provided that they comply with a number of agro-
environmental requirements. 
53 One of the aims is to start a process of structural transformation of the economy, 
thus favouring the recovery of economic systems and the development of trade. In 
this respect, although in different circumstances and within a peculiar context, 
there are conceptual similarities with the post-Second World War European 
Recovery Program (also known as the Marshall Plan, 1948-1951) through which the 
United States of America channelled some €100 billion to 16 European states. 
54 According to the principle of additionality, EU transfers for Structural policies 
should not replace public or equivalent structural expenditure by a member state. 
As a general rule the level of the expenditure shall be at least equal to the amount 
of average annual expenditure in real terms attained during the previous 
programming period (see Art. 15(1) of Regulation No 1083/2006 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, as amended by Regulation No. 539/2010, 16.6.2010, 
OJ L 158 of 24.6.2010). 
55  As defined by Danuta Hübner (2007a:3), the former European Commissioner 
responsible for Regional Policy.  
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56 See European Commission (1977:17). One should observe that the funds 
available are usually not fully used (for example, a surplus of €2.25 billion, 
amounting to 1.9% of the budget, was recorded in 2009). One reason is the slow 
process of disbursing the funds for operations co-financed by member states (thus 
depending to a large extent upon their administrative capacity to set up and 
implement projects) and managed over a number of years, e.g. Cohesion Policy.  
57 BusinessDictionary.com defines public goods as: “Item whose consumption is 
not decided by the individual consumer but by the society as a whole, and which is 
financed by taxation. A public good (or service) may be consumed without 
reducing the amount available for others, and cannot be withheld from who do not 
pay for it. Public goods (and services) include economic statistics and other 
information, law-and-order enforcement, national defence, national parks, etc. No 
m a r k e t  e x i s t s  f o r  s u c h  g o o d s ,  a n d  t h e y  m u s t  b e  p r o v i d e d  t o  e v e r y o n e  b y  t h e  
government.” 
58 See European Commission (2006:20).  
59 See Art. 312(1) TFEU. For a review of the features of the financial framework, see 
Cipriani (2007), in particular the section on “Financial perspective’: Whose 
perspective?”, p. 4. 
60 See European Council, Financial Perspective 2007-2013, 15915/05, Brussels, 19 
December 2005, p. 1. 
61 Member states hold the ‘purse strings’. This is the consequence of the respective 
powers of the two arms of the EU budgetary authority (the European Parliament 
and the Council) outlined by Art. 314(10) TFEU. The legal framework for EU 
revenue is provided by the Own resources Decision (for the period 2007–13, the 
Council’s Decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom of 7 June 2007 on the system of the 
European Communities’ own resources, OJ L 163, 23.6.2007). The Own Resources 
Decision establishes in particular the global ceiling on EU revenue, the typology of 
the resources financing the budget and the burden-sharing arrangements among 
member states. The Decision, on which the European Parliament can only give an 
opinion, has first to be unanimously adopted by the EU Council of Ministers and, 
to come into force, requires ratification by all member states according to their own 
constitutional rules (see Art. 311 TFEU). Hence, the Own Resources Decision 
constitutes in practice a treaty within the EU Treaty. 
62 Member states have traditionally taken the stance of accepting a revision of the 
financial framework subject to not increasing the overall spending. Therefore any 
increase in a ceiling had to be compensated by a corresponding decrease of another 
ceiling. It is worth mentioning in this respect the difficulties faced by two major EU 
projects in obtaining the necessary funding. The first example is provided by the 
European satellite radio-navigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo). Owing to 
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the failed negotiations with the private consortium, which had initially been 
expected to secure at least two-thirds of the financing for the deployment phase, 
the project had to face a funding gap of €2.4 billion for 2008–12 (while only €1 
billion was provided for by the financial perspective 2007-13). Member states 
opposed an increase of the overall budgetary ceiling and only agreed a 
redeployment of existing funds, mostly from unused agricultural spending and 
other budget lines. A similar case is provided by ITER, an international 
collaborative project involving seven partners (the EU, China, India, Japan, Russia, 
South Korea and the United States of America) for a planned duration of 35 years. 
The Commission announced in May 2010 that the project was facing substantial 
overall cost increases, more than doubling the EU’s share of the costs (from the 
initial €2.7 billion to around €7.2 billion). In particular, the shortfall for the 
remaining period (2012-13) of the current financial framework is about €1.4 billion. 
As member states were not prepared to follow the Commission’s initial proposal to 
either raise the EU budget spending ceiling or have member states provide direct 
contributions (see COM (2010) 226, 4.5.2010 and MEMO/10/165, 5.5.2010), a kind 
of déjà vu plan in the Galileo project has been envisaged, redeploying €460 million 
from the 7th Framework Programme for Research and recycling unused funds in 
the current framework programme (see the Commission’s press release IP/10/988 
of 20.7.2010). Parliament, whose backing is necessary to adopt the Commission’s 
proposal, has however opposed the redeployment of funds within the 7th 
Framework Programme for Research (see Parliament resolution of 20.10.2010 on 
Council's position on draft general budget of the European Union for the financial 
year 2011, para. 24). A solution for the ITER financing is still pending as of 15 
November 2010. 
63 The EU budget is financed from three main sources of revenue. The first of these 
are customs duties, levied at the external frontiers of the EU at rates based on the 
Common Customs Tariff, and sugar levies paid by sugar producers to finance the 
export refunds for sugar. The second source of revenue is represented by the Value 
Added Tax (VAT) own resource, which is levied on member states’ statistical 
‘notional’ harmonised VAT bases, calculated on the basis of national VAT receipts. 
The third resource, levied at a uniform rate in proportion to the Gross National 
I n co m e (G NI ) o f  each  m e m b er st at e, i s a  res idu a l reso urc e u se d t o  b al an ce  t h e 
budget. The EU budget is always assured of sufficient revenue; Art. 310(1) TFEU 
provides that revenue and expenditure must be in balance. The VAT-based and 
GNI-based resources are no more than a financial contribution calculated 
according to different parameters. For a critical analysis of the EU budget 
financing, see Cipriani (2007), especially the chapter “Reads as ‘Own Resources’, 
Means National Contributions”, p. 42. 
 THE EU BUDGET | 101 
 
                                                                                                                                       
64 The term ‘budgetary balances’ refers to the accounting balance between the 
contributions that the member states pay into the EU budget and the EU 
expenditure in favour of beneficiaries resident in their territory. Such calculations 
are traditionally a key element of the decision-making process of the Union. A 
widespread conventional milestone of this tendency is the declaration of Mrs 
Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, at the Dublin European Council in 
November 1979: “We are not asking the Community or anyone else for money. We 
are simply asking for our own money back.”  
65 See Barroso (2009:35-36). Gros (2008:2) stresses that this means that in the inter-
governmental negotiations that determine the budget, no voice will defend overall 
EU interests. In face of an EU-wide, encompassing interest, member states would 
tend to favour choices leading to more money for them, even if at a lower overall 
efficiency. Among the numerous ‘corrective mechanisms’ one should recall the UK 
rebate (which limits the balance between UK payments to the EU budget and EU 
expenditure in its favour to one-third), the variable financing of this rebate 
according to the member states concerned (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and 
Sweden pay only 25% of their normal share), the limitation of the VAT resource 
calculation base to 50% of GNI, the reduction of the rate of call of the VAT resource 
for some member states (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden), the 
member states’ levy of 25% of customs duties collected and ad hoc ‘bonuses’ for 
several member states. For a critical analysis of the different arrangements applied 
to the revenue side and the concept of budgetary balances, see Cipriani (2007), 
namely the chapters “Exception as the Rule, to Each his Own” and “Budgetary 
Balances – An Irresistible Temptation”, p. 65 and 88. 
66 See European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2005 on Policy Challenges and 
Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007–13, para. L. 
67 In 2009, member states’ contributions (VAT + GNI resources) have represented 
0.73% of the EU GNI. This corresponds to a per-capita average contribution of € 
189 (with two extremes, €39 and €469 respectively for residents of Bulgaria and 
Luxembourg). When adding up other EU revenue (customs duties and sugar 
levies) this average raises to €217. 
68 See European Commission (1998, annex 2, p. 3). Gros (2008:2) observes that 
European citizens have no clear perception of the total cost of the Union and the 
overall benefits of common action financed by the budget. But the few direct 
beneficiaries (mainly farmers) are well aware of budgetary transfers in their favour 
and place pressure on their government to preserve them indefinitely. The relative 
lack of knowledge among citizens concerning the European Union budget is 
confirmed by a survey by Eurobarometer. Only one in ten Europeans knows about 
the European Union budget (10%), half of them have heard of it but do not really 
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know what it involves (51%) and, finally, a third have never heard of it (33%). It is 
also interesting to note that respondents in the oldest EU member states are more 
likely not to have heard of the European Union budget: 36% versus 25% of the 
countries having joined since 2004 (see European Commission, 2010:207-208). 
69  In its 2004 own resources report (see European Commission, Financing the 
European Union, Commission report on the operation of the own resources 
system, Vol. II, COM(2004) 505 final, Brussels, 14 July 2004, p. 54), the Commission 
made a proposal for a genuinely fiscal resource, based on VAT which is the sole 
European tax for which the base harmonisation is quite advanced. The idea 
implied that as part of the national VAT rate paid by taxpayers there will be an EU 
rate, to be levied for the benefit of the EU budget. Citizens would not have to 
support an additional tax burden as the EU rate would be offset by an equivalent 
decrease of the national VAT rate. For visibility purposes, the EU VAT and 
national VAT should appear as separate taxes on the invoice or receipt that a 
taxable person provides to the customer.  
70 See Art. 1 TEU. The origin of this expression goes back to both the Treaties of 
Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) which introduced the notion of 
‘openness’. It is worth recalling that, with the Declaration of European Council of 
Laeken (14-15 December 2001), the member states had already taken note that 
“the European Union institutions must be brought closer to its citizens”. On that 
occasion, the member states recognised that European citizens do not always see 
the connection between the Union’s major objectives and its daily work and, more 
importantly, “they feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they 
want better democratic scrutiny” (Document SN 300/1/01 REV 1, p. 20).  
71 See European Parliament, Resolution of 12 July 2007 on the role and effectiveness 
of Cohesion policy in reducing disparities in the poorest regions of the EU, point P. 
72 The option to finance the EU budget by a real fiscal resource has been regularly 
discussed since the early days of the founding Treaties, which foresaw the 
possibility of replacing member states’ contributions by own resources (see Art. 
201 of the 1957 EEC Treaty). Many proposals have been made but none has found 
yet the required unanimous support (for a review of possible tax-based EU own 
resources see Cattoir (2004)). In 1965, the Commission proposed to allow the 
European Parliament (once directly elected) to create independent sources of 
revenue for the Community (see European Commission, 1965). Among others, the 
issue has been examined by the study group on the role of public finance in 
European integration chaired by D. MacDougal (European Commission, 1977) and 
by the Reflection Group for preparing the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
chaired by C. Westendorp. Following the Council request of December 2005 to 
carry out a comprehensive reassessment of the financial framework, the 
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Commission has initiated a review of the EU budget. The starting point was the 
adoption of the public consultation document “Reforming the Budget, Changing 
Europe” (see SEC(2007) 1188 final, 12.9.2007). The consultation process aimed at 
providing the means for reflecting on changes needed on spending and income 
(for a summary of contributions see SEC(2008)2739, 3.11.2008). As a result of this 
process, the European Commission presented in October 2010 its conclusions on 
the budget review and its views on the main priorities for the EU budget in the 
coming years. This includes several options for a new source of tax revenue, like an 
EU taxation of the financial sector, EU revenues from auctioning under the 
greenhouse gas Emissions Trading System, a EU charge related to air transport, a 
EU VAT, a EU energy tax and a EU corporate income tax (see COM (2010) 700, 
19.10.2010, p. 27). As indicated by President Barroso, it is not a question of an EU 
tax but of finding new sources of financing to gradually replace member states 
contributions (see Statement of President Barroso on the budget review, 19 October 
2010  http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/ 
statement_en.pdf). 
73 Opposition to a VAT-based resource has often also been founded on the 
traditional view that this indirect tax is inherently regressive because its 
assessment base is structurally higher in the least prosperous member states than it 
is in the richest ones. However, some authors are not convinced that the 
regressivity of VAT is a real issue. For example, Begg, Grimwade & Price (1997:10), 
and Gretschmann (1998:25-26) challenge the opinion that the VAT resource has a 
significant regressive effect. Gros (2008:8, 11) observes that available data indicate 
that among countries with high VAT revenues, one finds both rich (Sweden) and 
poor (Hungary); the same applies to countries with low VAT revenues in 
proportion to GDP (e.g. Spain, a Cohesion country, and Italy, with GDP per capita 
above the EU average). 
74 See note 69. 
75  One may notice in this respect that when looking at possible new funding 
sources for the EU budget, one of the criteria put forward by the Commission is 
that, if feasible, the proceeds of a new resource should be collected directly by the 
EU outside national budgets (see COM (2010) 700, op. cit, p. 27). This would 
represent a significant change compared to the present situation where EU revenue 
is collected by member states’ administrations.  
76 Parliament has recently stressed the need for a stronger and increased degree of 
flexibility and a simplification of the procedure for shifting resources between the 
different headings of the multi-annual financial framework (see European 
Parliament, Resolution of 22 September 2010 on the proposal for a Council 
regulation laying down the multi-annual financial framework for the years 2007-
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2013, point xv). The Commission’s budget review paper recognises the need for 
greater flexibility in the use of available appropriations (see COM (2010) 700, op. 
cit., point 4.7, p. 23). 
77 Reference is made here to EU expenditure for Agriculture, Rural Development, 
Fisheries and Structural actions which, de facto or explicitly, is pre-allocated by 
member state at the time of the multi-annual financial framework’s approval. It has 
been estimated that over 90% of the EU budget goes to funding EU policies and 
activities that have been agreed by all the member states (see European 
Commission, Annual accounts of the European Union, Financial Year 2009, 
SEC(2010) 963, 20.7.2010, p. 4). 
78 The 2010 budget authorises expenditure for €123 billion (payment 
appropriations). The revenues needed to finance the budget account for 0.99% of 
the total GNI. This compares with a ceiling of 1.23% of GNI as the limit for EU 
expenditure.  
79 See Art. 49(1) of the Financial Regulation, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 1605/2002, op. cit. Following entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon almost 
all EU legislation will be endorsed by both the Parliament and Council (see also 
note 30).  
80 ‘Eligibility rules’ designate a set of legal requirements, stemming from EU and 
national legislation, defining the conditions for national expenditure to be 
reimbursed by the EU budget. These rules govern in particular the location and 
range of the activities, the cost categories and the period during which expenditure 
can be incurred. There are a number of additional conditions for expenditure to be 
eligible, for example the compliance with EU rules and policies (such as public 
procurement, competition, environment; adequate publicity of the operations 
funded;  costs actually borne by the beneficiary; retention of supporting documents 
and keeping investments in operation for a certain period). The EU budget 
reimburses the full costs of the income support to farmers (as well as of measures 
to regulate agricultural markets), while for Cohesion policy (as well as for other 
funding such as the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the 
European Fisheries Fund) co-financing is applied and thus part of the costs rest 
with national budgets. Co-financing is a key principle for EU grants (see Art. 109(1) 
of the Financial Regulation No 1605/2002, op. cit.). It also represents an “indirect” 
assurance for ‘net-payers’ member states for effective spending and mitigating 
deadweight. For example, the around €344 billion of EU funds for the Cohesion 
policy are closely linked to the €144 billion of national co-financing. This means 
that for every €10 of EU expenditure in this area, another €4 are spent (on average) 
by the national budgets. 
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81  For an overview of the different programmes funded by the EU budget, see 
Statement of estimates of the European Commission for the Financial year 2011, 
Financial programming 2011 – 2013, SEC(2010)473, p. 116, May 2010, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/documents/annual_budgets_reports_accoun
ts/2011/2011_Draft_budg_preparation_en.pdf. See also later Table 1. 
82 This is also the case for the agricultural policy, which is commonly thought to be 
financed exclusively by the EU budget. Actually, as it has been observed (S. Tarditi 
- Tutto quello che non sappiamo della PAC, available at 
http://www.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina1897.html), the national budgets continue 
to finance the agricultural sector in various ways and at a significant level. Indeed, 
agriculture is considered in the EU Treaty to be a shared competence (see Art. 4(2) 
TEU). 
83 See Arts 17(1) TEU and 317 TFEU. One should mention that the provision for the 
Commission to “manage programmes” is an addition of the Lisbon Treaty. The 
definition of “manage” is “to be in charge of, to administer” (Collins); “to direct or 
carry on business or affairs” (Merriam-Webster). A synonym for “manage” is 
“conduct” (Merriam-Webster) or “to handle” (Online etymology dictionary). This 
addition in the Treaty seems to indicate an enhancement of the Commission’s role, 
further confirmed by other linguistic versions of the Treaty (DE, “Sie führt den 
Haushaltsplan aus und verwaltet die Programme”; ES, “Ejecutará el presupuesto y 
gestionará los programas”; FR, “Elle exécute le budget et gère les programmes”; IT, “Dà 
esecuzione al bilancio e gestisce i programmi”). One should also note that, unlike Arts 
14 and 16 TEU where the Treaty on European Union expressly indicates that 
legislative and budgetary functions are a shared competence of Parliament and 
Council, Art. 17(1) TEU does not mention the cooperation with the member states 
in the EU budget. This expression is only indicated in Art. 317 TFEU about the 
budgetary implementation. This seems to confirm that such cooperation refers to 
specific implementation tasks only. It therefore does not undermine the 
Commission’s full responsibility. 
84 This expression has been added to the previous Art. 274 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC) by the Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 317 
TFEU). The origin of this addition are the works of the European Convention 
(2002-2003) where the Commission had proposed “to examine the feasibility of 
sharing responsibility for budget implementation when the member states are 
responsible for most of the management of funds” (see European Commission, 
Communication on a Project for the European Union, COM(2002) 247 final, 
Brussels, 22 May 2002, p. 6). The Treaty of Lisbon has however confirmed the 
Commission’s ultimate responsibility (see also note 107).  
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85 The Financial Regulation defines the rules which determine in particular the 
procedure to be adopted for establishing and implementing the budget and for 
presenting and auditing accounts. It also provides for checks on the responsibility 
of financial actors, in particular authorising officers and accounting officers (see 
Art. 322(1) TFEU). Before the recent entering into force of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union, the adoption of the Financial Regulation was a 
sole Council competence. This competence is now shared with the European 
Parliament, both institutions having the same degree of lawmaking power. 
86 See note 19 and Box 1 “The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”. 
87  Where the Commission implements the budget on a centralised basis, 
implementation tasks shall be performed either directly by its departments or 
indirectly, through “executive agencies”, EU bodies (such as the European 
Investment Bank or the European Investment Fund), national or international 
bodies with a public-service mission. Centralised management by the Commission 
is limited mainly to fields like Research, Information society, Education & Culture, 
Transport & Energy and some external actions. 
88  This concerns mostly EU humanitarian and development programmes aid 
implemented by an international organisation (e.g. United Nations and its 
agencies, World Bank, Red Cross) through contribution agreements. Nuclear 
decommissioning funds are subject to joint management with the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
89 This refers mainly to Agriculture and Cohesion policy. The same arrangements 
also apply to other spending programmes like the European Refugee Fund, the 
European Return Fund and the Solidarity Fund. Concerning third countries, 
financial assistance involves in particular support to countries candidate to EU 
membership and economic and development assistance in various regions of the 
world.  
90 This is normally provided in the basic act establishing a spending programme. 
However, the Financial Regulation itself (see Art. 53b(1) of Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 1605/2002, op. cit.) prescribes that “shared management” shall apply 
in particular to the actions referred to the European agricultural guarantee fund, 
Structural funds, Cohesion fund, European fisheries Fund, and European 
agricultural fund for Rural development. It provides further that “[w]here the 
Commission implements the budget by shared management, implementation tasks 
shall be delegated to Member States”. 
91 It should also be noted that the possibility for the Commission to delegate its 
executive powers to third parties is strictly defined and limited. This is only 
foreseen in centralised management (delegation to executive agencies) and 
decentralised management (delegation to third country, national or international 
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public-sector bodies) (see Art. 54 of the Financial Regulation, Council Regulation 
(EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, op. cit.).  
92 Among the EU requirements one may note for example, the separation of duties 
between management, payment and control functions; the establishment of proper 
accounting systems; the definition of powers and responsibilities of the financial 
actors; the modalities and intensity of checks to be performed; the implementing 
procedures (competitive tendering, State aid rules). The accreditation of national 
bodies is a member states’ competence, although subject to EU requirements.  
93 To ensure that the funds are used in accordance with the applicable rules and 
principles, member states shall take all the legislative, regulatory and 
administrative or other measures necessary for protecting the EU financial 
interests. To this effect they shall in particular “(a) satisfy themselves that actions 
financed from the budget are actually carried out and to ensure that they are 
implemented correctly; (b) prevent and deal with irregularities and fraud; (c) 
recover funds wrongly paid or incorrectly used or funds lost as a result of 
irregularities or errors; (d) ensure, by means of relevant sector-specific regulations 
(…) adequate annual ex-post publication of beneficiaries of funds deriving from the 
budget. To that effect, the Member States shall conduct checks and shall put in 
place an effective and efficient internal control system (…) [and] “shall bring legal 
proceedings as necessary and appropriate”. Member states’ control of final 
beneficiaries implies both 100% administrative checks and on-the-spot checks 
(normally of at least 5% annually).  
94 See Box 2 “An overview of the EU’s financial frameworks”. 
95 Protocol No. 25 on the exercise of shared competence (Treaty of Lisbon) clarifies 
that “when the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of 
competence only covers those elements governed by the Union act in question and 
therefore does not cover the whole area”. 
96 Contrary to “shared management”, the degree of “decentralisation” depends on 
the Commission’s assurance on the management and control systems in place. This 
determines whether also payments are decentralised and whether control by the 
Commission on procurement takes place ex-ante or only ex-post. In the lowest 
level of decentralisation, the Commission entrusts to the country’s administration 
the tendering and contracting process, while keeping control on all decisions ex-
ante and making payments directly to the contractors. In the case of pre-accession 
countries, national administrations charged of budgetary tasks, whose 
organisational structure is subject to a number of binding conditions, go through a 
process of accreditation by the Commission. Payments to the contractors are made 
by the national administrations which then claim back the funds from the 
Commission. The latter monitors the implementation on an ongoing basis. In some 
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cases where national administrations meet more stringent management and 
control requirements, the ex-ante control over procurement may be removed by 
the Commission. 
97 The Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) is the EU's main instrument for 
funding research in Europe in selected priority areas, with a total budget of over 
€50 billion for 2007-13. Projects are given, in general, a grant contributing a certain 
percentage to the overall costs. EU funded activities are implemented by a large 
number of public and private entities in different member states or associated 
states. Beneficiaries may be research institutes, companies, public administrations, 
experienced researchers, organisations and researchers from third countries. The 
beneficiaries or partners usually work as a consortium across member states or 
associated states. 
98 Comitology goes back to the 1960s, where the first management committee was 
created in the framework of the agricultural markets. But a formal provision has 
been inserted in the treaties only in February 1986 following adoption of the Single 
European Act. Art. 202 TEC envisaged the possibility of the Council conferring on 
the Commission “in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the 
implementation of the rules which the Council lays down”. The spirit of this 
provision is that implementing measures are a full part of the powers of the EU 
legislative body (at the time the Council alone), which are delegated to the 
Commission for reasons of convenience. The Council could thus “impose certain 
requirements in respect of the exercise of these powers” and it could “reserve the 
right, in specific cases, to exercise directly implementing powers itself”. Council 
Decision No. 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 (OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, pp. 23-26), lastly 
amended by Council Decision No 2006/512/EC of 17 July 2006 (OJ L 200, 
22.7.2006, pp. 11–13) provided for five different procedures (Advisory procedure, 
Management procedure, Regulatory procedure, Regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny and Safeguard procedure). End 2009, there were 266 committees, mostly 
in the fields of Transport and Energy, Environment, Enterprises and Agriculture. 
More than one-hundred of them were operating under the management procedure 
which is relevant for the EU budget implementation. Under the management 
procedure the Commission submits to the committee a draft of the measures to be 
taken on which the committee shall deliver its opinion. The Commission may in 
theory adopt the measures immediately, also in the absence of an opinion (no 
quorum for a favourable, nor for an unfavourable opinion as a result of the vote in 
the committee) or even in case of an unfavourable opinion. However, following a 
committee’s negative opinion, these measures are submitted to the Council that 
may take a different decision within a period of a maximum of three months acting 
by qualified majority. In the meantime the Commission may defer application of 
the measures decided. By establishing a distinction between ‘delegated acts’ and 
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‘implementing acts’ the Treaty of Lisbon substantially modifies the framework for 
implementing powers that are conferred upon the Commission by the EU 
legislator (see note 104). This requires in particular the setting of new rules and 
general principles concerning mechanisms f o r  c o n t r o l  b y  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  
Commission’s exercise of implementing powers. The Commission’s proposal (see 
COM (2010) 83, 9.3.2010) maintains the previous Committee structure, but 
envisages only two procedures compared to five before. Are foreseen the advisory 
procedure (as the general rule) and a new “examination” procedure which would 
replace the existing management and regulatory procedures. It should finally be 
noted that on the basis of the acquis communautaire, legislation adopted before the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon continues to be applied, including all 
provisions on comitology, until the basic act is repealed or modified. 
99 In this respect one may notice that in a declaration to Council Decision No. 
1999/468/EC, op. cit., the Commission recalled that under the management 
procedure “its constant practice is to try to secure a satisfactory decision which will 
also muster the widest possible support within the Committee. The Commission 
will take account of the position of the members of the Committee and act in such a 
way as to avoid going against any predominant position which might emerge 
against the appropriateness of an implementing measure.”  
100 For example, the “Committee of Independent Experts”, convened early 1999 
under the auspices of the Parliament and the Commission to examine the 
Commission management practices, regretted “that a system which should 
introduce transparency and accountability into the management of programmes in 
fact can remove responsibility from the Commission for the management decisions 
taken. Commission managers can (and do) point to the extraneous demands of 
Member States as justification for management decisions which cannot be justified 
according to objective financial criteria” (see Committee of Independent Experts, 
Second Report on Reform of the Commission: Analysis of current practice and 
proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities and fraud, 10 September 
1999, Vol. II, point 7.15.14, p. 136).  
101 It is worth mentioning that the intervention of “comitology” procedures in the 
budget implementation has been the subject of institutional disputes. In particular, 
the Commission and the European Parliament have criticised the negative effects 
of these procedures on the institutional balance and the separation of powers, the 
opacity, the unjustified delays and the pointless costs. The Court of Justice had 
nevertheless considered that the mechanism of a management committee was not 
likely to distort the Community structure and institutional balance and that this 
procedure was one of the methods to which the Council could legitimately 
subordinate authorisation to the Commission (see Case-law 25-70, Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Köster and Berodt & Co. Judgment of 
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the Court 17.12.1970, ECR 1970, p. 1161). Concerning in particular the 
implementation of the EU budget, the Commission argued that the intervention of 
a management committee was likely to encroach on its exclusive responsibility as 
regards budgetary implementation. Indeed, the Council could ultimately have 
taken a different decision, which nevertheless would have involved the use of 
budget appropriations. In addition, any decision which would have interfered 
with this exclusive responsibility of the Commission would at the same time have 
deprived the European Parliament of its supervisory powers in respect of the 
implementation of the budget. It was on this basis that the Commission decided to 
take the Council to the European Court of Justice. The Court judged however that 
the adoption by the Council of acts that are individual in scope, with financial 
consequences, which it then authorises the Commission to implement, does not 
prejudice the Commission’s power to implement the budget on its own 
responsibility (see Case-law 16/88, Commission of the European Communities v 
Council of the European Communities. Judgment of the Court of 24 October 1989, 
ECR 1989, p. 3457, points 16-17). In this way, the implementation of the budget was 
interpreted by the Court of Justice as being on an equal footing with any other 
implementation power conferred by the Council on the Commission. In so doing, 
the Court identified the pre-eminence of the general rules enacted by Arts 202 and 
211 TEC and did not find that Art. 274 TEC constituted an example of a lex specialis. 
102 See European Commission (2001:31). 
103  See European Commission, Communication of the Commission on the 
institutional architecture, COM(2002) 728, 11 December 2002, p. 13. See also 
European Convention, Proposal from the Commission’s representative in the 
Working group to distinguish legislative and executive functions in the 
institutional system of the European Union, working group IX, working document 
No. 16, 7.11.2002. 
104 The Treaty of Lisbon establishes a hierarchy of norms with a distinction between 
legislative acts (regulations, directives, decisions, Arts 288-289 TFEU), delegated 
acts (the Commission to adopt delegated acts in the field of competence of the 
European Parliament and/or the Council, Art. 290 TFEU) and implementing acts 
(acts adopted by the Commission in its own field of competence, Art. 291 TFEU). 
As observed by the Commission, the distinction between “quasi-legislative 
measures” which are referred to as “delegated acts” and “implementing” or 
executive acts, which is mutually exclusive and did not exist in the previous EC 
Treaty (see Art. 202 TEC), originate from the different scope of the two provisions. 
When it receives the power to adopt “delegated acts” under Art. 290 TFEU, the 
Commission is authorised to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements 
of the legislative acts in the interests of efficiency, taking measures that the 
legislator could have adopted itself. In this respect Art. 290 TFEU clarifies that 
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“[t]he objectives, content, scope and duration of the delegation of power shall be 
explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The essential elements of an area shall be 
reserved for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject of a 
delegation of power”. It provides further that “[l]egislative acts shall explicitly lay 
down the conditions to which the delegation is subject”. Such a delegation is 
always discretionary and the legislator may control the exercise of the 
Commission's powers by means of a right of revocation and/or a right of objection. 
The situation is rather different concerning the implementation of EU binding acts 
which, according to Art. 291 TFEU, would normally be the prerogative of the 
member states, as a consequence of the increased focus put on the subsidiarity 
principle by the Treaty of Lisbon and the consequent decentralised 
implementation. The Commission is given implementing powers only where such 
acts require uniform implementing conditions. However, these powers do not 
imply the exercise of any ‘quasi-legislative’ power and they are purely executive. 
This is why it is the member states (and they alone, not the EU legislator – 
Parliament and Council) that are responsible for controlling the Commission's 
exercise of these implementing powers (see European Commission, 
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Implementation of 
Art. 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, COM (2009) 673, 
9.12.2009, point 2.2; and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down the rules and general principles concerning 
mechanisms for control by member states of the Commission’s exercise of 
implementing powers, COM (2010) 83, 9.3.2010, point 1).  
105 Communication of the Commission on the institutional architecture, COM(2002) 
728, op. cit., p. 14.  
106 These bodies are not less than two thousand in Agriculture and Structural 
policies alone. Also, there are about 12 million full-time farmers in the 27 EU 
countries who may potentially benefit from the CAP subsidies. For Rural 
development alone (Pillar 2 of the Common Agricultural Policy) the total number 
of beneficiaries in 2008 was some 3.6 million. Structural policies co-finance about 
two million of projects and the current European Social Fund (ESF) programmes 
support 9 million people each year. 
107 See Arts 17(1) TEU and 317 TFEU. As in previous Treaty’s amendments of the 
budgetary provisions (Treaties of Maastricht, 1992, and Amsterdam, 1997), the 
Treaty of Lisbon has confirmed the Commission’s ultimate responsibility by 
stating that it shall implement the budget “on its own responsibility” and “having 
regard to the principles of sound financial management”. To this effect, the 
Commission should count on adequate cooperation from member states, with the 
latter having control and audit obligations in the implementation of the budget 
and resulting responsibilities (see Art. 317 TFEU). The Commission’s ultimate 
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responsibility in the budget implementation i s  a l s o  e n o u n c e d  i n  A r t .  4 8  o f  t h e  
Financial Regulation, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No  1605/2002, op. cit. 
Several judgments of the European Court of Justice have confirmed this 
interpretation (see for example Case-law 16/88,  Commission/Council, op. cit., 
point 15; Case-law C-106/96, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland v Commission of the European Communities. Judgment of the Court 12 
May 1998, ECR I-2729, point 21).  
108 The Treaty of Lisbon has formally recognised that the budget shall be 
implemented “in cooperation with the Member States” (see Art. 317 TFEU). The 
“cooperation with the member states” is nothing more than the consequence of 
Art. 4(3) TEU which indicates that the Union and the member states shall assist 
each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. Member states shall 
take any appropriate measure to ensure fulfilment of their obligations and shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks.  
109 See European Commission, Synthesis of Annual Activity Reports 2003 of DGs 
and Services, COM (2004) 418, 9.6.2004, p. 11.  
110 Reference is made to the institutional crisis that lead to the resignation of the 
Santer Commission in March 1999 (for the context see Cipriani (2007), in particular 
the section “The need for a management culture”, p. 106).  
111 See European Commission, The control system for Cohesion Policy, How it 
works in the 2007–13 budget period, October 2009, p. 7. The Financial Regulation 
No 1605/2002, op. cit., Art. 28a(2) defines “internal control” as “a process 
applicable at all levels of the management and designed to provide reasonable 
assurance of achieving the following objectives: 
(a) effectiveness, efficiency and economy of operations; 
(b) reliability of reporting; 
(c) safeguarding of assets and information; 
(d) prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities; 
(e) adequate management of the risks relating to the legality and regularity of the 
underlying transactions, taking into account the multiannual character of 
programmes as well as the nature of the payments concerned”. Internal control is 
carried out by management and staff and is integrated into the internal structures 
and operating processes (for example a Commission’s Directorate-General or a 
national management authority). Within the Commission a distinction should 
made with “Internal audit”, which is independent from management. Its main task 
is to perform independent assessments of management’s internal control, risk 
management and governance, and provide recommendations for improvements. It 
can also supply consulting services. It is carried out by the Internal Audit Service 
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(IAS), a horizontal service that reports directly to the College. In addition, each 
service has an Internal Audit Capability (IAC) that reports directly to the Director 
General.  
112 See note 93. 
113 The difference between “interruption” and “suspension” constitutes a 
“subtlety” of the Cohesion policy legal framework (see Arts 91 and 92 of 
Regulation No 1083/2006, op. cit.). While “interruption” of payments is a decision 
taken by Directors-general and is limited to six months, “suspension” of payments 
has to be decided by the Commission. Funds cancellation may occur as a result of 
clearance procedures (see Art. 53(b)(4) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 1605/2002, op. cit).  
114 For example the Commission has indicated that when it relies on other 
authorities to manage the risk of irregular spending, it “verifies the operation of 
this framework, and when it finds that EU funds have been put at excessive risk, it 
suspends payments and makes financial corrections, thus repairing the damage to 
the EU's budget” (see European Commission, A gap assessment between the 
internal control framework in the Commission Services and the control principles 
set out in the Court of Auditors’ “proposal for a Community internal control 
framework” opinion No 2/2004, SEC(2005) 1152, 28.9.2005, p. 29). The same 
concept is expressed in the EU 2009 annual accounts (see SEC(2010) 963, 20.7.2010, 
p. 79). 
115 Art. 287(1) TFEU stipulates that the Court of Auditors “shall provide the 
European Parliament and the Council with a statement of assurance as to the 
reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying 
transactions”. An annual Statement of Assurance has been established for the first 
time concerning the financial year 1994. Since then the Court has not been in a 
position to confirm that the EU budget expenditure as a whole was legal and 
regular in all material aspects. The origin of this provision is to be found in a late 
stage in the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), with strong backing from the 
governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and the support of the 
European Parliament’s Budgetary Control Committee. The main objectives of the 
Statement of Assurance are to inform the discharge authority of whether: 
-  the consolidated financial statements of the general budget of the European 
Union present a true and fair view of the financial activities for the year and 
of the year-end situation; and 
-  legal and contractual provisions have been respected when executing the 
budget. 
According to international standards auditors can give the following kinds of 
opinions: 
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-  an unqualified opinion (also called "clean") when there is evidence that the 
accounts are reliable or the underlying transactions are legal and regular in 
all material aspects; 
-  an adverse opinion when the level of error in the underlying transactions is 
material and pervasive, or the accounts are not reliable; 
-  a disclaimer of opinion if auditors are unable to obtain sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence on which to base an opinion, and the possible effects are both 
material and pervasive; 
-  a qualified opinion when an unqualified opinion cannot be expressed but the 
effect of any disagreement or limitation on scope is not so pervasive as to 
require an adverse opinion or a disclaimer of opinion (see European Court 
of Auditors, The DAS methodology, available at 
http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1671539.PDF).  
116 The wording “irregularity” refers to misapplication or misunderstanding of the 
often complex rules of EU expenditure schemes. Payments are legal and regular 
when these conditions as well as the accuracy and existence of the underlying 
activities and/or costs are met, and the right beneficiaries receive the right 
amounts at the right time. An irregularity is not per se a fraud, which would imply 
that EU funds have intentionally been improperly claimed.  
117 See European Commission, Communication from the President in agreement 
with Vice-President Wallström, Strategic Objectives 2005–2009, Europe 2010: A 
Partnership for European Renewal, Prosperity, Solidarity and Security, COM(2005) 
12 final, 26.1.2005, p. 5. This objective has been reconfirmed for the current 
mandate (see Commissioner Šemeta's speech on 2008 Discharge before the 
European Parliament, 21 April 2010, SPEECH/10/2010, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/210). 
118 In the Cohesion policy to €1 of EU spending corresponds on average €0.4 of 
national co-financing.  
119 For the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund, over a third of the irregularities 
uncovered is connected to breaches of rules on public procurement (see the speech 
by Mrs. Hübner of 25 February 2008 before the European Parliament’s Committee 
on Budgetary Control, document SPEECH/08/100). Total public procurement in 
the EU – i.e. the purchases of goods, services and public works by governments 
and public utilities - is estimated at about 16% of the Union’s GDP or €1.500 billion 
in 2002. Undoubtedly the award of public contracts is a key factor for achieving the 
internal market, of the highest importance for public authorities. This high rate of 
irregularities for legislation put in place many years ago (some of the existing 
public procurement Directives date back to the 1970s) suggests that at least in some 
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cases the reason for such irregularities is a conflict of interests between the EU and 
the national level.  
120 In its annual report on the implementation of the 2009 budget (see European 
Court of Auditors, 9.9.2010, http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/ 
5926723.PDF) the Court of Auditors points out that although for the budget as a 
whole its estimate of error has fallen over recent years, EU payments continue to be 
materially affected by error except in two areas of expenditure (‘Economic and 
financial affairs’ and Administrative and other expenditure’). This is because 
supervisory and control systems are partially effective in preventing or detecting 
and correcting the reimbursement of overstated or ineligible costs. The Court 
observes however that its estimate of the most likely error in Cohesion spending 
was significantly lower in 2009 than in previous years (at least 3% of the 
expenditure certified by member states to the Commission should not have been 
reimbursed against 11 % for 2007 and 2008); though it remains the policy group 
most affected by error (36 % of payments to projects were affected by error). One 
should note in this connection that in 2009 the Commission has carried out an 
audit to assess the legality and regularity of Cohesion policy expenditure 
declarations for the period 2007-13, by applying an approach similar to the Court. 
The results of this examination indicated a rate of irregularity of around 5%, thus 
showing improvement compared to the past. However, it should be pointed out 
that the expenditure audited concerns systems covering only ten member states 
(namely excluding big funds recipients) and was related to the initial endowment 
of financial instruments where the risk of error is low (see European Commission, 
Impact of the action plan to strengthen the Commission's supervisory role under 
shared management of structural actions, COM(2010) 52, 18.2.2010, point 2.1, p. 
11). 
121 See European Commission, Protection of the European Union's financial 
interests, Fight against fraud Annual Report 2009, COM (2010) 382, 14.7.2010. 
122 See European Commission, A gap assessment between the internal control 
framework in the Commission Services and the control principles set out in the 
Court of Auditors’ “proposal for a Community internal control framework” 
opinion No 2/2004, SEC(2005) 1152, 28.9.2005, p. 23. 
123 For a definition of “eligibility” rules see note 80. 
124 For example, for Cohesion policies there are more than 200 pages of legal texts 
of EU legislation, without including other applicable provisions like for example 
t h o s e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  a w a r d  o f  p u b l i c  c o n t r a c t s .  Y e t ,  i t  i s  s t i l l  a r g u e d  t h a t  E U  
regulatory requirements are not sufficiently clear or include gaps (see European 
Parliament, Study on Member State difficulties with Structural Funds management 
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and control systems in the programming period, doc. PE 411.278, 2 June 2010, pp. 
1-2). 
125 A recent study in the frame of Cohesion policy indicates that two-thirds of 
survey respondents consider that the focus on control requirements is no longer 
proportionate, it is deflecting managers’ attention from content issues and it deters 
potential applicants for EU funds support, for example in the area of innovation 
(see European Parliament, Study on Member State difficulties with Structural 
Funds management and control systems in the programming period, op. cit., pp. 1-
2). Bachtler & Mendez (2010:19) also report growing evidence that some 
organisations are discouraged from applying for funding. 
126 The authors argue that the Commission’s administrative reform programme in 
the aftermath of the EU’s financial management and legitimacy crisis in the ‘90s 
has been the driver of an explosion in EU Cohesion policy auditing. This audit 
explosion corresponds to a compliance model, contrasting with the New Public 
Management ethos inspiring the Commission’s reform programme. The ever-
increasing attention given to financial management at both EU and national level 
has been at the expense of ensuring that programmes meet their policy objectives 
effectively.  
127 “Simplification” is a recurrent issue. Several initiatives have been taken since the 
late 90’s to simplify EU legislation. The latest initiative has been launched in 2007, 
with an Action Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens in the European 
Union (in this context, the Commission appointed an High Level Group of 
Independent Stakeholders on Administrative Burdens, chaired by Mr Stoiber). The 
aim is to reduce administrative burdens on businesses arising from EU legislation 
by 25%. This is a joint target for both the EU and member states, covering EU 
legislation as well as national regulatory measures, and to be achieved by 2012 (see 
COM(2007) 23 final, 24.1.2007). The target has been endorsed by the European 
Council in March 2007 (see Presidency Conclusions, doc. 7224/1/07, REV 1, 
2.5.2007, para. 24).  
128 For example, in the Cohesion policy several measures were introduced like an 
increased use of lumps sums, standard scales of unit costs and indirect costs on a 
flat rate basis, wider acceptance of the use of national eligibility rules. The 
Commission has observed that for the final beneficiaries of Cohesion financial 
instruments the potential reduction linked to the simplification measures already 
adopted is calculated at 24% compared to the estimated administrative burden of 
complying with the requirements laid down for the previous programming period 
2000-2006 (see DG “Regional policy“ Annual Activity Report for the year 2009, 
31.3.2010, p. 4, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/aar/doc/ 
regio_aar.pdf). 
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129 See Report from the Commission to the Council on the follow-up to 2007 
Discharge Decisions (Summary) - Council Recommendations, COM(2009) 682, 
10.12.2009, p. 4. 
130 See European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2010 on the mandate for the 
trilogue on the 2011 draft budget, para. 35.  
131 See Council recommendation in respect of the implementation of the budget for 
the financial year 2008, doc. 5826/10 Add 1, 3.2.2010, p. 6. 
132 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No 1/2010 “Improving the financial 
management of the European Union budget: Risks and challenges”, 14.1.2010, 
point 13. 
133 Art. 53b(4) of the Financial Regulation No. 1605/2002, op. cit., provides that in 
“shared management” arrangements, “[i]n order to ensure that the funds are used 
in accordance with the applicable rules, the Commission shall apply clearance-of-
accounts procedures or financial correction mechanisms which enable it to assume 
final responsibility for the implementation of the budget”. Art. 53c(2) contains a 
similar provision for the case of decentralised management, with third countries.  
134 It should be recalled that implementing competences of both the Commission 
and member states follow delegation by the EU legislator, i.e. there is no 
hierarchical primacy of the Commission over national bodies. See also note 7. 
135 See Art. 10(2) TEU. 
136 For example, the ex-post evaluation for the Cohesion policy 2000-06 remarks 
that no authorities were held accountable for not meeting the targets set (see 
European Commission (2010), Ex-Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 
2000-2006 financed by the European Regional Development Fund in Objective 1 and 2 
Regions, Synthesis Report, April, p. 11, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/ 
sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/synthesis_eval2000_2006.pdf). 
137 See European Commission, Annual accounts of the European Communities, 
Financial Year 2009, SEC(2010) 963, 20.07.2010, p. 6. See also, European 
Commission, Governance Statement, 30 May 2007, points 1.1, 1.2, 3.1 and 3.2; and 
European Commission, Code of conduct for Commissioners, SEC (2004) 1487/2, 
23.11.2004, section 2, p. 6. 
138 Art. 17(8) TEU states that “[t]he Commission, as a body, shall be responsible to 
the European Parliament”. In contrast, the individual political responsibility of 
Commissioners has to be enforced by the Commission President who is therefore 
accountable to the European Parliament in this context. The Framework 
Agreement signed by Parliament and Commission on 20.10.2010 indicates that 
“[e]ach Member of the Commission shall take political responsibility for action in 
the field of which he or she is in charge, without prejudice to the principle of 
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Commission collegiality” (see Annex, Art. 4). And it provides also that “[i]f 
Parliament asks the President of the Commission to withdraw confidence in an 
individual Member of the Commission, he/she will seriously consider whether to 
request that Member to resign (…). The President shall either require the 
resignation of that Member or explain his/her refusal to do so before Parliament in 
the following part-session.” (see Annex, Art. 5). Indeed, according to Art. 248 
TFEU (whose origin is the Treaty of Nice, entered into force in February 2003), the 
President has the power to reallocate responsibilities to Members during the 
Commission's term of office. A Member of the Commission shall resign if the 
President so requests. The Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 17(6) TEU) has reinforced this 
provision by giving to the President full power in this respect (the approval of the 
College is not anymore necessary). 
139 See Art. 17(7) TEU. 
140 In addition to the statutory parliamentary committees, the Parliament may set 
up a temporary committee of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Union law (Art. 226 TFEU). This 
faculty, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), is subject to the condition that 
the alleged facts are not being examined before a Court and the case is not still 
subject to legal proceedings. The modus operandi of a committee of inquiry is 
governed by the Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European Parliament, 
Council and Commission of 19 April 1995 (OJ L 113 of 19.5.95, p. 2) and by the 
Parliament’s rules of procedure (Rule 185). The Parliament has used this possibility 
for the first time in 1996 to inquiry into the Community Transit Regime. Since then 
a committee of enquiry has been established in few other cases (to investigate 
alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community 
law in relation to bovine spongiform encephalopathy – BSE, and to inquiry into the 
crisis of the Equitable Life Assurance Society). The establishment in 1999 of a 
“Committee of Independent Experts” has to be considered as a special case. The 
committee was convened under the auspices of the Parliament and the 
Commission (who agreed its composition and terms of reference), in the context of 
the institutional crisis of the end 90’. The Parliament made explicit that the 
committee had to report on their assessment in the first instance on the College of 
Commissioners (see European Parliament, Resolution of 14 January 1999 on 
improving the financial management of the Commission, para 1). 
141 See Art. 318 TFEU. 
142 The Parliament has stressed the need for a clearer definition of Commissioners’ 
individual and collective political responsibility and accountability for their 
decisions and for the policy implementation by their services (see European 
Parliament, Resolution of 22 April 2008 on the discharge for implementation of the 
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European Union general budget for the financial year 2006, para. 73; and 
Resolution of 23 April 2009 on the discharge for implementation of the European 
Union general budget for the financial year 2007, para. 57). At hearings before the 
European Parliament of the Barroso II Commission, newly appointed 
Commissioners were asked questions like: “In what respect would you consider 
yourself responsible and accountable to the Parliament for your actions and for 
those of your departments?”). For a review of the political accountability in 
Europe, see Broeksteeg H., Van den Driessche, I., Verhey, L. (eds) (2008). 
143 See European Commission, Synthesis of the Annual Activity Reports and 
declarations of the Directors-General and Heads of Service, COM (2002) 426, 
24.7.2002, p. 10.  
144 See European Commission, Synthesis of the Commission’s management 
achievements in 2009, COM (2010) 281, 2.6.2010, p. 2. 
145 European Commission, Governance Statement, 30 May 2007, point 3.2, p. 7. 
146 European Council, Recommendation on the discharge to be given to the 
Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 
2007, doc. 5587/09, ADD1/REV1, 4.2.2009, p. 10.  
147 See European Parliament, Working document of Mrs I. Grässle on Governance 
in the European Commission, Part 1, doc. 392.252, 29.8.2007, p. 4. 
148 See European Parliament, Resolution of 22 April 2008 with observations 
forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the 
implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2006, 
section III – Commission, point 46. 
149 In this respect, the Treaty seems to give ammo to such an interpretation when, 
in the context of the discharge procedure, it refers to the Commission’s 
departments “which are responsible for the implementation of the budget” (see 
Art. 319(3) TFEU). The principle of the Institution’s primary responsibility and the 
exercise of delegated responsibilities to authorising officers are set by Art. 59 of the 
Financial Regulation, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No  1605/2002, op. cit. 
This point has been stressed by the European Parliament in its discharge 
Resolution of 22 April 2008 concerning the financial year 2006 (para. 48; see also 
European Parliament, Working document of Mrs I. Grässle on Governance in the 
European Commission, Part 1, doc. 392.252, 29.8.2007, p. 4). For the background of 
the present responsibilities arrangements within the Commission, see European 
Commission: Supporting the reform of financial management : a new framework 
for authorising officers, SEC(2000) 2203, 13.12.2000; The annual reports and 
declarations required of Directors-General under the reform of the Commission, 
SEC (2001) 875, 27.6.2001; The 2002 review of the implementation of activity-based 
management in the Commission, including clarification of the methodology for the 
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establishment of Annual Activity Reports, COM(2003) 28, 21.1.2003; Clarification 
of the responsibilities of the key actors in the domain of internal audit and internal 
control in the Commission, SEC(2003) 59, 21.1.2003; Clarification of the role of 
Directors-General in the framework of shared management, C(2003)1830, 17.6.2003; 
Internal rules on the implementation of the general budget of the European Union, 
C(2010) 1858, 8.4.2010. 
150 On that occasion the “Committee of Independent Experts” stressed that “[t]he 
separation between the political responsibility of Commissioners (for policy 
decisions) and the administrative responsibility of the director-general and the 
services (for the implementation of policy) should not be stretched too far” and 
that Commissioners should bear responsibility for what is going on in their 
services (see Committee of Independent Experts, First Report on Reform of the 
Commission: Analysis of current practice and proposals for tackling 
mismanagement, irregularities and fraud, 15 March 1999, point 9.3.4, p. 140). The 
Committee also stressed that ultimately “responsibility for all actions of the 
administration must find its way back to individual Commissioners and through 
them to the College. (…) The global operation of internal financial control falls 
within the concept of the collective responsibility of the Commission as a whole” 
(see Committee of Independent Experts, Second Report on Reform of the 
Commission: Analysis of current practice and proposals for tackling 
mismanagement, irregularities and fraud, 10 September 1999, Vol. I, point 4.9.5, 
pp. 118-119). The idea that Commissioners are responsible only for laying down 
policy, while Directors-General implement policy, was rejected as untenable both 
in law and in fact; a stance seen as paving the way to granting ‘immunity’ to 
Commissioners with respect to the sound implementation of policy and the 
efficient organisation of their services (see Ibid., Vol. II, points 7.9.1 and 7.9.6.).  
151 See the European Parliament’s Resolution of 27 April 2006 on the discharge for 
implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2004 
(para. 79). The issue has been first raised by the European Parliament in its 
Resolution of 4 April 2001 on the discharge for implementation of the European 
Union general budget for the financial year 1999. The Parliament asked in 
particular that each Commissioner signs an annual declaration of assurance that 
adequate internal controls have been put in place as well as a statement that, 
according to available information, all funds under his/her responsibility have 
been spent in accordance with the principles of sound and efficient management 
(see point 10.II). In its Resolution of 12 April 2005 (discharge for implementation of 
the European Union general budget for the financial year 2003), the Parliament 
invited “the Commission to convert the Annual Synthesis Report into a 
consolidated assurance statement on the Commission's management and financial 
controls as a whole” (para. 62). The issue has been recalled in discharge 
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Resolutions for subsequent financial years. Also the European Court of Auditors 
has recommended that the Commission, as an institution, adopt as its own 
Directors-General management representations’ (see the Annual Report concerning 
the financial year 2004, para. 1.57). 
152 See European Parliament, Working Document of Mrs I. Grässle on Governance 
in the European Commission, Part 3, doc. 393.887, 30.8.2007, p. 2. Mrs Grässle has 
also expressed concern on the possibility of the European Commission and the 
college of Commissioners to remain accountable to the European Parliament “in 
the face of directorates-general acting with increasing independence and which in 
turn are granted discharge as an institution by Council and Parliament”. She also 
observed that “directorates-general come across on their websites as being 
independent parts of the Commission, without having a corporate identity” and 
that implementing provisions for the same administrative procedures, subject to 
the same rules, can vary between different directorates-general (see European 
Parliament, Working Document of Mrs I. Grässle on Governance in the European 
Commission, Part 2, doc. 393.886, 30.8.2007, p. 2, 6 and 7). For example, along the 
same lines, in its discharge Resolution of 5 May 2010 concerning the financial year 
2008 (see para. 319), the European Parliament highlighted the fact that the public 
regards the Commission as a single entity and regretted that only limited progress 
has been achieved in the formation of ‘one-stop shops’ covering the full range of 
Directorates-General responsible for research programmes. 
153 See European Commission, Report to the European Parliament on the follow-up 
to 2004 discharge decisions (summary) – European Parliament Resolutions, COM 
(2006) 641, 24.10.2006, p. 5, and the attached Commission Working Document, 
SEC(2006) 1376, p. 14. The Commission has pointed out that the “2000 reform 
centred on ensuring Authorising Officers by Delegation were solely responsible for 
the execution of their activities”, with a division of management responsibilities 
between Directors-General and the collegiate structure (see European Commission, 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament on the follow-up to 2005 
discharge decisions (summary), COM(2007) 538, 19 September 2007, p. 6, and the 
attached Commission Working Document, SEC(2007) 1185, 19.9.2007, p. 17). 
154 See European Commission, “EU Budget – facts and myths”, Press release 
Memo/07/350, 12.9.2007, p. 2. An implicit recognition of this argumentation is that 
Parliament normally granted discharge to the Commission, year after year. See box 
14 “Postponing and refusing discharge to the Commission”. 
155 See European Parliament, Resolution of 2  February  2006 on national 
management declarations, para 9. See also Parliament’s resolutions of 12 April 2005 
on the discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget for the 
financial year 2003 (para. 21); of 27 April 2006 on the discharge for implementation 
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of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2004 (para. 39); of 24 
April 2007 on the discharge for implementation of the European Union general 
budget for the financial year 2005 (para. 23) and the Working Document by Mr Jan 
Mulder, "Redesigning accountability structures and control activities in the 
European Union", PE 378.567v01-00, 7.9.2006. The issue has also been examined in 
a study commissioned by the European Parliament, “Annual summaries in the 
context of shared management: evaluation, ways forward and possible usefulness 
for the Court of Auditors”, 5.6.2009, doc. PE 411.270 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201005/20100519AT
T74795/20100519ATT74795EN.pdf). 
156 Such a ‘four-pillar’ scheme would be based on: 
•  annual ex-ante Disclosure Statements and ex-post declarations of assurance at 
the highest member state level; 
•  similar annual statements and declarations by each responsible authority at 
operational level (e.g. Managing Authority and Certifying Authority), 
supported by opinions from independent auditors; 
•  oversight by national authorities (in particular, Supreme Audit Institutions) 
over the control frameworks for EU funds and reporting on weaknesses in 
its design and operation in practice; and 
•  audit of the ex-post declarations of assurance by Supreme by Audit 
Institutions, or other independent audit bodies, and report to the national 
parliaments on the result. 
(see European Commission, Communication on a roadmap to an integrated 
internal control framework, COM(2005) 252, 15.6.2005, p. 9). Parliament’s appeal 
for an accrued role of national audit bodies intervened in 2006, where it called “on 
national audit bodies to assume responsibility for controlling the local use of EU 
funds, so as to make any consideration of establishing national offices of the Court 
of Auditors unnecessary” (see European Parliament, discharge Resolution of 27 
April 2006 concerning the financial year 2004, para. 65). On the same issue see also 
Parliament’s discharge Resolution of 24 April 2007 concerning the financial year 
2005 (para. 28); discharge Resolution of 23 April 2009 concerning the financial year 
2007 (para. 34); discharge Resolution of 5 May 2010 concerning the financial year 
2008 (para. 53). 
157 The Court stressed that such assurance very much depends on the reliability of 
the information supplied by beneficiaries when claiming EU funds (see European 
Court of Auditors, Opinion No. 6/2007 of 19 July 2007 on the annual summaries of 
member states, ‘national declarations’ of member states and audit work on EU 
funds of national audit bodies, Luxembourg, para. XI). 
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158 See European Parliament, Resolution of 12 April 2005 containing the comments 
which are an integral part of the decision on the discharge for implementing the 
general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2003, Section III – 
Commission, para 27. 
159 The Parliament suggested that in place of one overall declaration, member states 
could issue a declaration for each major sector. The Parliament also suggested that 
instead of one signature from the Finance Minister, member states themselves 
should identify the relevant body at central level which should be responsible and 
accountable for issuing the declarations (see European Parliament, Resolution of 2 
February 2006 on national management declarations, para 8; Resolution of 27 April 
2006 on the discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget 
for the financial year 2004, paras 39-41; Resolution of 24 April 2007 on the 
discharge for implementation of the European Union general budget for the 
financial year 2005, paras. 23-24).  
160 See the Ecofin Council Conclusions, 13678/05, 8.11.2005, point 12.  
161 Thus, only one of the four pillars envisaged by the Commission is actually in 
place (see note 156): these are the statements and declarations from authorities at 
operational level, supported by opinions from independent auditors.  
162 A number of voluntary initiatives have been undertaken by some member states 
in the context of accountability to national parliaments on the use of shared 
management EU funds. For example, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom currently provide ‘national declarations’ that, although different 
in status, scope and content, are meant to provide an assessment of compliance on 
EU funds spent. One should also mention the reports and certificates of some 
national audit bodies on management of EU funds within their member states. 
163 See the Inter-institutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound 
financial management of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission, op. cit., Art. 44. It should be observed that when this 
commitment was translated into the Financial Regulation, a further adjustment 
eventually took place, by omitting a reference to the “assessment concerning the 
compliance of management and control systems”. In the end, member states are 
only deemed to “produce an annual summary at the appropriate national level of 
the available audits and declarations” (see Art. 53(b)(3) of Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No. 1605/2002, op. cit.). The Commission pointed out that a summary 
which is no more than a catalogue of available audits has no value added, and 
would make this a meaningless additional reporting exercise. Therefore, although 
recognising that this was not a legal requirement, the Commission invited member 
states to analyse the result from the information provided in the annual summary 
“in order to determine the implications at the level of the Member States as a 
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whole, highlighting any systemic deficiencies and summarising the main cross-
cutting/horizontal issues, as well as indicating any further actions taken or to be 
taken as a consequence” (see European C o m m i s s i o n ,  G u i d a n c e  N o t e  o n  t h e  
Annual Summary in relation to Structural Actions and the European Fisheries 
Fund, document COCOF 07/0063/06-EN, 12.11.2008, point 2.6.3 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200902/20090210AT
T49079/20090210ATT49079EN.pdf). In its Opinion No. 6/2007 on the annual 
summaries of member states, ‘national declarations’ of member states, and audit 
work on EU funds of national audit bodies, the European Court of Auditors 
observed that the quality of the annual summaries will depend on the quality of 
the underlying declarations. If they highlight strengths and weaknesses they could 
stimulate improved control of the EU funds in shared management areas (see 
points III and IV, OJ C 216 of 14.9.2007, p. 3). 
164 See Parliament’s Resolution of 5 May 2010 with comments forming an integral 
part of the decision on the discharge for implementation of the European Union 
general budget for the financial year 2008, Section III – Commission, point 43.  
165 See replies of Commissioner Samecki, in charge of Regional policy, to questions 
raised by the Parliament’s budget control committee in the framework of the 
Discharge 2008, question 14 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/ 
activities/cont/200912/20091202ATT65755/20091202ATT65755EN.pdf). See also 
Commissioner Šemeta’s speech on Discharge and Audit at the meeting of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Budgetary Control, 22 February 2010 
(http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/semeta/headlines/speeches/2010/ 
02/cocobu_220210%20.pdf). 
166 See European Parliament resolution of 7 May 2009 on the development of the 
relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments under the 
Treaty of Lisbon, para 4.  
167 See European Parliament, discharge Resolution of 5 May 2010 concerning the 
financial year 2008 (paras. 49 and 51).  
168 In particular the proposal provides that annual summaries should also include 
an analysis of systematic or recurrent weaknesses as well as corrective actions 
taken or planned. National bodies should also provide a management declaration 
of assurance as to the completeness, accuracy and veracity of the accounts, the 
proper functioning of the internal control systems as well as to the legality and 
regularity of the underlying transactions and the respect of the principle of sound 
financial management. This should be accompanied by the opinion of an 
independent audit body (see COM (2010) 260, op. cit., Art. 53a(5), p. 74).  
169 See Art. 4(3) TEU. 
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170 As has been observed, “[t]he member states have a conflict of interest. On the 
one hand as members of the Council it is their duty in adopting regulations to 
create conditions for their implementation that are readily implemented and 
controlled by the Commission. On the other hand as nation states they favour their 
own systems of management and control. This hybrid arrangement leads to a lack 
of clarity on mutual responsibilities and obligations and fails to give any guarantee 
that the right balance has been struck in the interests of good management of 
Community monies” (see Committee of Independent Experts, Second Report on 
Reform of the Commission: Analysis of current practice and proposals for tackling 
mismanagement, irregularities and fraud, op. cit., Vol. I, para 3.5.3). It is worth 
noting that the Financial Regulation establishes the principle that “all financial 
actors and any other person involved in budget implementation, management, 
audit or control shall be prohibited from taking any action which may bring their 
own interests into conflict with those of the Communities” (see Art. 52(1) of 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002, op. cit.). 
171 See European Court of Auditors, opinion No 2/2004 on the ‘single audit’ model, 
op. cit., para 24.  
172 See note 202 for an illustration of the gap between irregularities detected by 
member states and those detected by the Commission. 
173 See Joint Audit Strategy for Structural Actions (2007-2009), March 2007, p. 10.  
174 See Art. 53b(2) and (3) of the Financial Regulation No. 1605/2002, op. cit.. The 
legal basis for Cohesion Policy 2007-13 recognises the principle at the basis of the 
Contract of Confidence, whereby the Commission can decide to rely principally on 
the opinion of the national audit authority with regard to the effective functioning 
of the systems and carry out its own on-the-spot audits in exceptional cases only 
(see Art. 73(3) of Regulation No 1083/2006, op. cit.).  
175 A further example is provided by the possibility of ‘partial closure’ of 
operations in the Cohesion Policy (2000-06), introduced to make financial 
management more flexible. A partial closure of an operational programme is made 
conditional upon member states sending to the Commission a statement of 
expenditure and a declaration assessing the legality and regularity of the 
expenditure concerned. However, member states take the risk that if expenditure is 
found subsequently to be ‘irregular’ (for example following controls from the 
Commission or the Court of Auditors), this may lead to a net reduction of the EU 
financial contribution (no possibility to replace ‘ineligible expenditure’ with other 
expenditure, see later note 195). This risk of losing funds for the programme has 
recently led to an amendment of the rules to provide that “where irregularities in 
operations which have been subject to a declaration of partial closure are detected 
by the member state”, EU funds released may be reused by the member state for 
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the operational programme concerned (see Art. 88(3) of Regulation No. 1083/2066, 
op. cit.). This implicitly means that national bodies could first certify compliance of 
the expenditure at partial closure, obtain on this basis the liquidation of EU funds 
by the Commission and undertake the control of expenditure afterwards. This 
potentially reverse the logic of the ‘single audit’ whereby member states, when 
introducing their reimbursement claims, certify their compliance with EU and 
national rules on the basis of adequate controls. 
176 See note 42. 
177 In the framework of the concept of ‘tolerable risk of error’ (see Box 7 “The cost 
of controls”), the Commission has pointed out that “in the shorter term, there 
needs to be a shared view among the Institutions on the extent to which it is 
reasonable to expect the Commission to limit the level of undetected error on an 
annual basis” (see European Commission, Synthesis of the Commission's 
management achievements in 2009, COM (2010) 281, 2.6.2010, p. 13). This stance 
finds some support in the Financial Regulation establishing that management of 
the risks relating to the legality and regularity has to take account of the “multi-
annual character of programmes as well as the nature of the payments concerned.” 
(see Art. 28a(2) of Council Regulation No 1605/2002, op. cit.). In this respect, the 
Council has emphasised “the multiannual character of EU expenditure, which 
should be duly taken into account. In this context, a transparent and reliable 
correction and recovery mechanism forms part of an efficient control framework. 
Furthermore, it considers that the effectiveness of controls should also be assessed 
on a multiannual perspective.” (see Council recommendation in respect of the 
implementation of the budget for the financial year 2008, doc. 5826/10 Add 1, 
3.2.2010, p. 7). As shown later (see note 201), programmes may still be uncleared 
ten years after the closure of a programming period. 
178 See for example the Annual Activity Reports for the Year 2009, DG Agriculture 
and Rural Development, March 2010, p. 90; DG Regional Policy, 31.3.2010, p. 57; 
DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 30.3.2010, p. 68. Such 
reports are available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/aar/index_en.htm. 
179 See McCubbins & Schwartz (1984:65-179). Analogous to the use of real police 
patrols, the authors define “police-patrol oversight” as “centralised, active, and 
direct”. This oversight is undertaken by the supervisory body “at its own initiative, 
with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by 
its surveillance, discouraging such violations”. By contrast, “fire-alarm oversight”, 
in line with real fire alarms, is “less centralised and involves less active and direct 
intervention than police-patrol oversight”. It is about “sniffing for fires”, while 
“police-patrol oversight” is about placing “fire-alarm boxes on street corners”, 
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building “neighbourhood fire houses” and sometimes dispatching the “hook-and-
ladder” in response to an alarm. See also Brandsma (2007:3). 
180 It is true that, for example in the Cohesion Policy, the ex-ante assessment by the 
Commission of national management and control systems and their audit strategy 
constitute the first essential building block of assurance on the design of the 
systems (see Figure 4). It remains the case, however, that this assessment is not a 
kind of ‘stress test’, as it is based on the description of these systems and not on 
their actual operation.  
181 See Arts 53b(4) (shared management) and 53c(2) (decentralised management) of 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, op. cit. 
182 The Commission has pointed out that financial corrections “provide a deterrent 
effect on Member States from any future mismanagement of EU funds – even 
where the funds remain within the Member States, the Member State must find the 
money to co-finance projects which replace those subject to financial corrections – 
and assist in eliminating errors detected during the implementation period, 
thereby reducing the residual risk of error at closure.” (see European Commission, 
Impact of the action plan to strengthen the Commission's supervisory role under 
shared management of structural actions, COM (2010) 52, 18.2.2010, p. 12). Also, 
the Council has considered “that the application of suspension and correction 
mechanisms, whenever appropriate, acts as a deterrent and can thus have an 
important positive impact on the legality and regularity of expenditure” (see 
Council recommendation on the discharge to be given to the Commission in 
respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities 
for the financial year 2007, doc. 5587/09 ADD 1 REV 1, 4.2.2009, page 25, point 3). 
183 See Commission staff working document accompanying the report from the 
C o m m i s s i o n  t o  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  o n  t h e  f o l l o w - u p  t o  2 0 0 7  d i s c h a r g e  
decisions, SEC (2009) 1427 final, 16.10.2009, p. 10. See also note 114. 
184 For example, the Commission has challenged a number of irregularities 
uncovered by the Court on the basis that “the Commission does not consider that 
the circumstances identified by the Court provide a basis for the application of 
financial corrections” (see European Court of Auditors, Annual Report for the 
financial year 2008, reply of the Commission to the paragraph 6.17). This confirms 
that the ‘benchmark’ for compliance is actually provided by the rules on financial 
corrections.  
185 The European Parliament wondered for example “if the current system of 
financial correction is sufficient to encourage Member States to combat fraud and 
irregularities” (see European Parliament - Resolution containing the comments 
which are an integral part of the decision on the discharge for implementing the 
general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2000, Section III - 
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Commission – 10 April 2002, point 78). More recently, Parliament has deplored 
“the fact that the system of sanctions for Member States returning high error rates 
and receiving large shares of funds is inefficient since they only repay between 3% 
and 5% of the overall appropriations in recoveries; it is concerned that the cost of 
maintaining proper control systems manifestly exceeds this amount, so that this is 
a negative incentive” (see European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010 with 
observations forming an integral part of its Decisions on discharge in respect of the 
implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2008, 
Section III – Commission and executive agencies, para. 119). The Court of Auditors 
observed that the financial corrections could provide no more “than a limited, 
auxiliary contribution to the necessary rigour of everyday management. Their 
effectiveness is essentially dependent on the number of checks performed. 
Furthermore, since financial corrections would intervene only after the fact, they 
could not be enough on their own to make good all the consequences of any 
transactions that might be implemented even though they did not meet the 
necessary regulatory requirements.” (see European Court of Auditors - Opinion 
No 2/2005 on the proposal for a Council Regulation laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social 
Fund and the Cohesion Fund – paragraph 14, Official Journal C 121 of 20.5.2005, p. 
14).  
186 It should be noted however that the Court of Justice may, at the initiative of the 
Commission, impose a lump sum or penalty payment on a member state having 
failed to take the necessary measures to comply with a judgment of the Court (see 
Art. 260 TFEU). 
187 Financial corrections may be limited to individual irregularities, or cover 
systemic errors or shortcomings in the national management or control systems. 
When it is not possible to quantify with precision the exact financial impact, 
extrapolated or flat-rate corrections are applied. The aim is to arrive at the best 
possible estimate of the financial impact on the EU budget. The amount of any 
correction is decided with respect to the principle of proportionality and the extent 
to which the fund was put at risk by individual irregularities or the shortcomings 
in the management or control systems.  
188 See European Court of Auditors, Special report No. 7/2010 “Audit of the 
clearance of accounts procedure”, answer of the Commission to para. IV 
(http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/5654728.PDF). 
189 See European Court of Auditors, Annual report for the financial year 2006, 
Commission’s reply to paragraph 5.76. Member states have an obligation of 
recovering undue payments to beneficiaries. EU rules provide that as a general 
rule any irregularity shall involve withdrawal of the wrongly obtained advantage 
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by a beneficiary (see Art. 4 of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of the Council 
of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities financial 
interests, OJ L 312, 23.12.1995, p. 1). Similarly, the Financial Regulation (Art. 
53b(2)(c)) requires member states to “recover funds wrongly paid or incorrectly 
used or funds lost as a result of irregularities or errors”. As a matter of fact, in the 
period 2007-2009, member states recovered directly from beneficiaries less than 
10% of the total amount of corrections outstanding at end 2006 for Agriculture (see 
DG “Agriculture and Rural development“ Annual Activity Report for the year 
2009, March 2010, p. 60, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/aar/doc/ 
agri_aar.pdf). This is despite the fact that regulatory provisions (see Art. 32(2) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005) allow member states, as an incentive, to retain 20% 
of the amounts recovered and credited to the EU budget as flat rate recovery costs 
(except in cases of irregularity or negligence attributable to its administrative 
authorities or other official bodies). Rules provide that half of the cost (the other 
half is supported by the national budgets) of any undue payments not recovered 
by member states from the beneficiaries within four or, in the case of legal 
proceedings, eight years may be put at the charge of the EU budget. Member states 
are however obliged to pursue the recovery of undue amounts. In case of 
negligence, the Commission may decide to charge the entire outstanding amounts 
to the member states concerned (see Art. 32(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005). 
Concerning the Cohesion Policy, available data do not permit us to know the 
amounts of financial corrections and related recoveries applied by member states 
as a result of their own checks. This has recently lead Parliament to recall its 
previous requests in this respect (see European Parliament resolution of 22 April 
2008 with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in 
respect of the implementation of the European Union general budget for the 
financial year 2006, paras. 13, 110, 113, 116; and the resolution of 5 May 2010 with 
observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the 
implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2008, 
para 32).  
190 According to the Financial Regulation (see Art. 96 of Regulation No 1605/2002, 
op. cit.), candidates or tenderers guilty of misrepresentation in supplying the 
information required by the contracting authority or failing to supply this 
information and contractors who have been declared to be in serious breach of 
their obligations under contracts covered by the budget may incur administrative 
or financial penalties. These shall be proportionate to the importance of the 
contract and the seriousness of the misconduct and may consist in: 
a)  the exclusion of the candidate or tenderer or contractor concerned from the 
contracts and grants financed by the budget, for a maximum period of ten 
years; and/or 
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b)  the payment of financial penalties by the candidate or tenderer or contractor 
up to the value of the contract in question.  
191 The European Parliament, recalling “that the cost of financial corrections is 
borne by the Member States, usually by the taxpayer, rather than by the 
beneficiaries of the aid irregularly paid”, has regretted “the lack of incentives for 
Member States to effectively control expenditure, since any ineligible expenditure 
identified by the Commission or the ECA can be substituted for eligible 
expenditure by a Member State”. It asked the Commission “to make sure that in 
the future only irregularities identified by Member States themselves can be 
substituted for other expenditure without any loss of funding for the Member State 
concerned” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 22 April 2008 on the discharge 
for implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 
2006, paragraphs 91 and 109). Parliament has reiterated a similar request in 2009 
(see European Parliament, Resolution of 23 April 2009 on the discharge for 
implementation of the European Union general budget for the financial year 2007, 
para. 83). 
192 This is the case for the overwhelming part of corrections (around 80% in 2009) in 
direct agricultural spending, decided either by the Commission or member states. 
193 This is for example the case of milk quotas in Italy. Since 1984, cow's milk is 
marketed in the European Union on the basis of quotas initially introduced in 
order to achieve a balance between supply and demand and curb surpluses. Milk 
production quantities are broken down among the member states (national milk 
quotas) and among producers (individual quotas) in each member state. Where 
there is an overrun in the national quota, a surplus levy is payable by the 
producers. Regular production overruns hav e  b e e n  r e c o r d e d  i n  I t a l y ,  w i t h  t h e  
subsequent request for payment of levies by the Commission. These corrections 
have been pre-financed by the national budget and their reimbursement by 
farmers is most problematic because of the protestations it regularly raises. In this 
respect the Court of Auditors has pointed out that for 2008 “Italy paid the levy for 
all producers concerned (€174.5 million) but only managed to collect €21.5 million 
from them” (see European Court of Auditors, Annual Report for the financial year 
2008, op. cit., chap. 5, para. 5.22). 
194 See President Barroso's speech on the State of the Union 2010, 7.9.2010, 
SPEECH/10/411, p. 7.  
195For Cohesion policy the practice distinguishes two types of financial corrections.  
The normal situation is that member states (on their own initiative or at the 
Commission’s request) withdraw ineligible projects. They can thus re-use EU 
funding released from ineligible projects for other eligible expenditure (for 
example, new projects, see Council Regulation No. 1083/2006, Arts 98 to 100, op. 
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cit.). In the end, these corrections do not entail a net reduction of EU payments for 
the member state, provided that it has a sufficient buffer of eligible spending. 
However, if a member state refuses to withdraw the expenditure presented for 
reimbursement and considered ineligible by the Commission, the latter may apply 
financial corrections having the effect of a net reduction of EU payments. 
196 For example, for Agriculture, by the end of 2009, the ‘conformity clearance’ 
procedure was not complete for any year later than 2001. The financial accounts for 
2009 show that for direct agriculture spending (EAGF), out of €462 million 
confirmed financial corrections in 2009, €274 million (or 58%) were actually 
recovered during the same year. This percentage is significantly lower for 
Structural and Cohesion Funds, where out of €2,411 million of confirmed financial 
corrections in 2009, only €478 million (or 20%) were actually recovered during the 
same year. In total, some €2.3 billion still remain to be recovered at year end 2009 
( s e e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m i s s i o n ,  A n n u a l  a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n ,  F i n a n c i a l  
Year 2009, SEC(2010) 963, 20.7.2010, pp. 81-95). 
197 See European Parliament, Resolution containing the comments which are an 
integral part of the decision on the discharge for implementing the general budget 
of the European Union for the financial year 2003, Section III – Commission, 
12.4.2005, point 69. 
198 For example, the volume of financial corrections in the Cohesion policy has 
increased substantially in recent years. In 2009 an amount of €2.4 billion has been 
fixed, compared with €1.5 billion in 2008 and €288 million in 2007. At the end of 
2009, cumulative corrections for Cohesion policy 1994-99 (€2.5 billion) were 
slightly less than half when compared to the cumulative amount so far for the 
2000-06 period (€5.2 billion). The significant difference between the two 
programming periods (likely to be further amplified as the closure process for 
2000-06 progresses) shows the extent of the margin of discretion enjoyed by the 
Commission in applying corrective mechanisms. 
199 For example, in response to the Court of Auditors’ observations, the 
Commission has indicated that “[t]he findings presented by the Court show the 
situation at a particular point in the execution of these control processes. A large 
proportion of the errors are likely to be corrected through the operation of the 
multi-annual corrective system.” (see European Court of Auditors, Annual report 
2006, Commission’s response to para. 1.41, OJ C 273 of 15.11.2007. See also 
European Commission, The control system for Cohesion Policy, How it works in 
the 2007–13 budget period, October 2009, p. 11).  
200 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No 1/2010 “Improving the financial 
management of the European Union budget: Risks and challenges”, 14.1.2010, 
point 7. 
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201 For example, the Commission admits that for the closure of the 1994-99 
programmes for Cohesion policy, there is still a high residual risk in a number of 
ERDF programmes (see DG “Regional policy“ Annual Activity Report for the year 
2009, 31.3.2010, p. 45, op. cit.) 
202 In this respect, out of the €625 million of total financial corrections and 
recoveries decided in 2009 for agriculture (EAGF), almost three-quarters originate 
from Commission’s clearance actions and the rest from irregularities detected by 
member states. In 2008, 39% (or €360 million) of the financial corrections were 
det ect ed b y m em b er st at es (se e Euro p ean  C o m m i ssio n , An n u a l acco un t s o f  t h e 
European Union, Financial Year 2009, SEC(2010) 963, 20.7.2010, p. 81). Concerning 
Cohesion policy, the Court of Auditors has observed in its last Annual report that 
at least almost a third of the errors found could have been detected and corrected 
by member states before certifying expenditure to the Commission (see European 
Court of Auditors, Annual report on the implementation of the 2009 budget, 
9.9.2010, op. cit., para. 4.23). 
203 The ‘conformity clearance’ exercise in Agriculture cannot exclude from EU 
financing national expenditure made more than 24 months before the Commission 
officially notifies the member state of its audit findings (see Art. 31(4)(a) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005). The Commission has repeatedly proposed an 
extension of this time limit, but these proposals were turned down by both the 
Council and the European Parliament. In the Cohesion policy, national authorities 
are required to keep available supporting documents regarding expenditure and 
audits for a period of three years following the closure of an operational 
programme or part of it, except in the case of legal proceedings or at the duly 
motivated request of the Commission (see Art. 90 of Regulation No. 1083/2006, op. 
cit). 
204 See “Introduction” by Heinrich Aigner, Vice-Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgets (European Parliament, 1973, point 12).  
205 The routine occurrence of corrective mechanisms is also shown by the fact that 
the EU financial statements disclose each year as a contingent asset an amount of 
expenditure, based on exclusions in previous years, which is likely to be discarded 
from EU financing by future clearance decisions (this represents an amount of €3.9 
billion for Agriculture and Cohesion spending at year-end 2009). This entry in the 
accounts could actually be interpreted as a ‘performance indicator’ and even as a 
target for the Directorates-General concerned, while representing at the same time 
a ‘negative’ indicator for the policy objectives.  
206 See European Commission, Annual accounts of the European Union, Financial 
Year 2009, SEC(2010) 963, 20.7.2010, p. 83. 
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207 See Council recommendation in respect of the implementation of the budget for 
the financial year 2008, doc. 5826/10 Add 1, 3.2.2010, p. 26. Indeed, Cohesion 
policy is based on the principle that local authorities can put in place a programme 
of actions because funds are ensured for a number of years. Reducing the 
availability of the funds would not serve the purpose of the policy. One may also 
notice that the non-observance of the principle of additionality (a principle 
providing that contributions from the Structural Funds shall not replace public or 
equivalent structural expenditure by a member state) triggers the application of 
financial corrections, with the Commission cancelling all or part of the Structural 
Funds contribution to the member state concerned (see Art. 99(5) of the Regulation 
No 1083/2006, op. cit.). The impact would be again to reduce further the funds 
available, which is at odds with the aim of the policy. 
208 Arts 310 (5) and 317 TFEU. 
209 See note 92. 
210 See note 80. 
211 See D. Hübner (2007a:3). 
212 See Commissioner Šemeta’s speech on Discharge and Audit at the meeting of 
the Parliamentary Committee on Budgetary Control, 22 February 2010, op. cit. 
213 See Art. 60(1) of the Financial Regulation, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 1605/2002, op. cit. 
214 See Art. 60(7) of the Financial Regulation, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 
No 1605/2002, op. cit. 
215 See European Commission, The annual reports and declarations required of 
Directors-General under the reform of the Commission, doc. SEC (2001) 875/6, 
27.6.2001, point 2.2.1. For example, one can read in the 2008 Annual Activity 
Report for DG Regional Policy that outputs and results reported “relate to activity 
which is primarily the responsibility of the Member States, given the shared 
management responsibilities of Cohesion policy. It is not a direct measure of the 
performance of DG Regional Policy” (see DG Regional Policy’s Annual Activity 
Report for the year 2008, 31.3.2009, point 1.2.1.3, p. 11 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
atwork/synthesis/aar/aar2008/doc/regio_aar.pdf). The same concept is repeated 
in the Annual Management Plan for 2010 (see DG Regio annual management plan, 
10.5.2010, p. 19 (http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/regio_mp.pdf). 
216 See for example the Annual Activity Reports for the Year 2009, DG Agriculture 
and Rural Development, March 2010, p. 90; DG Regional Policy, 31.3.2010, p. 57; 
DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 30.3.2010, p. 68.  
217 As required by Art. 60(7) of the Financial Regulation, Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No. 1605/2002, op. cit. It is worth recalling that the origin of this 
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provision can be found in the White Paper for reform of the Commission presented 
by the latter in 2000. “Action 82” stated that “[b]y signing the annual report, the 
Director-General takes responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of the 
information presented” (see European Commission, Reforming the Commission, 
White Paper, COM (2000) 200, vol. II, 5.4.2000, pp. 61-62). 
218 See Commission decision C(2010)1858  of 8 April 2010, Annex IV, Charter of 
tasks and responsibilities of authorising officers by delegation, Model declaration 
by the authorising officer by delegation relating to the Annual Activity Report, p. 
9. It should be observed however that such footnote has been inserted in some 
annual activity reports (see for example the Annual Activity Reports for the Year 
2009 - DG Regional Policy, 31.3.2010, p. 57; DG Research, 26.3.2010, p. 60) but not 
in others (see for example, DG Agriculture and Rural Development, March 2010, p. 
90 and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 30.3.2010, p. 68). 
219 See European Commission, 2010 Preliminary Draft Budget, Volume 0, General 
introduction, p. 15. The Budget Memorandum is based on information from the 
‘Activity statements’ which, with the introduction of activity-based budgeting, 
constitute the main instrument for justifying the appropriations requested by the 
Commission. The ‘Activity statements’ are meant to present performance 
information for each area of EU activity, providing the main elements justifying the 
level of resources requested by the Commission in its preliminary draft budget. 
The statements should include details of the resources allocated to the activities, as 
well as associated objectives, indicators, outputs and outcomes. 
220 See European Commission, 2010 Preliminary Draft Budget, Introduction, point 
2.1. 
221 See European Commission, 2010 Preliminary Draft Budget, Volume 0, op. cit., p. 
15. 
222 See European Commission, 2010 Preliminary Draft Budget, Budget 
Memorandum, “Re-launching the EU's economic activity”, p. 3.  
223 See Oliver, D. (1995), Standards of Conduct in Public Life – What Standards?, Public 
Law, p. 497, cited in Harlow (2002b:10). 
224 For example, although taking 1/3 of the EU budget resources, Cohesion policy 
is still a relatively small policy when compared to similar spending in member 
states. Another example is provided by the research domain, whose bulk of public 
funding is provided by national budgets (around 95%). 
225 See note 81. 
226 It is worth mentioning in this respect that the Inter-Institutional Agreement 
provides that “[t]he institutions will, as far as possible, avoid entering items in the 
budget involving insignificant amounts of expenditure on operations (see the 
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Inter-Institutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial 
management of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission, op. cit., para. 33). 
227 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No. 1/2010, “Improving the financial 
management of the European Union budget: Risks and challenges”, 14.1.2010, 
para. 14. 
228 EU priorities for the Cohesion policy are multiple and wide-ranging 
(“sustainable development by strengthening growth, competitiveness, 
employment and social inclusion and by protecting and improving the quality of 
the environment”). The priority convergence objective seeks to improve 
“conditions for growth and employment through the increasing and improvement 
of the quality of investment in physical and human capital, the development of 
innovation and of the knowledge society, adaptability to economic and social 
changes, the protection and improvement of the environment, and administrative 
efficiency.” A wide remit is also envisaged for the other two objectives, “Regional 
competitiveness and employment” and “European territorial cooperation” (see 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, Art. 3, op. cit.). The Barca report on an 
agenda for a reformed Cohesion policy observes: “In the absence of a high-level 
cultural and political compromise on a policy model, strategies, both at EU and 
Member States (Regions) level, often lack clear-cut objectives and a justification of 
how planned interventions should achieve them. Priorities are very broad, 
covering all possible areas of public action and cannot be identified with any 
European public good” (European Commission, 2009:106). 
229 This refers to the usual relationship input⇒ output⇒ outcome⇒ impact. The 
following definitions are given by the “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and 
Results Based Management” (see OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 
Paris, 2002). Inputs (The financial, human, and material resources used for the 
development intervention); Outputs (The products, capital goods and services 
which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting 
from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes); 
Outcomes (The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an 
intervention’s outputs); Impacts (Positive and negative, primary and secondary 
long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, 
intended or unintended). 
230 The word “conditionality” is typically employed in the context of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), where it is used to specify “how the Fund’s 
financing will be linked to the member’s implementation of an adequate program 
of policy adjustments in response to its external imbalances” (see International 
Monetary Fund, Guidelines on Conditionality, 25.9.2002, point 1, p. 8). In 
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particular “[a]ll conditionality under an IMF-supported program must be ‘macro-
critical’, that is to say, either critical to the achievement of program goals or for 
monitoring implementation, or necessary for the implementation of specific 
provisions under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement”. This means that IMF 
disbursements are made conditional upon demonstrable policy actions (see 
International Monetary Fund, Factsheet on IMF conditionality, September 2009 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm). 
231 See European Commission (2010), Ex-Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy 
Programmes 2000-2006 financed by the European Regional Development Fund in 
Objective 1 and 2 Regions, Synthesis Report, op. cit., p. 11. 
232 Ibid., p. 162. It is interesting to note that the same remark was made some years 
ago. A study indicates that “While there is universal agreement about the need for 
monitoring as an important dimension to accountability, there is little evidence 
that the outcomes of the monitoring system are being fed back into the 
management process” (see European Commission, DG Regional Policy, A Study of 
the Efficiency of the Implementation Methods for Structural Funds, December 2003). 
One may recall in this respect concerns previously expressed by the Council and its 
intention to ensure that “assistance will be allocated where appraisal shows 
medium term economic and social benefits commensurate with the resources 
deployed. Operations should be adjusted to accord with the results of monitoring 
and evaluation.” (see European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the European 
Council in Edinburgh, Future Financing of the Community, Delors II package, 11-
12 December 1992). 
233 Although it is admitted that a direct casual link is difficult to establish, for 
example, between ERDF assistance and expected developments in terms of GDP 
growth rates and unemployment (see DG Regio Activity Based Statement for the 
2010 draft Budget, p. 6). A similar conclusion is drawn in the Commission staff 
working document on the Budget review (SEC(2010)7000, op. cit., p. 25). 
234 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No. 1/2010 “Improving the financial 
management of the European Union budget: Risks and challenges”, 14.1.2010, par. 
16. 
235 See European Parliament, Resolution containing the comments which are an 
integral part of the decision on the discharge for implementing the general budget 
of the European Union for the financial year 2003, Section III – Commission, 
12.4.2005, point 32(d).  
236 S e e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t ,  R e s o l u t i o n  o f  1 2  J u l y  2 0 0 7  o n  t h e  r o l e  a n d  
effectiveness of Cohesion policy in reducing disparities in the poorest regions of 
the EU, point H.  
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237 See European Commission, Synthesis of the Commission’s management 
achievements in 2007, COM (2008) 338, 4.6.2008, p. 2. 
238 Ibid., p. 2. 
239 To borrow an expression used by Advocate General Darmon in his conclusions 
concerning Case-law 16/88, Commission/Council, op. cit., ECR 1989, p. 3472.  
240 For example, none of the 37 actions undertaken by the “action plan to 
strengthen the Commission's supervisory role under shared management of 
structural actions” (see COM(2008) 97, 19.2.2008) has covered specifically ‘value for 
money’ issues. And the Commission’s services in charge for Cohesion policy are 
reported having “neither sufficient availability of resources nor the special 
expertise in the field to undertake performance audits in the near future” (see D. 
Hübner, 2007a:2). 
241 See Art. 319(1) TFEU. In the founding treaties it was up to the Council to grant 
discharge to the Commission. Later, with the 1970 Budget Treaty (Treaty of 
Luxembourg of 22.04.1970, OJ L 2 of 2.1.1971), discharge was granted jointly by the 
Council and Parliament. Since June 1977, with the entering into force of the Treaty 
of Brussels (22.7.1975, OJ L 359 of 31.12.1977), granting discharge to the 
Commission has become a prerogative of the European Parliament.  
242 See Art. 319 (2) TFEU. It is to be observed that this provision (as well as the 
following sub-paragraph) only refers to expenditure, not to revenue, which is 
ensured through national contributions and is basically member states’ game 
preserve. Parliament has only a consultative power on revenue arrangements (see 
note 61). 
243 See note 140.  
244 See Art. 15 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (National 
Assembly of France, 26 August 1789).  
245 European Parliament resolution on reform of budgetary control procedures and 
institutions, 13.12.2000, para. E.  
246 Ibid., para. D.  
247 See Art. 234 TFEU. The members of the Commission shall resign as a body if the 
motion of censure is carried by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing 
a majority of the members of the European Parliament. However, this provision is 
only an “emergency break” and not a mechanism for accountability. There have 
been only eight motions of censure and no one has ever been adopted.  
248 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No. 2/2005 of 18 March 2005 (op. cit.), 
para. 6.  
249 See European Parliament, discharge Resolution of 5 May 2010 concerning the 
financial year 2008 (para. H).  
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250 See note 40. 
251 See the Treaty amending certain financial provisions, signed in Brussels on 22 
July 1975, preamble.  
252 See European Parliament, discharge Resolution of 5 May 2010 concerning the 
financial year 2008 (para. 70).  
253 See Ecofin Council Conclusions on the budget guidelines for 2011 adopted on 16 
March 2010, doc. 6794/10, 24 February 2010, p. 9. 
254 See European Commission (2002:19).  
255 See note 68. 
256 This principle goes back to the Magna Carta (1215), which is at the origin of 
modern constitutional principles. 
257 The Commission further explains that the ‘democratic deficit’ is usually meant 
to suggest the lack of full parliamentary scrutiny by and accountability to the 
European Parliament; presently, the term is used to indicate a manifestation of this 
in the form of the incomplete monitoring and control of the budget by the citizens 
(see European Commission (1998, annex 2, p. 3).  
258 See in this respect European Commission (2010), Ex-Post Evaluation of Cohesion 
Policy Programmes 2000-2006 financed by the European Regional Development Fund in 
Objective 1 and 2 Regions, Synthesis Report, op. cit., pp. 159-161. 
259 This refers to the SMART standard provided for by Art. 27(3) of the Financial 
Regulation No. 1605/2002, op. cit. 
260 M. Power (1997:147), cited in Schenker-Wicki (2006). 
261 In this respect, although they may provide useful additional information 
depending on the scope and quality of the work that underlies them, ‘national 
declarations’ do not seem to bring a definitive solution. They respond to national 
motives; their status, scope and content is different and it seems unrealistic to 
standardise it. They constitute in practice a self-assessment by member states, not 
necessarily based on conclusive evidence, of how eligibility rules have been 
complied with (therefore ‘value for money’ remains outside their scope).  
262 See Auditor General of Canada (2002:10). 
263 See European Commission, President José Manuel Barroso’s political guidelines 
for the next Commission, op. cit., p. 36. 
264 The draft document (dated 6.10.2009) suggested that most of the EU budget 
should be spent on three key areas (namely, sustainable growth and jobs; energy 
and tackling climate change; and Europe in the world). This would imply either an 
overall increase in EU spending (a hypothesis not really in line with the air du 
temps amidst the economic crisis) or, most likely, a corresponding (significant) 
 THE EU BUDGET | 139 
 
                                                                                                                                       
reduction for the traditional high-budget areas like Agriculture and Cohesion 
policy. The proposal envisaged a radical reduction of Agriculture spending, 
particularly direct aid and market intervention mechanisms. Spending would also, 
to a large extent, become national again, especially for the co-funding of direct aid. 
Concerning the Cohesion policy, the draft suggested increasing the concentration, 
conditionality and performance. As a result, most of the regions currently 
benefiting from Cohesion policy would be excluded from it, precluding to a re-
nationalisation of this policy. The document is available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/pdf/Draft%20document%20reforming%20the%20bud
get%20oct%202009.pdf. 
265 See for example the idea of setting up a European Energy Community to meet 
the challenges of climate change, energy security and the economic crisis launched 
by J. Delors according to whom, if necessary, the project could initially be achieved 
by an initial core group of dedicated member states through the shape of 
s t r e n g t h e n e d  c o o p e r a t i o n  a s  d e f i n e d  b y  A r t .  2 0  T E U .  M r  D e l o r s  r e c a l l s  t h a t  a  
differentiated approach of this kind has been used in the past to make major 
strides in the European project like the Schengen area and the single currency. The 
report “Towards a European Energy Community: A Policy Proposal”, April 2010, 
is available at http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Etud76-
Energy-en.pdf.  See also in this connection the declaration “Towards a new 
European Energy Community” subscribed by Mr Buzek, President of the 
European Parliament, and Mr Delors (http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/ 
tx_publication/EN_Buzek-Delors_declaration.pdf). 
266 See European Council, Financial Perspective 2007-2013, 15915/05, Brussels, 19 
December 2005, para 2bis. 
267 Ibid., para 80. 
268 See Art. 1 TEU. The concept is reaffirmed by Art. 10(3) TEU. See also note 70. 
269 See Preamble of the Treaty on European Union. 
270 One should also mention that the provisions of the new Treaty (Arts 290 and 291 
TFEU) put the Council and Parliament as co-legislators on an equal footing in 
relation to the conferral of delegated and implementing powers to the 
Commission. 
271 See Art. 17 (8) TEU. 
272 See Art. 318 TFEU. 
273 The European Parliament decided in June 2010 to set up a special committee on 
the policy challenges and budgetary resources for a sustainable European Union 
after 2013. This committee should in particular define Parliament's political 
priorities in both legislative and budgetary terms, estimate how much money the 
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EU will need to achieve its objectives and the related policies, draw up guidelines 
on how resources should be distributed, and propose how the EU budget should 
be financed in the future. The mandate of the committee will last  until the 
Commission presents its proposal with figures for the next multi-annual financial 
framework, planned for July 2011. 
274 See European Parliament resolution of 2 9  M a r c h  2 0 0 7  o n  t h e  f u t u r e  o f  t h e  
European Union's own resource, point 34. Also, in its resolution of 25 March 2009 
on the Mid-Term Review of the 2007-2013 Financial Framework, Parliament 
pointed out that the reform of revenue and a review of expenditure “should be run 
in parallel with the aim of merging them in a global and integrated reform for a 
new system of EU financing and spending at the latest for the MFF starting in 
2016/2017” (see para. 9). 
275 See European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2005 on Policy Challenges and 
Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-2013, point 7. 
276 See European Parliament resolution of 25 March 2009 on the Mid-Term Review 
of the 2007-2013 Financial Framework, points 11, 12, 16. Parliament has also 
expressed concern (stressing the contradiction with the basic principles of the 
reform of 2000 following the White Paper) on the fact that the present budgetary 
cycle “tends to add one priority after another without taking any political decision 
as to issues that, given the limited resources available from the tax-payer, need to 
be scaled down in order to give way to the most crucial priorities” (see European 
Parliament resolution of 25 March 2009 on the ABB-ABM method as a 
management tool for allocating budgetary resources, para 13). Parliament has 
recently acknowledged “that the current economic climate might lead the 
budgetary authority to make some efforts towards reprioritisation within the 
budget in order to ensure the adequate funding of priorities (…)” (see European 
Parliament, Resolution of 22 September 2010 on the proposal for a Council 
regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2007-
2013, point vi). 
277 See European Parliament resolution of 24 April 2007 with comments forming an 
integral part of the decision on the discharge for implementation of the European 
Union general budget for the financial year 2005, Section III – Commission, points 
205 and 238. 
278 See European Parliament, Resolution accompanying the decision concerning 
discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European 
Union for the 2002 financial year, 21.4.2004, point 4. 
279 See Art. 211 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and Art. 
17(1) TEU. 
280 See Arts 3 TEU, 13(1) TEU and 7 TFEU. 
 THE EU BUDGET | 141 
 
                                                                                                                                       
281 See Art. 317 TFEU. 
282 See Art. 17(1) TEU, emphasis added. See also note 83. 
283 See Letter by President Barroso to the Members of the European Parliament, 7 
September 2010, MEMO/10/393. 
284 See European Commission, “Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe” 
(SEC(2007) 1188, 12.9.2007, point 2) and the summary of the experts’ contributions 
(SEC(2008) 2739, 3.11.2008, point 2). It is worth mentioning that an attempt to 
determine what the EU should be doing had been made by the Commission by 
identifying some criteria, such as “economies of scale”, the “need of a 
comprehensive approach with other EU financed policies” or of “lightening the 
burden on national budgets”. These criteria, however, were too vague to be made 
operational (See European Commission, Global appraisal of the budgetary 
problems of the Community, COM(78) 64, Brussels, 27 February, pp. 6-8). 
President Barroso has recently stated the need to “develop a much clearer doctrine 
of how we decide when action needs to be taken at EU level” (see European 
Commission, Political guidelines for the next Commission, op. cit., p. 39).  The 
European Court of Auditors has suggested that “[t]he concept of European added 
value should be articulated in a suitable political declaration or in EU legislation in 
order to provide guidance to the EU's political authorities to be used when 
choosing expenditure priorities” (See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No 
1/2010 “Improving the financial management of the European Union budget: 
Risks and challenges”, 14.1.2010, point 18). Tarschys (2005) examines the concept of 
EU added value and its use in various policy settings, suggesting some ways to 
convert it from an all-purpose argument into a better tool for policy choices. 
285 See Arts 3 TEU, 5(1) TEU and 311 TFEU. 
286 See Art. 5(3) TEU. 
287 See Art. 5 of the protocol on subsidiarity/proportionality attached to the Treaty 
of Lisbon. The Financial Regulation No 1605/2002, op. cit., establishes a link 
between ‘value for money’ and the setting of performance indicators in such a way 
that results can be assessed for each activity (see ‘whereas’ No 11 and Art. 27 (3)). 
288 See European Commission, “Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe” 
(SEC(2007) 1188, 12.9.2007, p. 5.  
289 This was one of the key assumptions underlying the Commission’s proposal 
concerning the 2007–13 financial framework (see European Commission, 
Communication on the Financial Perspective 2007–13, COM(2004) 487, 14.7.2004, 
page 5).  
290 As pointed out by J. Pelkmans, cited in Public Finances in the EU, Conference 
o r g a n i s e d  b y  t h e  B u r e a u  o f  E u r o p e a n  P o l i c y  A d v i s e r s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
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Commission, 3-4 April 2008, Brussels, p. 25 (proceedings available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/publications/docs/public_finances_we
b_version_en.pdf). 
291 See J. Monnet, (1978:316). 
292 Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030, Report to the European Council 
by the Reflection Group, May 2010, p. 5. 
293 For example the Council has taken the view that no increase of resources is 
needed for the current 2007-13 financial framework (see Ecofin Council 
conclusions on the budget guidelines for 2011 adopted on 16 March 2010, op. cit., 
p. 3). By contrast, Parliament has considered that needs cannot be met through 
redeployment or reprioritisation and that a revision of the multi-annual financial 
framework and of the flexibility mechanisms is necessary (see European 
Parliament, Resolution of 22 September 2010 on the proposal for a Council 
regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2007-
2013, point vii). A modification of the financial framework requires unanimity by 
the Council and the consent of the European Parliament (see Box 2 “An overview 
of the EU’s financial frameworks”). 
294 See President Barroso’s speech on the State of the Union 2010, 7.9.2010, 
SPEECH/10/411, p. 6. 
295 In this respect Parliament’s stance is that there is a need for “prior identification 
of positive and negative priorities rather than through self-imposed ceilings” (see 
European Parliament resolution of 25 March 2009 on the Mid-Term Review of the 
2007-2013 Financial Framework, para 11). 
296 For example, as noted by Parliament, “a large proportion of the Union’s 
objectives have been taken into account by the Member States in their national 
budgets” (see European Parliament resolution of 25 March 2009 on the Mid-Term 
Review of the 2007-2013 Financial Framework, para 18). Parliament also noted that 
since the EU budget is very limited compared to national budgets there is a need to 
create synergies between the EU budget and national budgets in order to 
implement common EU strategies. It stressed that coherence gives European 
policies greater impact, achieving true European added value  while supporting 
long-term policy objectives (see European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2010 on 
the mandate for the trilogue on the 2011 draft budget, para. 15). 
297 In this respect, president Barroso has indicated that where the added value of 
EU action can't be demonstrated, the Commission will support reductions. He has 
also stressed that spending on the right policies only makes real sense if it secures 
the desired results on the ground (see Statement of President Barroso on the 
budget review, 19 October 2010). 
298 J. Monnet, (1978:127). 
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299 See European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, Political guidelines 
for the next Commission, op. cit., p. 29.  
300 This logic is intrinsic in the concept of “value for money” set by Art. 27(3) of the 
Financial Regulation No. 1605/2002, op. cit. 
301 As an example, the Council recognises “the need to concentrate operations in 
regions on a limited number of priorities to ensure they have a tangible impact” 
(see Council conclusions on the Strategic report of 2010 by the Commission on the 
implementation of the Cohesion policy programmes, Press release, 14 June 2010, p. 
3). 
302 Gros (2008:17) argues that it should be easier to reach agreement on sunset 
clauses than on an explicit agreement to lower expenditure today, because a sunset 
clause’s impact is uncertain and lies in the future, thus generating much less 
opposition. Sunset clauses are a recognised element of good governance for 
reform. Organisational theory, empirical studies and experience all show that once 
a specific structure has been established, those who hold positions in the structure 
have a natural tendency to make it survive and grow even if it does not seem 
reasonable to outsiders (see Sigma 2007:34). Some kind of sunset clauses exist 
already in the current legislative framework, although ‘performance’ is very much 
dependent on the ‘spending’ rate rather than on achieving pre-determined results. 
For example, in the Cohesion policy, funds are de-committed if not used after a 
certain period (n+2 rule). 
303 See COM (2010) 700, op. cit, pp. 5-6. 
304 According to the proposal, the payment of the grants would be entirely based 
on the assessment of outputs/results, thus putting in place the conditions for a 
shift of the control efforts from the financial to the scientific side (See European 
Commission, “Simplifying the implementation of the Research Framework 
Programmes”, COM(2010)187, 29.4.2010, point 3.3, p. 10). A similar stance is taken 
by the Commission in its conclusions of the fifth report on economic, social and 
territorial cohesion (see COM (2010) 642, 9.11.2010), where the Commission 
delineates the future of Cohesion policy with a concentration of financial resources, 
the introduction of conditionality and incentives and a focus on results.  
305 See Auditor General of Canada (2002:5). 
306 See SEC(2007) 1188 final, 12.9.2007, p. 10. 
307 See Art. 17(1) TEU. 
308 See European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, Political guidelines 
for the next Commission, op. cit., p. 39.  
309 It is referred here to the general principles of EU law as stated by the EU Court 
of Justice (see for example Case-law No. 10/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie 
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Metallurgiche, società in accomandita semplice v High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community, Judgment of the Court of 13 June 1958, ECR. 1958, p. 
157). A delegation of powers can only involve clearly defined executive powers, 
the use of which must be entirely subject to the supervision by the delegating 
authority. As observed by the Court of Justice, since it replaces the choices of the 
delegator by the choices of the delegate, a delegation of powers implying a wide 
margin of discretion brings about an actual transfer of responsibility. Similarly, the 
Financial Regulation No 1605/2002, op. cit. (see Art. 54(1)) provides that “the 
implementing tasks delegated must be clearly defined and fully supervised as to 
the use made of them”, the delegation “shall comply with the principle of sound 
financial management” and no implementing tasks “may give rise to conflicts of 
interests”. In the event of shared management, this will require for example to re-
establish the principle that the Commission “shall first carry out document and on-
the-spot checks into the existence, relevance and proper operation within the 
entities to which it entrusts implementation, in accordance with the rules of sound 
financial management” of the procedures applied, of control systems, of 
accounting systems and procurement and grant award procedures. And shall 
review such arrangements periodically (see Box 4 “Systems assessment”).  
310 In its conclusions on the EU budget review the Commission puts forward the 
idea of a ‘Development and Investment Partnership Contract’ between the 
Commission and the member states, setting out the objectives to be achieved, how 
progress towards the achievement of these objectives will be quantified and 
measured and the allocation of national and EU resources among priority areas 
and programmes. Also, the Commission identifies the institutional capacity at 
national, regional and local level as key for successful development, 
implementation and monitoring of the policies. The allocation of EU financial 
resources should therefore take account of the capacity to effectively utilise these 
resources (see COM (2010) 700, op. cit, p. 14).  
311 Because of the national co-financing and/or because these bodies often manage 
other national funds. 
312 This refers to the concept of ‘fire alarm’ versus ‘police patrol’ oversight 
discussed in note 179.  
313 For example, this would imply re-establishing a systematic presence of the 
Commission on the ground, for example in the ‘monitoring committees’ on 
Cohesion policy which are in charge of assessing the effectiveness and quality of 
the implementation of operational programmes, by reviewing progress made 
towards achieving the specific targets and proposing suitable measures. This was 
the case in the previous programming period, while today the Commission’s 
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presence is optional (see Art. 64(2)) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006, op. 
cit.). 
314 See Art. 60(1) and (7) of the Financial Regulation n° 1605/2002, op. cit. 
315 See Art. 318 TFEU.  